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INTRODUCTION
1. Problem of the Dissertation: Investigation of
Hartmann's Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgments,
with Special Reference to the Relations between His
Appeals to Independent Intuitions (Atomism) and His
Appeals to Synoptic Intuitions (Coherence)
In Nicolai Hartmann's system of ethics we discover
two kinds of ethical convictions which are apparently incon-
sistent with each other. The first is the conviction that
ethical knowledge is revealed to us only through intuition
or Wertgefuhl^- and that solely out of an immediate Wertgefuhl
without regard to any synoptic survey can we know anything
about the realm of value s.^
Wertstrukturen sind eben ideale G-egenstande, Jenseits
alles realen Seins und Nichtseins, auch Jenseits des
realen Wertgefuhl, welches alleln sie erfasst.3
Wie die Dinge liegen, kennen wir selbst die wenigen uns
bekannten Zuge der Wert-Rangordnung lediglich aus
lt
dem
unmittelbaren Wertgefuhl, nicht aus konspektiver Uber-
schau.... Die Rolle des relationalen Kriteriums hier
auf ein Minimum reduziert 1st. Es tritt kaum in Funktion.
Und— so musste man schliessen--wenn emotionale Wertschau
wirklich absolut sein sollte, so bedarf es seiner auch
nicht. 4
1 Hartmann,
p Hartmann,
* Hartmann,
4 Hartmann,
Ethlk
,
107.
G-ME, 542.
Ethlk
, 107
G-ME, 542.

In smother context, however, Hartmann holds that through
coherent thought a unique Insight into ethical knowledge can
be obtained—an insight which is beyond the scope of any-
immediate intuition,
5
tt
Die Zusammenschau Uberlasst der wandernde Wertblick
der sekundaren Wertschau, die sich geschichtlich an den
Stadien dieser Wanderung das Material aufliest. Die
Aufgabe der philosophischen Ethik im G-egensatz zur posi-
tlven Moral ist hlermlt, eindeutig gekennzeichnet . Ihr
Nachteil, ihr Sekundarsein, ihre Abhangigkeit hat als
Kehrseite den Vorzug, dass sie durch lhren Umfang, d. h.
eben durch ihr Nachfolgen und Zusammenschauen, etwas durch
aus Neues und Eigenartiges erschaut ; die Zusammenhange,
die Ordnung, die das Wertreich selbst durchziehenden
Relationen und G-esetzlichkeiten. Fur sie sind eben die
Stadien jener Wanderung nicht verloren. In ihr sind sie
aufgehoben und zusammengefugt . Ihre Tendenz geht auf
das System der Werte.°
A similar conviction is expressed in the following passages
in which Hartmann holds that one's Wertgefuhl is so limited
that it cannot always discern the syntheses of moral values,
while every value reaches true fulfilment only in its syn-
thesis with all the others and that synoptic thought, com-
pared with Wertblick
.
is more adequate in grasping the
entire gradational ladder of moral values, with which
morality in the full and genuine sense has to do.
Dass wir statt ihrer nur die Antithetik der Werte sehen,
beruht eben darauf, dass wir die Wertsynthesen zu lhnen
nicht konkret zu erfassen vermttgen, wle sehr wir auch mit
5 Hartmann, Ethik
. 38, 144, 245, 267, 496, 518, 526,
527, 534, 535, 540,~5567 557.
6 Xbld ,. p. 144.

unserem Wertgeftthl nach ihnen tasten. Die eigentllchen
Tugenden wiirden auch hier erst die Synthesen sein. . .
.
Sofern aber die Antithetik der Werte sich abgestuft
durch das ganze Wertreich hindurchzieht , so ergibt sich
die Konsequenz, dass isollerte Werte fur sich uberhaupt
nicht bestehen, dass vielmehr jeder Wert nur in Synthese
mit anderen zu seiner wahren Sinnerfullung kommt—und
zwar der Idee nach schliesslich in Synthese mit alien.'
Druckt mann das posltlv aus, so besagt die Synthese
zwischen Vorzug der Starke und Vorzug der Hohe nicht
s
als dieses, dass Sittlichkeit im vollen und echten Sinne
es immer zugleich mit der ganzen Stufenleiter der sitt-
lichen Werte zu tun hat, dass die niederen Werte niemals
gleichgultig werden um der hBheren willen, wie diese
niemals entbehrlich werden um der fundamentaleren willen.
Bedenkt man, wie sehr die Enge menschlich-endlichen Wert-
bewusstseins gerade in diesem Funkt zur Einseitigkeit
neigt, wie labil sein Gleichgewicht gerade an dieser
G-renzscheide ist, so leuchtet es ein, dass diese Forderung
eine eminent praktische und aktuelle ist; und am meisten
fur den, der am hBchsten hinaus tendiert, derm bei ihm
sind die elementaren Grundlagen am meisten gefahrdet.8
To take Hartmann seriously would mean, on the one
hand, that ethical knowledge which is atomistically intui-
tive is always right and, on the other, that ethical
knowledge is never right until it is tested by coherent
thought. Thus there is an inconsistency between his appeals
to independent intuitions (atomism) and his appeals to
synoptic intuitions (coherence). Hence this dissertation
aims to examine more comprehensively the relations between
these two kinds of appeals, in hope of investigating his
criterion of the truth of value judgments.
7 lPid . t 526.
8 Ibid ., 556.

In this dissertation we deal also with the problem
of belief in God, a belief which he rejects on metaphysical,
moral, and theological grounds. We aim to test whether or
not his reasons for atheism rest on an appeal to coherence.
2. Previous Work in the field
a. August Messer' s View
August Messer, in his Wertphilosophie der Gegenwart9
accurately represents Hartmann's Ethik which he regards as
highly important ( hochbedeutsam)
.
As to the essence of values, Messer says, Hartmann
rejects Nietzsche's valuational relativism. If Nietzsche's
teaching of the re-valuation of values ("Lehr von der
Umwertung der Werte") were true, we could create and annihi-
late them, and they would be as arbitrary as fancies.^ In
the valuational domian what is invented by man has no power
over man, no power to convince his his feeling. His Wertgefiihl
has in it something unaccommodating; it has a law of its own.
Values have an essence which is independent of all con-
trivance and likewise independent of all longing. Indeed
values are self-existent ideal objects ("an sich seiende
ideale Gegenstande")
; they are not actual objects. When the
9 Messer, WdG, 12-20, 34-39, 49-52.
10
Ibid
. , 12.

5subject perceives them they are perceived a priori and as
contents which are independent of all experience ("von keiner
Erfahrung abhangige Inhalte"). 11
Hartmann's values are ideal essences and are differ-
ent from Plato's ideas which he regarded as truly actual
essences ( "wahrhaft wirkliche Wesenhelten" ) , Messer regards
these Platonic wirkliche Wesenheiten as an inadmissible
hypostatization ("eine unzulassige Hypostaslerung" )
.
12
Messer points out that Hartmann's values are not
formal, contentless forms ("formale, gehaltlose Gebilde")
but materials or structures, which constitute a special
source of things, relations and persons ("ein spezifisches
Quale an Dingen, Verhaltnissen, Personen"). Values are not
directly comprehensible by thought; rather they are directly
comprehensible only to an inner view ( eine lnnere Schau )
.
By the inner view Hartmann understands the valuational
feeling which is illustrated in acts of attitude, approval
and disposition ("das Wertfuhlen, das sich in Akten der
Stellungnahme, Billigung, G-esinnung dokumentiert" ) . That
which is set over against the subject as something inde-
pendent, something irremovable ("als Unabhangiges, Unver-
-
LJ
- Messer, WdG, 13.
12 Ibid., 13; a consideration of Plato's ideas in
comparison with Hartmann's values will appear in Chapter II,
4 of this disseratation (pages 119-126).

ruckbares" )— that which the subject may grasp or miss but
cannot arbitrarily change—this has for him the character
of self-existence (Ansichseln ) . The act of perceiving the
values is a transcendental act and in this perception the
subject is purely receptive and submissive. The values
determine him but he on his part determines nothing (" es
selbst aber bestimmt seinerseits nichts" )."^
Messer points out that according to Hartmann, an
Ought is contained in the essence of value, but this ideal
and pure Ought -to-Be is not equivalent to the Ought-to-Do.
From the fact that something is valuable does not follow
the fact that someone ought to do it. The ideal Ought-to-
Be is the mode of being of the value. Though value and
Ought-to-Be belong together indissolubly they are not
identical; the Ought means the direction toward something
("die Richtung auf etwas"), the value that something toward
which the direction goes.l^"
By means of these phenomenological considerations
( phanomenologl sche Betrachtungen ) concerning the essence
of value Hartmann comes to the conclusion that values have
a self-existence and over against the valuing subject they
x3 Messer, WdG, 13-14
14 Ibid .. 14.

7IShave absoluteness. v
Here Messer completely agrees with Hartmann. "Ich
glaube, dass in dieser Frage Hartmann richtig das Wesen der
Werte geschaut hat." Messer is impressed by Hartmann'
s
argument that Wertrelativismus does not do Justice to the
fact of experience that we must feel, view and think values
as something self-existent and that we find them as inde-
pendent of our caprice and all contrivance ("als unabhangig
von unserer Willkur und allem Erfinden" ) Messer main-
tains that if valuational objectivism such as Hartmann'
s
were not true, then our value experience would be dependent
upon natural inclination, craving, and experiences of
pleasure and displeasure. xo
As to Hartmann* s view of valuational knowledge
(Werterkenntnls ) Messer points out that Werterkentnls is
above all a Wertgefuhl which is a primary, immediate contact
of feeling with the valuable ("ein primares, unmittelbares
Fuhlunghaben mit dem Wertvollen" ) . Wertgefuhl has a valu-
ational orientation of its own ( eine elgene Wertorientier-
ung ) . It is an independent, autonomous power in man ( ,1 eine
15 Messer, WdG, 14-15
16 15.
17 Ibid .
18 Ibid.

selbstandige, selbsttatlge Macht im Menschen"), which Is
independent of his will (Wlllen ) . Through Wertgefuhl
numerous values arise in us, without being grasped directly
by thought. Their structure becomes illuminated ( durch-
leuchtet ) only in the philosophy of value
According to Hartmann, Messer says, the essence
(Wesen ) of value is supertemporal ( uberzeitlich ) . Wert -
bewusstsein cuts ( schneidet ) , from time to time, a small
circle of the perceived ("ein klelner Umkreis des Er-
schauten" ) out of the total realm of values. This indi-
cates a narrowness of valuational consciousness ("die Enge
des Wertbewusstselns" ) . With a growing range of the
valuational consciousness, however, its intensity and
immediacy diminish ( "Aber mit wachsendem Umfang des Wert-
bewusstselns nimmt seine Intensitat und Unmlttelbarkeit
ab"). 20
Messer agrees with Hartmann in that the element of
preference ("das moment des Vorziehens") lies necessarily
in the primary Wertfuhlen
,
through which the height of a
value is immediately given to us. With the belief (which
is common to Scheler and Hartmann, says Messer) that the
gradation of values itself is something absolutely
19 Ibid .. 16.
20 Ibid
.. 17.

9unchangeable is combined the fact that actual preference
in the course of history changes greatly. 21
The knowledge of values is not valid a posterior but
it is valid a priori, independent of experience. In order
to know whether and in what way an instance of experience
is valuable man must have in his Wertgefuhl a valuational
standard (Wertmassstab )
.
22
Messer points out that Hartmann's understanding of
a priori valid knowledge is different from Kant's. Kant
could not conceive an Apriori, which was not produced by
the subject. For Kant there were only two possibilities;
either a value is abstracted from things ( Dlngen ) or
natural impulses (Trieben) in us--in which case its knowl-
edge is valid solely a posteriori--or it is dictated by the
willing subject ("vom wollenden Subjekt diktiert" ) --and
hence value is not objective. Messer agrees with Hartmann
in that the concept of the Apriori does not originate from
the subject nor from his reason (Vernunf
t
) . Nor is it
found in real empirical objects. 2 -^ Values, even when they
are objectively valid, are not laws of being ( Selnsgesetze )
;
they are not realized in all actuality ("nicht in allem
21 Ibid.
,
17-18.
22 Ibid., 18.
23 Ibid., 19.

10
Wirkllchen realisiert" ) . Hence the fact that they do not
agree ( ubereinstimmen ) with the actual does not count against
their objectivity. Thus the apriority of values hovers in
the air, as it were ("die Aprioitat der Werte schwebt
gleichsam in der Luft"). The whole responsibility for the
legitimacy ( Rechtmasslgkeit ) and objectivity ( Objektivitat )
of the valuational standard ( Wertungsmassstab ) rests upon
Wertgefuhl itself. 24
Messer goes on to describe Hartmann's view of the
system of values. Both Messer and Hartmann do not believe
in a system where one value takes the lead ("ein Wert an die
Spitze trete") but in a systematic unification of manifold
values ("ein systemartiger Zusammenschluss mannigfaltiger
Werte") without having one supreme unity. Messer refers to
Hartmann's belief in the ideal table of values ( die ideal
e
Werttafel ) , which is united ( elnheitllch ) and absolute
( absolut ) and transcends the multiplicity of historical
25tables of values.
In considering the system of values a relationship
between values has to be considered. Hence Messer refers to
Hartmann's view of the relation of conditioning ("das Ver-
haltnis der Fundlerung" ) . Properly moral values do not
24 Ibid., 20.
25 Ibid
., 34-35.

11
cling to things and relations of things but to persons
alone. Only acts of persons can be good or bad. Further,
a moral relation is always a relation to persons, but it is
at the same time always a relation in reference to something
valuable and something contrary to value. For example, the
moral value of truthfulness is conditioned upon the value
of the true assertion for the other person.
Where moral values and disvalues should appear in
persons, there a world of real goods must already be
present, for to such goods as objects the acts of persons
refer. This Fundierungsverhaltnls is irreversible (umkehr -
bar) . The conditioning value is a material of a higher
axiological formation. In every other way the conditioned
value is independent of it. This conditioning is merely
material and not axiological. 2
'''
Hartmann maintains, Messer says, that in the realm
of values the assumption of a single gradation of values
is not tenable. Vertical ( senkrecht ) to the scale ( Skala )
of each valuational height ( Werthohe ) is a coordinate
relation of various values upon the same valuational height
("eln Koordinationsverhaltnis verschiedener Werte auf
gleicher Werthohe"). Thus the System der Werte is many-
26 Ibid
. , 35.
2? Ibid
.. 35-36.

dimensional ( mehrdlmenslonal ) and the Werthtthe is only one
of the many dimensions. 2^
Messer agrees with Hartmann in that the thought that
there is a united, ideal system of values ("ein einhelt-
liches, ideeles Wert system" ) , in which we can perceive the
exact place ( Ort ) and rank (Rang) of each value,—the
thought of such a Wertsy stem is not self-understood ( selbst -
verstandllch ) . Even if there were such a system we have no
sufficient knowledge of it. Hence we cannot solve ( lBsen )
valuational conflicts either by means of a table of values
(Werttaf el ) or on the ground of Wertgefuhl . Though Wert -
konflikte cannot be solved ( gelost ) they can be decided
( entschleden ) ; in other words, a person, through an inde-
pendent procedure can take upon himself the responsibility
and guilt. If man could solve the conflict by perceiving
( erschauend ) its axlologically sufficient solution, then he
would have nothing to decide; he would need only to follow
the perceived solution ( die geschaute L8 sung ) , The given
situations of life, however, are not such. From step to
step in life man must decide, without being able to solve
the conflicts. Hence he must be free in the sense of being
capable of a genuine initiative ( echte Initiative )
.
29
28 Ibid
., 37.
29 Ibid
. ,
38.

13
This is, on the whole, an accurate summary of
Hartmann's view. Messer exactly represents Hartmann's
views of Wertgefuhl , the 7/esen der Werte, Werterkennt nis t
and the Rangordnung der Werte . And from time to time
Messer indicates that he is an advocate of Hartmann's
ethics. 50
Messer fails to represent Hartmann correctly, how-
ever, in two respects. First, in describing the theoreti-
cal construction of Hartmann's system, Messer mentions only
the Fundlerungsverhaltnls , while Hartmann contemplates,
besides this relation, seven other relations which are
equally signif icant--the Schichtungsverhaltnis ,^ the
G-egensatzverhaltnls , 32 the Wertsynthese 1 33 the Komplementclr -
verhaltnls , ^ the Werthflhenverhaltnis , 35 the Wertstarken-
verhaltnls .36 the Wertindlf ferenz . 37
Secondly, Messer fails to indicate that Hartmann
30 ibid
. , 12, 13, 15, 49.
51 Hartmann, Ethik
,
500-511.
32 Ibid., 512-532.
33 ibid .
34 Ibid
., 532-541.
35 IblcU, 541-557.
36 Ibid
.
37 ibid
., 558-564.

does not believe in religious values at all and the reasons
why he is atheistic.
Because of these omissions Messer fails to present a
synoptic view of Hartmann's system.
However, on the whole, Messer holds to Hartmann's
ethics so closely that our critical evaluation found in the
first and second chapters of this dissertation may he
applicable to Messer also.
b. Werner Brock's View
Werner Brock in his An Introduction to Contemporary
G-erman Philosophy 38 regards Hartmann as one of the "few
especially prominent personalities" of contemporary G-erman
philosophy. According to Brock, Hartmann has modelled his
view under the influence of phenomenology, especially in
its more realistic tendency as represented by Max Scheler,
Moritz G-eiger and Alexander Pfander. Hartmann is concerned
with an ontology of different spheres of reality (matter,
life, soul, mind) in the sense that he treats of the
problems, underlying the different sciences, in their indi-
vidual character and their insolubility. Brock believes
that Hartmann is pre-eminent for his thorough and penetrating
38 Brock, ICG?, 89

15
analysis of his problems. 59
Brock is right in holding that Hartmann is a master
of analysis. His analytic genius is shown everywhere in his
Ethik
,
especially in his sections, ''Die Allgemeinsten Wert-
gegensatze"40 and "Zur Oesetzlichkeit der Werttafel.
"
4l
But all analysis must be completed by synopsis. And since
Hartmann is pre-eminently an analytic thinker he is apt to
miss a view of the whole, which is vital in metaphysics.
Hence we have reasons to disagree with Hartmann in many
metaphysical problems, to which the second and third chap-
ters of this dissertation refer.
c. Johannes Hessen* s View
In his Wertphilo sophle He s sen points out that Hartmann
is an advocate of phenomenological philosophy of values
("die phanomenologische Wertphilosophie" J.^2 The founder of
this philosophy, says Hessen, is Max Scheler. His great
work, Der Formal lsmus in der Ethik und die materiale Wert -
ethik, is an attempt to apply ( anzuwenden ) to the realm of
values the phenomenological method which was introduced into
39 ibid
. ,
90-91.
40 Hartmann, Ethik
, 267-305.
41 Ibid
., 495-564.
42 Hessen, Wertphilo sophle
.
18.

philosophy by Husserl ("die von Husserl In die Phllosophie
eingefuhrte phanomenologische Methode").^ The results so
gained are in keeping with Brentano's philosophy: in
opposition to psychologism ( Psy chologismus ) and to axiologism
( Wertlogismus )^ values are defined as objective qualities
which are comprehended in the acts of intentional feeling
("in Akten des intentionalen Fuhlens). Upon the foundation
laid by Scheler Hartmann builds his ethics. While Scheler
holds to valuational objectivism (Wertobj ektivismus ) Hart-
mann goes further and holds to valuational ontologism
(Wertontologlsmus ) t in the sharpest antithesis to every val-
uational relativity (Wertrelatlvismus ) value is defined as
an ideal self-existence (ein ldeales An-slch-sein ) . ^5 For
Hartmann the realm of values is a self-subsistent , inde-
pendent world of being ( Selnswelt ) ; the realm of values is
independent not in the sense of real existence ("nicht im
Sinhe der realen Existenz" ) but in the sense of objective
ideal being ("im Sinne des objektlven idealen Seins")^6
Hessen criticizes Hartmann' s ethics by saying that in
43 ibid.; See Husserl, IPpP, 1-6, 48-57, 108-141,
265-323.
^ Brightman stated in a note of December 6, 1940
that Wertloglsmus means "appeal to value as a criterion of
truth and Psy chologlsmus
, "appeal to psychological method
as a criterion of truth."
45 Hessen, ?/ertphllosophie
. 18.
46 Ibid
., 20.

17
it value is taken out of its context with its relation to
the valuing subject. Hessen is right when he regards this
as an inadmissible hypostasization ("eine unzulassige
Hypostasierung" ) . Hessen points out that Hartmann used to
hold to neo-Kantian subjectivism and functionalism but that
he has reacted against it and now holds to ontologism
( Qntologismus ) which is equally one-sided. Hessen believes
that value is not, as Hartmann maintains, something which
subsists in itself ("ein an sich Seiendes") but something
which exists for someone ("ein fur jemand Seiendes").
Hessen regards it as impossible to eliminate from the con-
cept of value (Wertbegrif
f
) the relation to a value-
experiencing spirit ("die Bezlehung auf einen werterlebenden
Geist") without destroying the Wertbegrif
f
.
47
Concerning the problem of evil Hessen agrees with
Hartmann when the latter maintains that evil is just as real
as the perfect and the good ("das Vollkommene und Gute"
)
and that evil cannot be explained away. 48 Both Hessen and
Hartmann agree that a theoretical solution of this problem
is impossible, though Hessen maintains that this problem
can be solved practically ( praktisch ) since we overcome
evil through moral deed ("indem wir durch die sittliche
47 lbid-» 31-32.
48 Ibid
. , 58, footnote.

18
Tat das Bttse uberwlnden" )
.
^
Hessen' s consideration of the gradation of values
("die Rangordnung der Werte") is much influenced by Scheler
and Hartmann. Hessen holds that values are not only dis-
tinguishable from one another but also stand in a fixed
gradation to one another. The order of values (Wertordnung )
has a hierarchlal structure ("eine hierarchische
Struktur" )
.
50
As to the criteria of the valuational rank ("Kriterien
des Wertranges") Hessen accepts Scheler* s five criteria and
then goes further to maintain with Hartmann that Wertgefuhl
is more finely discriminating than any of Scheler' s five
criteria.
Scheler* s criteria to which Hessen refers are as
follows: 52
1. Values are relatively higher the more enduring
they are: 2. Values are so much the higher, the less the
quality of their carrier increases with its extension and
decreases with its division: 3. Compared with the values
^9 Ibid
.. 58.
5° IM£«> 87; See pages 129-133 of this dissertation,
where we present our criticism of a scale of values.
51 Hessen, Wertphilosophle
.
87-92.
52 Ibid
., 87-89.
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which are dependent, the value which is fundamental ( der
fundierende Wert) is the higher: 4. There exists an
essential relation between valuational height and the depth
of satisfaction ("die Tlefe der Befriedigung" ) which ac-
companies the consciousness of fulfilment of value: 5. An
Indication of the height of a value consists in the degree
of relativity to some specific valuational feeling. The
value which is the less relative in this sense is the
higher,
Hessen agrees with Hartmann in that Wertgefuhl is
more finely discriminating than any of Scheler's five
criteria. Hessen points out that Hartmann, influenced by
Hildebrand's theory of valuational response ("Theorie der
Wertantwort" ) , believes that for every value there is only
one kind of emotional reaction which corresponds to its
essence (
rl Es fur jeden Wert nur eine seinem Wesen ent-
sprechende Art der gefuhlsmassigen Reaktion gibt" ) • Every
living feeling of value is already primarily related to a
scale of values. "Alles konkrete Wertgefuhl 1st bereits
primar auf eine Rangordnung bezogen."^
Making use of these criteria, Hessen contemplates
53 Ibid., 89-90, footnote; Hildebrand, "Die Idee der
sittlichen Handlung," Jahrbuch f. Philos. u. phan. For-
schung, III, 1916, p. 162 ff.
S4 Hessen, Wertphilosophle
. 89-92; Hartmann, Ethik,
260.

20
a Rangordnung der Werte In which there are three classi-
fications:
1. Spiritual (geistig) values are higher than
sensuous (sinnlich) values. Hessen says that the application
of Scheler's criteria makes this evident. 55
2. Within the class of spiritual values ethical
values are higher than logical and aesthetic values. Ethic-
cal values are characterized by the marks of unconditioned
validity ("die Merkmale der unbedlngten G-eltung" ) . 56
3. The highest values are religious values because
all the rest of values are dependent upon them. 57
Concerning "die Gnoseologie der Werte," Hessen
points out that Hartmann is much influenced by Scheler who
maintains that the organ of valuational knowledge is not
understanding but feeling ("Das Organ der Werterkenntnis
1st nicht der Verstand, sondern das G-efuhl").58 Even more
strongly than Scheler, says Hessen, does Hartmann emphasize
the intuitive character of valuational knowledge ("in-
tultiver Gharakter der Werterkenntnis" ); 59 for Hartmann
55 Hessen, Wertphilosophie
, 90.
56 90-91.
57 Ibid
., 91.
58 Scheler, FEMW, 262; Hessen, Wertphilosophi e. 94.
Hessen, Wertphilo sophle
. 96.
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Wertfuhlen means a beholding of value ( eln Wertschauen )
and valuational knowledge is not a neutral comprehending
(kein neutrales Erfassen ) but an act by which man is cap-
tured ( ein £rfasstsein ) . "Man ist ergriffen, gepackt von
dem, was einem als wertvoll und seinsollend einleuchtet
^
In his consideration of human being ( "Betrachtung des
menschlichen Wesens") Hessen holds to Hartmann* s ontological
consideration of personality.
Wir halten uns dabei im wesentlichen an die Gedankengange,
die N. Hartmann im ersten Teil seines Buches: Das Problem
des gelstigen Seins entwickelt hat. 62
Hessen agrees with Hartmann in that since the world
(Weltwirklichkeit ) has the character of stratification and
man is, to a certain degree, a condensation ( Zu sammenfassung )
of the world, he too participates in the stratificational
character of the world. In consequence, man is a stratified
being ( ein geschicht etes Wesen ) . ^3
The lowest stratum is that of the physical -material
( Physisch-Materiellen ) . It is the inorganic nature, the
world of inanimate body ("die Welt der unbelebten K8rper" )
,
60 Ibid .
61 Hartmann, Deutsche systemat lsche Phllosophle naoh
lhren G-estalten
. herausgegeben von H. Schwarz, Bd. I,
Berlin 1931, 324.
62 Hessen, Wertphllosophie
,
160-161.
65 Ibid
., 161.
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which is extended ( ausgedehnt ) and exhibits a juxtaposition
of parts ("ein Nebeneinander von Tell en" ). 64
Upon the inorganic is raised the realm of the
organic ("das Reich des Organischen" ) . The organic contains
the inorganic in itself and depends upon the Inorganic. The
law of the physical-material stretches into the organic
realm. ^5
Above the stratum of the organic comes that of the
psychical being ( seelisches Seln ) . This is essentially
different from the organic life in that the former possesses
consciousness ( Bewusstseln ) which is lacking in the latter. 66
Above the psychical stratum is raised the spiritual
being ( das geist ige Sein) as the highest layer. It means a
novelty ( ein Novum ) over against the psychical realm. This
novelty consists of volition ( Wollen ) , action ( Handeln )
,
valuation (Wertung ) t ethics ( Ethos ) , religion ( Religion )
and art (Kunst). These realms tower above ( ragen hinaus)
the realm of psychic phenomena ("das Reich der psychischen
Phanomene" ) . 67
64 Ibid
.
65 Ibid
.
66 Ipld
-
.
161-162.
67 Ibid
.
, 162.
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Even here, however, the same relation to the lower
being is present. The spiritual being does not hover in the
air ("schwebt nicht in der Luft"). It is supported by the
psychical being just as the psychical realm is supported by
the organic, which in turn is supported by the material. 68
Concerning the stratif icational constitution of the
world and man Hartmann discovers three laws to which Hessen
holds.
1. Each stratum has its own principles ( Prinziplen )
,
laws ( Jesetze ) or categories ( Kategorien ) . The particular
feature of one stratum cannot be explained by the categories
of another stratum. 69
2. In the stratification of the world, the higher
stratum is always supported by the lower.
Es handelt sich also um eine durchgangige Abhangigkeit
des Httheren vom Niederen: ohne materielle Natur kein
Leben, ohne Leben kein Bewusstseln, ohne Bewusstsein
keine geistige 7/elt. 70
It is impossible to reverse ( umkehren) the direction of
this dependence. 71 Hartmann calls this law the law of
strength (3-esetz der Starke). 72
68 IM£., 162.
69 Hartmann, PgS, 15; Hessen, Wertphilo sophie , 163.
7° Hartmann, PgS, 15; Hessen, Wertphilosophie , 163.
71 Ibid
.
72 Hartmann, Ethik
, 544; Hartmann, PgS, 15; Hessen,
Wertphilosophie
,
163-164.

3. The dependence which is indicated by the (reset
z
der Starke does not cancel the independence of each higher
stratum of a lower. The particular formation and peculi-
arity of the higher has unlimited scope ( unbegrenzter
Spielraum ) over against the lower. The novelty which
appears in the higher stratum is the independence ( Selb -
standlgkelt ) or freedom ( Freiheit ) of the higher category.
To the Gesetz der Starke is thus added the law of freedom
( 3-esetz der Freiheit ) ; these two laws counterbalance each
other. 73
Hessen agrees with Hartmann in that these two laws
combined enable us to realize the inadequacy of every
monistic explanation of the world ( We 11 erklare
n
) whose
process of explanation is either exclusively from above
( von oben ) or exclusively from below ( von unten ) . The
G-esetz der Starke is opposed to the first kind of world-
view, and the G-esetz der Freiheit forbids the second kind. 74
Hessen compares Scheler with Hartmann as to their
attitude toward what is called the phanomenolofilsch.es
Wesensgesetz
. According to Scheler, this law which is the
law of correlation between act and object ("das G-esetz der
Korrelation von Akt und G-egenstand" ) is the most important
73 Hessen, Wertphllosophle
. 164.
74 Hartmann, PgS, 16; Hessen, Wertphllosophle , 164-
165.
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means of thinking ( der wlcht listen G-edankenmittel ) which
enables us to infer the existence of an absolute spirit
("das Dasein eines absoluten Geistes"). This law states:
Da das Sein der Welt selbst vom zufRlligen Dasein
des Erdenmenschen und seinem empirischen Bewusstsein mit
Sicherheit unabhangig ist, da aber gleichwohl strenge
Wesenszusammenhange bestehen zwischen gewissen Klassen
gelstiger Akte und bestimmt en Seinsregionen, zu denen
wir Zugang durch diese Aktklassen gewinnen--muss dem
Qrunde aller Dinge alles das an Akten und Operatlonen
zugeschrieben werden, was uns verg&nglichen Wesen diesen
Zugang gibt. 75
Hessen points out that this proposition concerning
the essential relation between act and object ("der Satz vom
We sens zusaminenhang zwischen Akt und G-egenstand" ) is regarded
by Scheler as unconditionally valid (unbedingtgttlt lg)
.
Hartmann who also stands on the ground of phenomenology
("Boden der Phanomenologie" ) , however, doe^ not accept this
law, though he bases his ethics on the foundation laid by
Scheler. For Hartmann values are self-subsist ing essences
which require no subjective correlate at all. 76
Hessen does not regard the phanomenologlsches
Wesengesetz as unconditionally valid but finds an element
of truth in it: values are relative to the spirit that
appreciates them; they exist for the spirit ("Die Werte sind
75 Scheler, Philosophlsche Weltanschauung , 11 f
;
Hessen, Wertphilosophie
,
241-242.
76 Hessen, 7/ertphllosophle
. 242-243.

fur den G-eist da"). Hessen maintains that this relation of
values to the spirit indicates their origination from the
life of an absolute spirit. Hessen admits that here he is
guided not so much by a logical compulsion of reason
("logischer Zwang der ratio") as by the characteristic
feature of a deep and living persuasion of the dignity of
/ ii S
spiritual values ( Zug einer tiefen und lebendigen Uber-
zeugung von der Dignitat der geistigen Werte").??
There is another way in which Hessen disagrees with
Hartmann. As Hessen points out, in Hartmann's philosophy
the metaphysics of moral values culminates in proving that
man is free and has the Dower to commit himself to values
and actualize ( verwirkllchen ) them. Hessen maintains, how-
ever, that exactly that which is proved by Hartmann demands
an explanation. Here Hessen wonders why actuality ( Wlr-
klichkeit ) at its highest (spiritual) stage exhibits the power
to actualize values. This fact finds its valid explanation
( vollgultige Erklarung ) only in the thought that actuality
at its very foundation is constructed for values ( "fur die
Werte angelegt"), that the primal cause ( Urgrund ) of being
is a valuational power (Wertmacht ) and valuational actuality
(Wertwlrklichkelt )
.
78
77
» 243-244.
78 Ibid
. ,
245-246.
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In considering the problem of theodicy (Theodizee-
problem ) Hessen theoretically agrees with Hartmann, though
practically Hessen solves the problem thelstically while
Hartmann remains an atheist throughout. Hessen holds that
we cannot harmonize the fact of evil ("die Tatsache des
Ubels") with the existence of a perfect ( vollkommen )
,
almighty ( allmachtlg ) and infinitely good ( allgUtlg) God. 79
Hessen regards the following remark by Hartmann as decisive:
To explain evil as unreal ( nlchtig ) does not help us to
solve the problem of theodicy, for by so doing we obliterate
the reality of evil.^ Since Hartmann has in mind an idea
of God who is an infinite and perfect spiritual person
("unendllche und vollkommene Geist esperson" or the uni-
versal, absolutely all-inclusive being ("das universale,
absolut allumfassende Wesen") 82 he regards the problem of
theodicy as unsolvable. Hessen holds, however, that
theoretically we cannot solve the problem of evil but practi-
cally we can solve it because we overcome evil through
moral act ("Wir durch die sittliche Tat das Bose Uber-
79 Ibid ., 57.
Ibid., 58, footnote; Hartmann, Zur Grundlegun^
der Qntologle
, 62.
81 Hartmann, Ethik
, 217.
82 Ibid., 225.
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winden"
)
83
Hessen's contention that we overcome evil through
moral act agrees with Baron von Hugel ' s thought that
Christianity cannot completely explain evil but has im-
mensely increased the capacity which issues in a practical
transcendence and transformation of sorrow, pain and sin. 8^
However, when Hessen holds that evil cannot be harmonized
with the existence of a perfect and almighty God he reminds
us of Kant when he wrote about the teleological argument
for God:
The utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove
is an architect of the world who is always very much
hampered by the adaptability of the material in which
he works, not a creator of the world to whose idea every-
thing is subject. 85
Concerning this Brightman would say that here the
evidence points to a finite G-od, yet both Kant 8^ and Hessen
decline to consider the conception. 8? As long as we hold
a priori that God is almighty and infinite the problem of
83 Hessen, Wertphilosophle t 58.
84 Hugel, EAPR, First Series, 111.
85 Kant, KrV (tr. N. K. Smith), A627 (B655), quoted
by Brightman in his POR, 294-295.
86 The attributes of God which Kant had in mind are
allmachtlg
,
unendllch (Kant, KrV, A595) and allgenugsam
(KrV, A627) and so forth. —
8? Brightman, POR, 294-295.
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theodicy must remain unsolved. °
Hessen points out that one of the. greatest problems
for Hartmann is the Augustinian problem of grace ( Gnade ) and
freedom. Hartmann' s solution of this problem, compared with
Augustine's, points exactly in the opposite direction.
While Augustine emphasizes grace at the cost of freedom
("auf Kosten der Freihelt" ) and makes human causality
( Kausalltat ) absorbed ( auf&esogen ) by divine causality, Hart-
mann emphasizes human freedom at the cost of grace, human
activity (Wlrksamkelt ) at the cost of divine causality.
Hessen goes on to say that what Augustine could see Hartmann
overlooks; namely, here the problem is about a polarity
( Polarltat ) which constitutes perhaps the deepest secret
( Gehelmnls ) of our being. Hessen holds that we cannot suc-
cessfully explain this problem in a formula which is free
from logical objection ("eine logisch einwandfrele Formel" ).
The religious person knows, says Hessen, that religion is
life (Leben) and not theory ( Theorie ) and that his innermost
certainties will never be shaken ( erschuttert ) if he finds
it impossible theoretically to represent the life of the
holy in a conceptual construction (Begriffsgefuge)
88 See Brightman's, The Problem of God, The Finding
of God, Personality and Religion , and A Philosophy of
Religion
.
89 Hessen, Wertphlloaophle
.
210-211.
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Hessen is right if he means here that there is
always an element of mystery in our knowledge of God and
that the clearest vision is most keenly aware of the inex-
haustible abysses of our religious life. And we do not take
Hessen to mean to hold with Calvin that disquisitions on the
essence of G-od are cold and frivolous, 9° or with a modern
humanist that our belief in G-od is merely an idealistic
dream. 91 Hessen' s position, then, is not contradictory to
that of a thinker who holds that theism is philosophically
well-grounded and that we must tell our stories of Him as
best we can, though it may be that when we have done that
silence is better. 92
Hessen says that Augustine emphasizes grace at the
cost of freedom but N. P. Williams represents Augustine's
93
view in a different way. Williams admits that on
Augustine's view of grace real freedom of choice cannot
exist in fallen man, for his will is invariably determined
by concupiscence, nor yet in the elect, for in them the
will is moulded by grace. 94- Nevertheless, Augustine himself,
90 Calvin, Institutes
.
Bk. I, Chap. II, ii.
91 See Horton, TMM, 44-86.
92 Calhoun, GCC, 249.
95 Williams, GG, 19-43.
94 Ibid
. , 29.
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says Williams, never admitted that he had denied free will
either to the unregenerate or to the elect ;95 in fallen man
the will is now hampered by the tyranny of the passions, so
that heart-breaking effort is needed to overcome them, and
yet, our freedom is real, though limited: to believe or not
to believe, to welcome or to reject G-od's call, is within
our own power, and belongs to the exercise of that god-given
responsibility which could not be eradicated from our per-
sonality without destroying it. 96
What Hessen says about Augustine is more applicable
to Barth's idea of grace. As Baillie points out in his
Our Knowledge of G-od
, for Barth there is no knowledge of
G-od except through revelation, and there is no revelation
except in Christ. 9? Barth regards it as a literal truth
( wortwBrtliche Wahrhelt ) that there is a new creation when-
ever a man comes to be in Christ. 9^ Man had once been
created in the image of G-od but this Image of 'God has been
so totally defaced by the Fall as to leave not a trace
behind, so that nothing but a wholly new act of creation
will suffice. And with the rest of his human nature
95 ibid .
96 Ibid
.. 30.
97 Baillie, KG, 18.
98 Barth, Nein, 30.
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his reason also has been totally corrupted, so that since
the Fall we are all insane ( verriickt ) As Brunner puts
it in his Natur unci Gnade , Barth's idea of grace is that of
a miracle of sheer omnipotence, according to which men like
stocks and stones ( Stelne und Klotze ) have no free ac-
ceptance in the presence of grace. 100 "What is our sin?"
asks Barth. "It is what we are and what we do...." 101
Hessen holds that the problem of grace and freedom
cannot be explained reasonably. 10^ However, the idea of
cooperation gives us the clue to the solution of this
problem.
The essence of religious activity is that it is
cottperative
. . . . It is an elevation of the soul toward
God, which involves both a receiving and a response.
Without experienced commerce with the divine, involving
activity on both sides for a common value, there is no
religion. 105
John Oman's Grace and Personality is an elaboration of the
theme that no form of irresistible grace can be harmonized
with the conditions which are necessary for the growth of
moral persons. Baillie is right in holding that the
exercise of grace always implies a certain self-limitation
99 Ibid., 42.
100 Brunner, Natur und Gnade
, 18.
101 Barth, KG (tr. Hair and Henderson), 53.
10?
Hessen, Wertphllosophle
.
210-211.
1Q5 Brightman, POR, 435.
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on the part of omnipotence, since there can only be grace
where there is free acceptance in the absence of coercion}^*
Both Hartmann and Hessen claim that they hold to Max
Scheler 1 s "funf Kriterien des Wertranges.
"
10 5 Hartmann*
s
description of Scheler 's third criterion is different from
Hessen' s representation of the same criterion. Hartmann
states:
Der material fundierende Wert 1st dann gerade als
der selbstandigere und unabhangigere zugleich der
elementarere und nledere Wert, der fundierte aber der
hohere.106
Hessen says:
Der fundierende Wert ist der htthere gegenuber dem
fundierten. Die Gesamtheit der Werte ist fundiert auf
den Wert eines unendlichen personlichen Geistes und der
vor ihm stehenden Welt der Werte. 107
Max Scheler, in his Der Formalismus in der Ethik
und die materiale Wertethlk
, to which both Hartmann and
Hessen refer, states his third criterion briefly: "So
schelnen die Werte um so hoher zu sein...je weniger sie
durch andere Werte fundiert sind." 108 This agrees with
Hessen. Scheler is explicit: "Dann 1st aber der jeweilig
10* Balllie, KG, 24.
105 Hartmann, Ethik
. 252-255; Hessen, Wert -
philosophie
.
87-92.
106 Hartmann, Ethik
, 253-254.
107 Hessen, Wertphlloscphie
. 88.
108 Scheler, FEMW, 88.

fundierende Wert...auch Jeweilig der hohere Werte." 109
Scheler's view in sharp contrast with Hartmann's leads to
this:
Alle moglichen Werte aber sind fundiert auf den
Wert eines unendlichen persBnlichen G-eistes und der
vor ihm stehenden Welt der Werte.HO
About this matter Scheler and Hessen are right in holding
that lower values are more dependent and higher values are
more independent. Brightman holds that lower intrinsic
values such as bodily values are "narrower, more partial
than the higher ones"; they "include a smaller area of
value experience," and are "more dependent on other values
for their own worth." While higher intrinsic values such
as intellectual and religious values are "broader," "more
inclusive of experience as a whole," "more independent,"
and "more coherent. "HI This insight, coupled with the
vision of the uniqueness and the coalescence of the in-
trinsic values, H2 is » the heart of all idealistic philoso-
phy" and is "a truth which the mind must recognize when it
views experience synoptically #"H3
!09 Ibid., 93.
110 Ibid *. 94.
111 Brightman, POR, 95-100.
112 Ibid
. ,
100-102.
H3 Brightman, ITP, 313.
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&. Merle G. Walker's View
A comparison of Hartraann's ethics and Ralph Barton
Perry's is made by M. G-. Walker in his article, "Perry and
Hartmann: antithetical or complementary?"
Walker says that to Hartmann the kind of being
peculiar to every value is that of an ideal self-existence
;
each is independent of our knowledge and of our choice; it
is equally independent of its actual realization in the
actual world. Our sensing of it is a Platonic beholding. H5
Perry's view of value, says Walker, is that of
psychological subjectivism. Value is, for Perry, a quality
bestowed upon any object through its serving the Interests
of motor-affective life. It is purely subjective. Its
source lies in the desires and interests of the subject. 11^
Walker points out that for Hartmann the nature of
the moral obligation follows directly from his conception
of the objective sphere of value itself. The actual world
is in a state of tenslon--tension between the ideal ought-
to-be and a negative disvalue. Man's dignity is that he is
a mediator between the ideal and the real. 117
114 Ethics
, 49 (October, 1938), 37-61.
115 Walker, Art. 1, 39.
116 Ibid
., 39.
117 Ibid. , 41.

36
According to Perry, the moral values in contrast to
"simple value s" 11^ are those values which contribute
creatively to the "massive satisfactions of a world of
interested persons, "H9 DUt, the simple value may lead only
to the "trivial satisfaction of a single individual need." 120
For both Perry and Hartmann the moral situation is
set against and in contrast to a mechanistic and ethically
indifferent background. Man alone is purposive. Nature
is completely careless of value. ^ x
For Hartmann the higher moral principle is always
the more conditioned; the lower is always the more uncon-
122ditioned. For Perry also, the relation of the lower to
the higher value is that of means to end; but the higher
values are more universal than the lower in that they
surpass them in validity and are entitled to preference .
l
2^
The deepest similarity between the two systems, says
Walker, is the agreement on the function of an individual
as a carrier of ideals. For Hartmann it is intuitive
US Ibid
.. 44.
u
* Ibid ,
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid
., 51.
122 Hartmann, Ethik
. 157.
123 Walker, Art. 1, 54.
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awareness of value s^-2^- that urges the moral agent to
objectify them; for Perry It is the eagerness of life itself
that pushes forward to more and more massive interests. 12 5
Walker maintains that in their conceptions of moral
character there is a difference of emphasis. For Perry
man's highest moral efficacy lies in the great consequences
of his choice—their congruity with the universal realms of
Interest. For Hartmann the important values are those
incidental but supremely significant moral values which are
by-products of conscious and directed actions. 12^
In organizing the value hierarchy, Perry's emphasis
is purely quantitative. The final aim of an economy of
interests lies in that universal system in which all inter-
ests are satisfied in a system of incluslveness. "*"2^ For
Hartmann the solution is qualitative. The valuational
scheme does not ascend in a single series. Values are
different qualitatively as well as in the relative spread
of their effects. Here Walker holds to Hartmann' s view
and rejects Perry's. 12^
122f By this phrase we understand Hartmann' s phrase
Wertgefuhl
.
125 Walker, Art. 1, 54.
126 Ibid.
127 ipia
., 56.
128 Ibid., 57.
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Walker maintains that Perry alone, among all ethi-
clsts, has given to value a generic sense that bears the
scrutiny of analysis, in that Perry has given to ethics the
essential concept of interest; thus Perry has avoided that
path usually taken by those who seek a generic definition
—
a summum bonum—and has discovered what truly makes values
values. No such satisfactory meaning can be discovered in
Hartmann's ethics, says Walker. 12^
Walker sees an element of truth in both Perry 1 s sub-
jectivism and Hartmann's objectivism, for values are sub-
jective in that they are all objects of concern but they are
objective in the sense of dictating imperatives to the
will. 130
Walker's article shows successfully that both Hartmann's
view and Perry's are inadequate in at least one respect.
They have a purely mechanistic view of nature. The ex-
istence of values in human life is hard to explain if the
universe itself is entirely indifferent to value. On these
two views our value experience is "an incoherent item of
worth" in a worthless world. In such a world there is some-
thing miraculous about the rise of value and if there is an
adequate way of describing reality that can include the
129 Ibid ,. 58.
130 Ibid ., 60.
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facts of nature and of value in a more reasonable world-
view, reason would compel us to say that the more reasonable
view is more probably true."*-31 Our second and third chap-
ters will deal with this problem in detail.
Perry 1 s view may be reduced ultimately to the propo-
sition that nothing more than a relation to the feeling of
the moment is recognized as entering into value experience.
However, he has an ideal criterion of value which is in-
clusiveness. And about an atomistically intuitive theory
1"^2
of value which associates goodness with agreeable feeling '
he says:
The most serious defect of this type of theory is
its failure to provide any systematic principle whatever.
There are as many indefinable values as there are feeling
attitudes, and since these are to be regarded as ob-
jective qualities rather than as modes of feeling, there
is nothing to unite them, not even the principle of
feeling. 1^
Perry holds that the greatest good is the object of
an all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests. 1 3^-
Thus even a subjectivist like Perry stresses the necessity
of system in ethics.
Walker holds that Perry has given to ethics the
131 See Brightman, ITP, 161,
132 Perry, G-TV
,
32-34.
133 Ibid .. 34.
134 Ibid
.. 659.
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essential concept of interest, thus avoiding a summum
bonum . 1^ 2t is true that value experience in its simplest
form is interest (without ideals)—liking, approval or
value-claim. In this Perry and Walker and Brlghtman
agree. But Walker errs in holding that Perry avoids a
summum bonum . The "moral economy , "^37 ^e mOQ^ inclusive
system of interests ( inclusiveness being the ideal cri-
terion), is Perry's summum bonum >
e. George F. Thomas's View
G-. F. Thomas criticizes Hartmann for analysing love
into three different kinds—love of neighbor, love of the
remote and personal lovei38Thomas claims that Hartmann
conceives them as so antithetical that he is unable to
bring them into fruitful relation with one another. Thomas
attributes this to Hartmann' s almost exclusive use of the
analytical method. Thomas holds that Hartmann' s use of
analysis to separate completely three different kinds of
love leads him to find irreconcilable antimonies where
there are only distinctions, essences opposed to one
155 Walker, WdG, 58.
136 See Brightman, POR, 88.
157 See Perry, ME, Chapter III.
158 Thomas, SIF, 62-65.
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another where there are only aspects closely related to one
another .^-^
Thomas Is right in holding that Hartmann is pre-
eminently an analytic thinker. However, "the analytic
method also takes account of the relations of the parts
(synthesis)." 1^0 And in the section of the Ethik . to which
Thomas refers, Hartmann' s interest is as much synthetic as
analytic. Hartmann keenly differentiates different kinds of
love because he desires to make more meaningful the synthesis
which is to follow. Thomas sees nothing but an irreconcilable
antinomy between Hartmann' s Nachstenllebe and Fernstenliebe ,
and yet Hartmann himself points out the following concerning
the relation between the two:
Das Bestehen der Wertantinomie entbindet nlcht von
der Aufgabe der Wertsynthese. Der Wert der Nachstenllebe
besteht an sich zu Recht und darf nicht herabgesetzt
werden. Uberragt ihn ein h8herer Wert, so kann seine
Herrschaft im Leben durch diesen htichstens eingeschrankt
werden. Seine vollstandige Aufhebung wurde das Leben des
Fernsten auch wertlos machen, wertloser vielleicht als
das In seinem Wert angefochtene Leben des Nachsten. J-^l
Hartmann Is even more emphatic in stressing the Importance
of synthesis in the theoretical construction of his ethics:
Sofern aber die Antithetik der Werte sich abgestuft durch
das ganze Wertreich hindurchzieht , so ergibt sich die
ibid., 63.
x Brightman, ITP, 24.
lZH Hartmann, Ethik, 447.
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Konsequenz, class isolierte Werte fur sich uberhaupt nicht
bestehen, dass vielmehr Jeder Wert nur In Synthase mit
anderen zu seiner wahren Slnnerfullung kommt—und zwar
der Idee nach schliesslich in Synthese mit alien. ^-^2
Hartmann probably anticipated the kind of criticism Thomas
makes when he wrote in the "Vorwort zur zweiten Anflage" of
his Ethlk the following:
Dass einzelne Kapitel ein elnseltiges Bild geben, ist bei
einem so grossen Stoff nicht zu vermeiden; nur im
Zusammenhange kann das Einzelne seine Elnschrankung, das
G-anze seinen Ausgleich erfahren.1^3
3. Method of the Dissertation
The method of the dissertation is that of internal
criticism and evaluation. It starts from Hartmann* s own
convictions about ethical knowledge and attempts to discover
whether or not those convictions are consistent among them-
selves and with his metaphysics as a whole. However,
internal criticism may become dogmatic, in the sense that
it may aim at no more adequate statement of a position that
is essentially untenable. Hence Hartmann' s point of view
(or any other thinker's) needs also to be confronted by
external criticism, 1^ that is, by criticism which rests on
different presuppositions and criteria and which may
142
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43
therefore challenge the validity of his whole position.
Thus this dissertation refers to Plato's system of ethical
philosophy, Sorley's, or Brightman's, as a source of such
possible challenge. However, these other systems are not
regarded as final truths accepted by all thinkers but as
alternative views which may serve to bring out the full
implications of Hartmann* s system of ethics. Nevertheless,
the outcome of the investigation is that Hartmann 1 s system
(and, inferentially, any system) i3 truer in its internally
coherent aspects than in those which rest solely on inde-
pendent intuitions. This result is harmonious with the
Platonic-Hegelian conception of reason, which Hartmann
himself makes use of in the theoretical construction of his
1 46
system of ethics. u
145 See Plato, Republic
. 537 B ff; Hegel, PG, 20;
Brightman, POR, 189-195.
146 Hartmann, Ethlk, 144, 245, 269, 496, 518, 527,
534, 535, 540, 556, 557; See pages 2, 3 of this disser-
tation.

CHAPTER I
EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR HARTMANN 1 S POSITIVE VIEW
Wertgefuhl as Central
According to Hartmann, man's spiritual growth
( geistlges Wachstum) is essentially an inner growth of his
valuational feeling amid a given fulness of values ("ein
inneres Heranwachsen des Wertgefuhls an gegebene Wert-
fulle"). 1 And the greatest task of ethics is to educate
and sharpen ( erzlehen , scharfen ) our Wertgefuhl so that we
may be receptive of the significant and lie open to what-
ever has meaning and value. 2
Hartmann holds that through Wertgeflihl alone can we
grasp valuational structures which are ideal objects.
Wertstrukturen sind eben ideale Gegenstande, jenseits
alles realen Seins und Nichtseins, auch jenseits des
realen Wertgefuhls, welches allein sie erfasst.
5
Wertgefuhl is the only point of contact between
human personality and the ideal self-existent realm of
values.
Das Wertgefuhl des Menschen 1st das Hineinragen
des lebenden G-eistes in die andere Welt; oder richtiger
wohl umgekehrt das Hereinragen dieser anderen, an sich
1 Hartmann, PgS, 145.
2 Hartmann, Ethik
. 8.
5 Ibid., 107.
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idealen und gegen das Reale indifferenten Welt in die
reale Welt.^
For example, the essence of brotherly love ( Nachsten-
liebe) is a Wertgefuhl 0 f the living feeling of another's
worth ("Das lebendlge Wertgefuhl fur den Wert des Anderen").
It is not pity ( Mltleid ) nor suffering ( Leiden ) but a
feeling, a striving, which approves another person as such
("ein die fremde Person als solche bejahendes Fuhlen und
Streben")
.
5
The historic form of the current consciousness of
value ( "geschichtliche Form eines jeweiligen Wert-
bewusstseins" )^includes every kind of concrete ideal, every
kind of reverence for heroes. Every moral rejection or
acceptance ("alles moralische Ablehnen und Anerkennen"
)
rests upon an independent feeling of value ( selbstandlges
Wertgefuhl ) t even in example and imitation. 7 And the pre-
supposition of our commitment ( Elnsatz ) to any cause is the
Wertgefuhl of that toward which the commitment is directed.®
Thus Hartmann regards Wertgefuhl as central in his
ethics. It is the empirical basis for his positive view.
4 Hartmann, PgS, 138.
5 Hartmann, Ethlk
, 413.
6 Ibid ., 119.
7 Ibid
. , 116.
8 Ibid
., 533.
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a. Wert fiefuhl and Wertordnung
Hartmann believes that every morally selective
consciousness of value ("alles slttlich seligierende
Wertbewusstsein" ) is necessarily a consciousness of
gradation ("ein Bewusstsein der Rangordnung" )
.
9 The
phenomena of valuational feeling which are to be analysed
("die zu analysierenden Fhanomene des Wertgefuhls" ) furnish
us with the single assured landmarks which we have ("die
einzigen sicheren Anhaltspunkte, die wir haben"); they
contain impliclty in themselves the total phenomenon ( das
(jesamtphanomen ) of the gradation of values. 1°
In investigating the gradation in the Wertreich
Hartmann regards the atomistic intuition of Wertgefuhl to
be absolutely dependable while the synoptic Intuition of
the relational criterion is almost useless. Because the
synoptic intuition encounters the greatest difficulties,
for example, even the general laws of a synoptic view
("die allgemeinen Jesetze konspektlver Schau") like logical
laws are here partly adjourned ( verschoben ) —contra-
diction, for instance, which is cancelled in the law of
contradiction, is shown to be present throughout in the
9 Ibid
.. 247.
10 Ibid .. 249.
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Wertreich: there are antinomies of values, conflicts of
values, and harmonies of values, where they appear, can
never unconditionally hold good as a sign of correctness
("Anzeichen der Rlchtigkeit" ) . On the contrary, as things
lie, solely out of the immediate feeling of value ("lediglich
aus dem unmlttelbaren Wertgefuhl" ) , and not out of a synoptic
survey ("nicht aus konspektiver Uberschau" ) , can we know
even th= few features of the valuational gradation, which
are known to us ("die wenigen uns bekannten Zuge der Wert-
Rangordnung" ) . Under such circumstances it is compre-
hensible that the role of the relational criterion ("die
Rolle des relationalen Kriteriums" ) is reduced to a minimum.
The relational criterion hardly functions ("es tritt kaum
in Funktion"). Thus Hartmann concludes that if an emotional
Intuition of values is actually absolute ( wlrklich absolut )
then there is no need of the relational criterion. 11
b. Wertgefuhl and Werthohe
According to Hartmann, valuational feeling reacts
in a totally different way to different values ("das Wert-
gefuhl reagiert auf verschiedene Werte in durchaus
verschledener Weise"). 12 For each value there is one, and
Hartmann, GME, 542.
Hartmann, Ethik, 255.
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only one, attitude corresponding to its nature ("nur eine,
seinem Wesen entsprechende Art der Stellungnahme" ) . The
connection between a mental attitude and a value is some-
thing fixed in the nature of things ("eine wesensgesetzlich
bestlmmte Bezlehung"). This irremovable uniformity ("dlese
unverruckbare G-esetzlichkeit" ) holds in regard to negative
as well as to positive values; also to every disvalue a
specific kind of attitude corresponds, both as regards
quantity and quality."*"3
This uniformity furnishes Hartmann with a basis for
a phenomenology of the valuational height ("eine Phanomen-
ologle der Yiferthdhe" ) , and not only for the larger intervals
in a whole group, but for the finer and often imponderable
distances of moral values among themselves ("auch fur die
feineren, oft unwagbaren Distanzen sittlicher Werte
untereinander" ) . The variety of response is extraordinarily
great, and is by no means exhausted within the narrow limits
of spoken language. The shades of value, for which there
are no names, must be described somehow by circumlocutions
( Umwegen )
Hartmann goes on to describe that the valuational
predicates and responses are outward manifestations of an
13 ipia ». 255-256.
14 Ibid., 256.
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existing inner connection between valuational height and
the kind of valuational feeling ("die ausseren Kundgebungen
eines bestehenden inneren Zusammenhanges zwlschen Werthtfhe
und Art des Wertgefuhls." ) . There must be a primary feeling
of difference of valuational height ("eln primares Differenz
gefuhl der WerthBhe"), which corresponds with the types of
response. And this must be as original as the valuational
feeling, which discriminates materially and qualitatively
("wie das material und qualitativ unterscheidende Wert-
gefuhl"). The feeling of relation of height among values
must adhere to the primary feeling for value ( primares
Wertfuhlen ) in such a way that when two values are given
the valuational height of each is given, A valuational
consciousness limited to one single value is only an
abstraction, and in all concrete feeling of value ("in
allem konkreten Wertgefuhl") the feeling of height referred
to a valuational gradation ("das auf elne Wertordnung
bezogene Htthengefuhl" ) is primary. Such Wertsefuhl is
characterized by the complete absence of reflection in the
valuational responses tuned to the valuational height
("die vollkommene Unreflektiertheit der auf die Werth8he
abgestimmten Wertantwort" ) . 5
Hartmann is convinced that the clue to the
15 Ibid .. 257-258.
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valuational height ( Index der Werthohe ) lies in the
assenting feeling of value ( zustlmmendes Wertgefuhl )
,
as it expresses itself in specific responses and predicates
such as approval (Billigung), respect (Verehrung ) , admi-
16
ration ( Bewunderung ) , and so on.
Hence the good man does not spend time to weigh and
choose ( wagen, wahlen ) ; his Wertgefuhl guides ( leitet ) him
surely, even in axiologically complicated predicaments
("auch in axiologisch komplizierter Lebenslage" ) . The
conflicting values need not appear as such to him. He does
not primarily resort to deliberation ( Uberlegung ) . None
the less his decision for the one value and against the
other has the weight of a preference on principle ("das
G-ewicht eines prinziplellen Vorziehens" ) . How this is
possible, is the innermost secret of the valuational feeling
("das innerste Geheimnis des Wertgefuhl s" ) . The fact that
such decisions exist- -perfectly spontaneous and unre-
flective— shows that our Wertgefuhl consists not only in a
consciousness of the content and the character of its
value ("nlcht nur ein Bewusstsein der Materien und ihrer
Wertcharaktere") ,
. but also in a consciousness of the
direction which shows the valuational height ("sondern
Ibid
., 547.
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auch ein die Werthtfhen anzeigendes Richtungsbewusstsein").1?
c. Wertgefuhl and Wert
s
t arte
e
Hartmann holds that the unconditionallty of the
Ought-to-Be ("die Unbedingtheit des Seinsollens" ) is
presented to Y/ertgefuhl not only in the assenting V^ertgeftlhl
which is the clue to valuational height but also in the
negative, rejecting feeling ("im negativen, absprechenden
Wertgefuhl") which is the clue to valuational strength
( Index der Wertstarke ) . This negative, rejecting Wertgefuhl
asserts itself wherever values are violated ( verletzt )
.
Das absprechende Wertgefuhl also has its specific valu-
ational responses and predicates, which are reactions to
disvalues. These show an independent scale of intensi-
fication ("eine selbstandige Skala der Steigerung" ) , --such
as disapproval ( Mlssbllligung ) , contempt (Verachtung )
,
abhorrence ( Abscheu ) , and so on. This is not a simple
reflection of the scale of positive responses ("einfaches
Spiegelbild nach der Skala der positiven Wertantworten" )
.
The variability of strength, which is independent of height
is attached to the independence of the negative scale.
This is proof of the peculiar autonomous character
17 ipia *. 351.
18 ipia » » 5^7.
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of valuational strength as compared with valuational height,
When the higher value is violated, the transgression
(Vergehen ) is less, not more serious; but when the stronger
value is fulfilled, the meritorlousness ( Verdlenst ) is not
19greater but less.
For example, murder, theft, and all real crimes are
felt ( empfunden ) to be the most grievous transgressions,
because the Justice which they violate is based upon the
most elementary of goods-values (life, property and the
like). Justice is the virtue which protects these goods
which support all actualization of values whatever. Hence
the unique import of justice in moral life, '^his import
does not attach to its Werthtthe but to its Wertstarke . 20
Compared with justice radiant virtue ( schenkende
Tugend ) 21 exposes no one to radical danger. A person who
is incapable of it is not on that account a bad man; his
conduct does not threaten any one; it merely lacks the
higher moral content. Only the lower value is more ele-
mental and requires prior actualization. 22
19
.
547-548.
20
Ibid-.
.
550-551.
21 Originally a Nletzschean concept (Nietzsche, AsZ,
109 ff.); Hartmann, Ethlk
,
456-462.
op
** Hartmann, Ethlk, 551.
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It is significant that for our Wertgefuhl the charac-
teristics of the strongest values become less marked, while
those of the highest are discriminated with the greatest
plasticity ("mit der grttssten Plastik" )
.
25
For example, we think of schenkende Tugend with the
greatest admiration; but the most elementary values, where
they are actualized, are taken for granted--thus life,
health, welfare, especially whatever is necessary for daily
needs. We first become properly aware of the value of such
goods, when we are in need of them. What we thus become
aware of is not the height of their value but its strength. 2
d. Wertgefuhl and Wertsynthese
Hartmann claims that wherever there are valuatlonal
antinomies (Wertantinomlen ) the living feeling of value
( das lebendlge Wertgefuhl ) spontaneously ( unwillkurllch )
seeks for the synthesis ( Synthese ) and thus indicates
clearly the direction^ in which philosophical reflection
must look. Whether in all cases the synthesis really
exists, and whether, even when it does exist, it is
discernible ( erfassbar ) to Wertgefuhl , is another question.
The watchfulness of the valuatlonal feeling (Ausschauen
23 Ibid
. ,
561-562
2
^ iPld
. , 562.
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des Wertgefuhl
s
) is independent of that. This Ausschauen
des Wertgefuhls is the indication of the way to a possible
investigation of values ("die Wegweisung mttgllcher Wert-
forschung").
The perpetual watchfulness of the valuational feeling
("das ewige Ausschauen des Wertgefuhls") is an eloquent
witness ( beredtes Zeugnis ) to the valuational syntheses
towards which the whole multiplicity of values ( alle
Wertmannlgfaltigkelt ) presses command ingly ( gebleterlsch
hlndrangt )
.
26
e. Werttauschung
Hartmann realizes that there is a possibility of
valuational deception. About this he holds that when valu-
ational deception (Werttauschung ) is demonstrable ( nach-
weisbar ) there is always an underlying fact that the
positive valuational feeling ( positives Wertgefuhl ) is right
( Recht hatte) but the negative valuational feeling ( nega-
tives Wertgefuhl ) or disputation concerning felt values is
not right. The positives Wertgefuhl is illustrated by the
Wertgefuhl of the lover, of the moral reformer, of the
misunderstood and persecuted champion of ideas, and of the
Ibid., 523.
Ibid
. , 563.
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artist. On the contrary the negatives Wertgefuhl finds its
illustrations in valuational adjournments (Wertver-
schiebungen ) such as the false objectification (Verselb-
standlgung ) of instrumental values, for example, the false
appreciation of utility ( Nutzlichkelt ) in utilitarianism: 2?
such W ertverBchiebungen are not valuational substitutions
(Wertunterschlebungen ) but blindness towards the under-
lying value which is actually autonomous ("Blindheit gegen
den dahinterstehenden, wirklich selbstandigen Wert" )
•
Hartmann goes on to maintain that the moral phe-
nomena, of which the primary valuational consciousness
( primares W ertbewu s s t s e in ) is the witness are unmistakable
("gar nicht zu verfehlen"), if once their significance has
been grasped. They contain such manifestations (Er-
schelnungen) as moral approval ( morallsche Billlgung ) and
disapproval (Missbllllgung ) , accusation (Anklage ) . self-
blame ( 3 elbstvorwurf ) , conscience ( Gewissen ) , the sense of
responsibility (Verantwortungsgefuhl ) t the consciousness
of guilt ( Schuldbewusstseln ) and remorse (Reue). Hartmann
admits that there can be a falsification (Verfalschung ) of
27 However, Mill holds that every writer, from
Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility,
meant by it pleasure, together with exemption from pain
(Mill, ULRG, 5). Yet, Mill's own usage is not uniform.
28 Hartmann, G-ME, 541.
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these phenomena. But ordinarily they are genuine and are
based on a genuine valuational feeling ( echtes Wertgefuhl )
•
Even in this one's intuition ( Bllck ) can be sharpened. But
the criterion of the genuine and spurious is nothing but
the primary Wertbewusstsein . 29
Hartmann understands that not everyone has the
ethical maturity (die ethische Re if
e
) for seeing the situ-
ation as it is. Nevertheless, Hartmann believes in the
universality, necessity and objectivity of the valuational
Judgment ("die Allgeraeinheit
,
Notwendigkeit und Objektivtat
des Werturteil") based on Wertgefuhl .
^
Q Because he thinks
that valuational deception is possible only in the case of
mediocre persons (Durchschnltt smenschen ), morally inex-
perienced or narrow-minded ( "moralisch Unerfahrene oder
Engherzige") or philosophically undisciplined ( philosophlsch
Ungeschulte ) ,31 And whoever has attained the adequate
mentality ("wer uberhaupt geistig an ihren Sinn heranreicht")
must necessarily feel and judge in a certain way and not
otherwise. For instance, the moral value of a noble-minded
act matured in quiet meditation ("der sittliche Wert einer
in der Stille vollbrachten hochherzigen Handlung" ) is
29 Hartmann, Ethik, 55.
50 Ibid ., 140.
31 Ibid., 55.
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certainly appreciated by the Wertgefuhl of everyone who
has the sense and understanding (Sinn und Verstandnis )
for such a noble-minded act, In this sense, moral judgment
and the primary moral feeling of value which underlies it
("das moralische Werturteil und das hinter ihm stehende
primare moralische Wertgefuhl") are strictly ( streng )
32
universal, necessary and objective.
f . The Apriority of Wertgefuhl
Hartmann maintains that, unlike categories, values
are not to be recognized by the fact that they are, or are
not, contained in the real. They subsist even where the
given case, or where all actual cases, contradict them.
For so long as one does not already know the value from
some other source it remains questionable whether the case
agrees with it or not. Thus the knowledge of a value is a
purely a priori knowledge. 33
Thus ethical values are not to be discovered in
the conduct of man ("am Tun des Menschen"). One must
already have knowledge of them in order to distinguish
whether his conduct accords with them or not. But even if
the facts of human conduct("die Tatsachen des menschlichen
32 Ibid
. .
140.
33 Ibid., 51-52.
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Verhaltens") cannot reveal the principle, it is not these
facts alone which are here at hand. Rather is there also,
accompanying them, a valuational consciousness of the fact
("ein Wertbewusstsein des Tatsachlichen"). This is not a
consciousness of principles, not a pure beholding of values,
but a valuational feeling which is a clearer or obscurer
acquaintance with the worth or worthlessness of the actual
conduct ("ein Wertgefuhl, ein klareres oder dunkleres
Mitwissen um Wert und Unwert des tatsachlichen Verhaltens" ).^
This Wertgefuhl is not constructed out of the laws
of existence ("nicht aus Seinsgesetzen aufgebaut ist") and
rejects and accepts, condemns and justifies ("ablehnt und
anerkennt, verurteilt und rechtfertigt" ) . This can separate
the good from the bad ("Gut und B8se scheiden") and con-
stitutes the ethical standard ( ethischer Massstab ) of man's
resolutions and dispositions. 3 ^
The phenomenon of the primary Wertbewusstsein is
real (real), is capable of being experienced ( erfahrbar )
,
and yet in its essence not empirical ("in seinem Wesen nicht
empirisch"). The primary Wertbewusstsein is aprioristlc.
Valuational intuition (Wertschau ) is aprioristlc, whether
it have the primary form of Wertgefuhl or the derived form
34 Ibid
., 52-53.
35 Ibid
. . 53.
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of reflective discrimination ("die Form des differenzierten
Durchschauens" ) . The posterius is only a roundabout way to
autonomous aprioristic insight ("nur ein Umweg zur autonomen
apriorischen Einsicht" ) .-^
Hartmann goes on to maintain that the aprioristic
is always universally valid, the aposterioristlc is not.
"Das Apriorische ist zwar immer allgemeingultig, das
Aposteriorische nicht." The aprioristic is not necessarily
formal as Kant maintained. A principle like the moral law
( das Slttengesetz ) . or a commandment ( ein G-ebot ) in general,
even a standard of value ( Wertmassstab ) , can have matter
( elne Materle ) , without any prejudice to its apriority.
The distinction between form and matter has no bearing upon
an autonomous ethical principle. It is only a question of
apriority ("Es kommt nur auf die Aprioritat an"). 37
According to Hartmann, the aprioristic Wertgefuhl
is emotional and not intellectual; intuitive, not reflec-
tive. It does not first wait for a judgment of the under-
standing. Immediately, in accordance with feeling, does
it penetrate our practical consciousness or our whole
conception of life. The valuatlonal hall-marks (Wert-
akzente ) which it communicates to things and events are
36 Ibid .. 5^-56
37 Ibid .. 99.
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not derived from the things and events. On the contrary,
the Wertakzent e are impressed by Wertgefiihl upon the
things and events.-^
Der primare Sitz des Wert- A priori ist und bleibt das
die Wirklichkeitserfassung und Lebenseinstellung durch-
dringende Wertgefiihl selbst. Nur in ihm ist ursprung
-
llche, inexplizite sittliche Erkenntnis, eigentliches
Wis sen urn Gut und Bttse.39
Ethics as a science is the logical work of making
explicit this implicitly given aprioristic factor and
setting upon it the seal of concepts and formulae. A
special philosophical method is needed, which discovers
laws ( Gesetze ) and makes their content and matter accessible
to consciousness and to the conceptual understanding. But
such a method is secondary. The essential factor in ethics
is the primary Wertgefiihl and an ethicist can do nothing
except draw out ( herausheben ) from the total emotional
phenomenon the aprioristic content which was already
within it. 40
Hartmann explains further the nature of the apri-
ority of Wertgefiihl
.
Wertgefiihl is aprioristic over
against the real particular case ("dem realen Elnzelfall
gegeniiber" ) , such as a real person, action and situation.
58 Ibid
., 104-105.
39 Ibid
., 105.
ha
Ibid., 105-106.
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And here everything depends upon this apriority. The
penetrative intuition of Wertgefuhl is not directed to the
real as such but to the self-existent value which may or
may not be represented in the real. Since Wertgefuhl is
radically aprioristic over against the real it follows from
this that Wertbewusstseln is completely autonomous as the
fundamental condition of the act of evaluation ("als der
Grundbedingung des Bewertungsaktes" ) . ^
The atomistic intuition ( at lgmatlsche Anschauung)
of Wertgefuhl
.
like all atomistic intuition, is a synthesis
of genuine apriority and direct givenness which is caused
by the ideal object ("eine Synthese von echter Aprloritat
und dlrekter, vom idealen Objekt her kommender G-egebenheit")
thus it is an aprioristic givenness ( apriorlsche G-ege-
benhelt ) . It is aprioristic over against the real case,
but given over against the relational-synoptic view, pure
thought and reflection of every kind ("gegeben dem
relatlonal-konspektiven Schauen, dem reinen Denken und der
Reflexion aller Art gegenuber" ) . This atomistic valu-
ational intuition is aprioristic in relation to knowledge
of the real but aposterloristlc in relation to the
synoptic knowledge of the ideal ("apriorisch 1st diese
stigmatische Wertschau in bezug auf die Realerkenntnis,
Hartmann, GME, 538
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aposteriorisch aber In bezug auf die konspektive Ideal
-
erkenntnls"
)
2, Wertgefuhl and the Extent of the Wertreich
Hartmann holds that in the Wertreich every grade
( Htthenlage ) is a whole plane of values (eine ganze Wert-
ebene ) ;and the manifold, that is grasped by Wertgefuhl &.t
any time, is always only a section ("immer nur ein
Ausschnitt" ) , 4^ Thus the extent ( Spannwelte ) of the Wert -
reich is greater not only than that of the primary Wert -
gefuhl but also that of the philosophical Wertbewusstseln.^"
According to Hartmann, it is impossible to give an
unambiguous account of the content of the good, for that
content embraces the whole table of values ( die ganze
Werttaf el ) , including the principle on which they are
arranged ( Ordnungsprinzlp ) . But neither the table nor the
principle is ever given in its entirety. And for this
reason the content of the good varies from case to case.
In other words, the Werttaf el has not been presented in
its clarity and entirety ( Eindeutlgkelt und Totalitat ) to
our Wertgefuhl
. We can always have but a segment
42 Ibid., 538-539.
45 Hartmann, Ethik, 358.
44 Ibid ., 495.

63
(Ausschnltt ) before our eyes and since we lack the per-
spective of the whole (Perspektlve des Ganzen ) we may be
subject to errors even within the segment. Hence every
gradation of values being dimly felt has an element of
subjectivity in it and is only an approximation to the
objective gradation of values itself.
But the rudiments of an absolute scale of values
("ein Ansatz zur absoluten Rangordnung der Werte") are con-
tained in all moral feeling for values ("in allem sittlichen
Wertgefuhl" ) . The good as the controlling moral order of
the heart hidden in man ("das Gute als die verborgen ira
menschen waltende moralische Ordnung des Herzens") is not
simply the objective gradation of values ("die objective
Rangordnung der Werte") but is the decisive role which this
gradation--so far as it is revealed in Wertgefuhl—plays in
disposition, will and behavior ("Gesinnung, Wollen, und
Handlung")
.
46
The realization of this limitation on the part of
Wertgefuhl leads Hartmann to a theoretical construction of
his ethics which we shall discuss later.
45 IMd. f 352-353.
46 Ibid ., 353-354.
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3. Criticism of Hartmann's View of Wertgefuhl
Empirically Hartmann's ethics is "based solely on
Wertgefuhl . About this Scheler,^ Messer^ and Hessen^
essentially agree with Hartmann. Nevertheless, it is
possible to hold with Brightman that "the basis of moral
knowledge is total moral experience."-*0 Our moral experi-
ence^1 includes at least four factors: (1) the consciousness
of value; (2) of obligation; (3) of law; (4) and of an
intelligent interest in the whole self on the part of the
datum self." 52 Qf these four experiences Wertgefuhl may
include the first two but not the last two experiences.
Because, as Hartmann himself holds, in Wertgefuhl there is
not an original, explicitly present consciousness of law
("ein ursprungliches, explizite vorliegendes G-esetzes-
bewusstsein" ) .53 And Wertgefuhl is only one aspect of the
^7 Scheler, FEMW, 94; See pages 18-21 of this
dissertation.
hQ
Messer, WdG, 13-14; See pages 4,5,8,9,13 of this
dissertation.
*9 Hessen, WF, 87-92,125; See pages 18-21,33,34 of
this dissertation.
50 Brightman, ML, 84.
51 Ibid
., 58.
52 ipia *
.
79.
JJ Hartmann, Ethik
, 105.
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present complex consciousness which is a datum self. Thus
if this alternative view is right about the basis of moral
knowledge Hartmann's system of ethics is potentially inco-
herent at its very basis.
As to the gradation of values, he declares that
Wertgefuhl furnishes us with the single assured landmarks
which we have,^ and that, while the atomistic Intuition
of Wertgefuhl is here absolute, the synoptic intuition of
the relational criterion is useless, because solely out of
the immediate feeling of value without regard to any
synoptic survey can we know even the few features of the
valuational gradation which are known to us. 55 This
assertion contradicts his statement that morality in the
full and genuine sense has to do with the entire gradational
ladder of moral values which is revealed to us through
synoptic thought, 5^ and it contradicts also his statement
that coherence is superior to intuition in the sense that
through the former a unique insight into ethical knowledge
can be obtained—an insight which is beyond the scope of
54 IMd .. 249.
55 Hartmann, GME, 542; For Hessen also Wertgefuhl
is the criterion of valuational height (Hessen, WP, 87-92).
56 Hartmann, Ethik, 556, 557; See pages 2,3 of this
dissertation.
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any immediate intuition.^ Thus Hartmann is not consistent
about the relative adequacy of intuition and coherence as a
basis for ethical knowledge.
Hartmann reveals his supreme confidence in intuition
when he maintains that the connection between the intuitional,
mental attitude and a value is something fixed in the nature
of things ("eine wesensgesetzlich bestimmte Bezlehung" )
.
^
He bases this on his intuitive conviction that "Das Wert-
gefuhl reagiert auf verschiedene Werte in durchaus ver-
schiedener Weise."59 Hence he claims that the clue to the
valuational height lies in the assenting Wertp;efuhl t as it
expresses itself in specific responses and predicates like
60
approval, respect, admiration and so on. Likewise he
holds that the clue to the valuational strength lies in the
negative, rejecting feeling of value ("im negativen
absprechenden Wertgefuhl" ) which is shown in an independent
scale of intensification such as disapproval, contempt,
61
abhorence and so on. Since he believes that Wertgefuhl
can reveal all this about the Wertreich he claims that the
57 Hartmann, Ethik, 144; See pages 2,3 of this
dissertation.
58 Hartmann, Ethik, 255; He regards this fixed con-
nection as an unverruckbare G-esetzlichkeit ( Ethik , 255-256).
59 Hartmann, Ethik
, 255.
60 Ibid
., 547.
61
Ibid.
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good man does not spend time to weigh and choose; his
Wertgefiihl guides him surely, even In axiologically com-
62Heated predicaments.
Here again what Hartmann claims for Wert fie fuhl
contradicts his own conviction that through coherent thought
a unique insight into ethical knowledge can be obtained--an
Insight which is beyond the reach of any immediate intu-
ition. 65
Hartmann maintains that wherever there are valu-
ational antinomies (Wertantlnomlen ) Wertgefuhl spontaneously
aims at a synthesis and thus indicates clearly the direction
64in which philosophical reflection must look. But in
another context he maintains that every value, when once
it has gained power over a person, has the tendency to set
itself up as sole tyrant of the whole human ethos ("die
Tendenz, sich zum alleinigen Tyrannen des ganzen mensch-
lichen Ethos aufzuwerfen" ) , and indeed at the expense of
other values ("zwar auf Kosten anderer Werte"), even of
such as are not inherently opposed to it; and that this
tendency adheres to values as the determining or selective
powers in the valuational feeling of man ("als bestimmenden
62 Ibid ., 351.
63 Hartmann, Ethik, 144. See pages 2,3 of this
dissertation.
64 Hartmann, Ethik
, 523.
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Oder seligierenden Machten lm menschlichen Wertgeftthl" ) .^5
Here Hartraann refers to two conflicting tendencies
inherent in WertgefUhl , and thus implicitly demonstrates
that Wertgefuhl has to be guided and enlightened by a
criterion other than intuition itself.
Hartmann claims that Werttaunschung is possible only
in the case of mediocre persons (Durchschnlttsmenschen )
but the Wertgefuhl of the philosophically disciplined is
always right. 67 However, here an advocate of coherence
would present an alternative view: The very nature of
coherence indicates that it must be applied to the experi-
ence of every person, testing all thoughts and experiences
and "itself being constantly tested anew by the very use
that is made of it." 68
Hartmann declares that the positive Wertgefuhl which
is demonstrated by the intuition of the lover, of the moral
reformer, or of the artist is always right. 69 But history
testifies to the fact that this assertion is unjustifiable.
Hartmann does not tell us how to distinguish the positive
65 Ibid.. 524.
66 Ibid .. 55.
67 Ibid .. 140.
68 Brightman, ITP, 66.
69 Hartmann, GME, 54l
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Wertgefuhl from the negative 7/ ertgefuhl which he regards
as illusory. 70 By indicating that Wertgefuhl is sometimes
positive (and right) and sometimes negative (and deceptive)
he again demonstrates that Wertgefuhl must be guided by a
criterion which is more synoptic that any atomistic
intuition.
According to Hartmann, the knowledge of a value
71
cannot be found in ordinary human experience but only in
Wertgefuhl , which is independent of experience and not
constructed out of the laws of existence ("nicht aus
Selnsgesetzen aufgebaut ist" ), 72 and Wertgefuhl alone can
73
separate the good from the bad. Hence the judgment of
Wertgefuhl is always a priori, 74 and what is a priori is
always universally valid.'
5
According to an alternative view, however, it is
misleading to claim that there is anything independent of
experience. 7^ Our experience of Wertgefuhl is certainly a
70 Ibid .
71 Hartmann, Ethik
, 52-53.
72 Ibid., 53.
75 Ibid
.
74 Ibid
.. 5^-56.
75 Ibid., 99.
76 Brightman, FOR, 2-3.
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conscious experience. "The assertion that one part of
experience is independent of all experience is logically
contradictory • "77
The quality of being independent of experience appertains
to no truth, if experience be defined inclusively. No
truth can be said to be unqualifiedly a priori unless it
is necessarily related to all experience in such a way
that it is always valid, no matter what happens.... It
is possible that some truths are universal and necessary;
but this fact cannot be known prior to experience of
thinking and observing. 78
A priori principles cannot even be known to be a priori
unless they are necessary to a coherent universe of dis-
course; and any such universe must be related to other
possible universes and criticized with regard to its
coherence. 79
In view of all this we conclude that in presenting
the empirical basis for his positive view Hartmann depends
ultimately on what he claims to be the universally valid
apriority of Y/ertgefuhl , which is his criterion of the truth
of value judgments.
77 Ibid ., 3.
78 ibid., 3-4.
79 md
. , 191-192.

CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OE HIS SYSTEM
1. Grounds for Objectivity of Value
In presenting the empirical basis for Hartmann's
positive view, it was found that the fundamental presup-
position was that values are objective. Experience is an
experience of an objective order. So before a presentation
of the theoretical construction of his system, his grounds
for accepting the objectivity of value must be mentioned. 1
a. Kant's Subjectivism and Its Two Difficulties
According to Kant, the will is free to follow the
principle and at the same time to be itself the originator
of the principle ( Urheber des Prinzlps )
.
Hartmann holds that it is not conceivable that the
will should first give the law and then transgress ( uber-
treten ) it. The will must be able to transgress it, since
otherwise it would not be free but would be subjected to the
principle as to a natural law. But if the principle be
already contained in the essence ( Wesen ) of the will, the will
cannot deviate from the principle. 3
1 Hartmann, Ethlk, 88-153.
2 Ibid
.. 91.
3 Ibid.
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Hartmann realizes that Kant could recognize, along
with the law ( Sesetz ) , alien, anti-moral impulses ("ander-
weitige, antimorallsche Triebfedern" ) which allure the will
from the direction proper to it. Then there would be two
kinds of will: the pure will which gives the principle and
the empirical one which is subjected to other determining
4factors.
Hartmann maintains that of these two the will which
is free is the one which has before it the open possibility
(die offene Mogllchkelt ) of following either the principle
or the alien determinants. Therefore the empirical will.
However, for Kant the pure will is accepted as free, in so
far as it has no other ground of determination than the
principle which inheres in its own essence. Hence Kant'e
free will has, on the basis of these determinations, self-
legislation ( Elgengesetzllchkeit ) » but no freedom in the
proper sense of the word. It is subject to the autonomous
principle of its essence exactly as nature is subject to
natural law.^
Thus in ethics Kant's subjectivism does not lead to
that freedom of the will for the sake of which it was
introduced. What would be requisite is not the laying down
Ibid
.
Ibid
., 91-92.
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of the principle by the will, but its own activity in face
of the principle ("seine Beweglichkeit ihm gegenliber" )
.
Only this condition of aloofness fits the facts if the
principle has some other origin (if it is not rooted in the
subject). Thus, in Hartmann's thinking, only the objectivity
of value solves the problem of moral freedom.
^
For Kant there exist only two possibilities: either
the moral law ( Slttengesetz ) —hence every moral value
—
emanates from nature (Natur) or from reason (Vernunf
t
) In
the former case it is merely a hypothetical imperative ("ein
bloss hypothetischer Imperatlv" ) . In the latter case it is
universal, a priori, an unconditional categorical imperative
("ein unbedingter kategorischer Imperativ").
But Hartmann regards this Kantian alternative as
false, the disjunction as not complete. Because the a priori
does not subsist In a function of the subject. Aprioristic
insight subsists without there being given to the mind any
real individual objects of perception. As the relation of
cause and effect is never perceptible to sense but objective,
so the exacted harmony ( geforderte flbereinstimmung ) of the
individual will with the ideal will of all cannot be
extracted from an empirical will. It is not a legislation
6 ipia
.. 92.
7 Ibid
. . 92-93.
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of reason ("eine Gesetzgebung der Vernunft") either. It is
purely objective. Its content is an ideal objective
relation which hovers before the moral consciousness, inde-
ed
pendently of the degree of its actualization in real life.
Thus Hartmann concludes that Kant's subjectivistic
and functionalistic apriorism is a total misunderstanding
of the originally objective character of everything knowable
a priori
b. Value is Related to a Subject but is Absolute in Itself
According to Hartmann, the relatedness of goods
( Guter ) to a personal subject is not valuational relativity
(Wertrelatlvltat ) . It does not bar out the objective
character of the G-uter but evidently implies it. A person
cannot change the fact that a thing is good for him. The
fact that it is so is not relative to the valuableness of
the G-uter for the subject. In this "for" the subject does
not play the part of a determiner or giver of values. His
role is that of a point of reference concerning the valu-
ational material ( Wertmaterie ) . The relativity of the
value of the goods to the subject is an absolute relation
which is comprised in the content of these values ("eine
absolute, lm Inhalt dieser Werte enthaltene Relation"). The
Ibid
., 93-96.
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thing and the subject are here objectively drawn into the
structure of the valuational materials, as cause and effect
( Ursache und Wlrkung ) are included in the causal nexus. In
both cases the binding relation is purely objective, and,
as regards any understanding of it, is absolute. "In beiden
Fallen 1st die bindende Relation eine rein objektive und
aller Auffas sung gegeniiber absolute." 9
Speaking of moral values Hartmann maintains that the
sort of relativity which exists objectively in the value of
goods is here excluded. Moral values adhere not to things
and relations but to deeds, to the will, purpose and dis-
position. Moral value in the conduct of a person does not
exist for a subject, whether for one's self or for another.
It Inheres simply in the person or to the act of the person,
as a quality. Virtues ( Tugendwerte ) have a purer self-
existence than goods-values ( Guterwerte ) . Moral values
have another kind of autonomy, evidently more absolute
("eine andere,und offenbar absoluterer Autonomie" )
,
10
This circumstance does not exclude relation to a
subject in another way. This relation is threefold in
direction and here valuational relativism is still less
involved than in G-uterwerte.
9 Ibid
. t 126-127.
10 Ibid
.. 128.
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(1) Every moral value is also a goods-value Indir-
ectly and as such It actually exists for other persons. But
it also subsists exclusively as a quality of his own per-
sonality, of his own conduct as such. The relatedness to
another person is thus in this case not only a Wert -
relatlvltat , but is also not even an inner relation belonging
to the objective structure of the Wertmaterle . For it does
not concern the ethical quality of the conduct or of the
person but only the accompanying goods-value. 11
(2) The outer relation of the goods for the other
person rests upon the inner relation of the direction of the
act towards him, without the two relations on that account
coinciding or the valuatlonal characteristics commingling.
The inner, intentional Relatlvat conditions the other
Relational it at of the goods-value which is dependent upon
it. But this conditioning relationship (Bedingungs-
verhaltnls) no more allows the two relations to coincide
12than the two kinds of value.
(3) All moral imputations ( Zurechnungen ) attach to
the person. Thus moral values are related to the person
as a carrier of values (Werttrager ) . But this does not mean
valuatlonal relativity. It does not imply that the value
Ibid., 128-129.
Ibid., 130.
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of noble-minded disposition and the anti-value of a mean
one are dependent upon whether anybody thinks such dis-
positions really exist. An actual noble-minded disposition
is of value, because such disposition is universally a
moral value. The relation to the person as a Werttrager
inheres in the nature of the material of the moral value.
But the moral value itself is absolute.
^
Now Hartmann takes the last two types of relation
together and obtains the basic relational structure of the
moral valuational materials. Upon the bipolar structure
of deeds, in which the two poles are persons, depends the
double relationality of the values to the personal entity
as such--to a subject as subject, and to a subject as
object, of the acts. But with this the relation is
exhausted. It has resolved Itself, without a remainder,
into the inner relational structure peculiar to the con-
tents, which is universally imbedded in the essence of
personal conduct. This structure is a general one,
applicable to all moral values.
Hartmann goes on to maintain that thus the nature
of this twofold relation is completely severed from the
nature of the values themselves. The ethical dimension of
Ibid
., 131-132.
Ibid
., 132-133.
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value and anti-value, together with Its qualitative differ-
entiation, finds scope only within this general relational
structure. But this means that the values themselves are
not affected by this relation. They are absolute. The
structure is nothing but their categorial (not their axio-
logical) conditio sine qua non. The values themselves are
neither contained in the relation nor derivable from it.
They come to it from another source. ^5
c. Not the Material of Value but the
Valuatlonal Character is Objective
Hartmann distinguishes between the material (Materie)
of value and the valuatlonal character (Wertcharacter )
•
The material is only the concrete structure which has the
valuatlonal character ("das inhaltliche G-ebilde, das den
Wertcharakter hat"). The moral worth of trust ("der
sittliche Wert des Vertrauens") is not the trust Itself
(Vertrauen selbst ) . The latter is only the material--a
specific relation between person and person, which can be
quite generally described. But the value of trust is not
this relation, and indeed is not only not an actual
relation between particular persons, but is also not the
idea of such a relation in general ("nicht die Idee eines
15 Ibid.
, 133.

solchen Verhaltnisses tlberhaupt"). The material is here
simply the idea of trust ( Ide e des Vertrauens ) . It is,
taken by itself, purely an ontological structure, not
axiological; it is the ideal structure of essence of a
specifically formed relationship ("die ideale Wesensstruktur
eines besonders gearteten SeinsverhRltnisses" ) • Its proper
valuableness is something different, not capable of being
derived from anything else, but can be felt in its own
peculiarity and exhibited in our Wert fie ftihl .
Now according to Hartmann, a subject, by his co-
operation (Zutun), can, within certain limits, produce the
material (for example, a relation of confidence); but he
can not prevent such a material from being of value, --or
the contrary. Such a material simply is so, without any
co-operation, and even if it is believed not to be so. Thus
valuational characters have self-existence. Consciousness
can grasp ( erfassen ) or miss ( verfehlen ) them, but cannot
make ( machen ) them or spontaneously decree ( spontan set zen )
them. They are objective.^
16 Ibid
., 133-134.
17 Ibid.

d. A Subject is Purely Receptive in
Intuiting values, and is Ethically
Spontaneous Only as Regards Other Persons
Hartmann believes that values are objects of possible
valuational intuition (G-egenstande mb'glicher Wertschau" )
,
and not intuitions (Anschauungen ) nor thoughts ( Gedanken )
nor presentations (Vorstellungen ) . In intuiting values
the subject is purely receptive ( rein rezeptlv ) . He is
determined by the object, the self-existent value. But he
himself, on his side, determines nothing ("Es selbst aber
bestimmt seinerseits nichts" ). The spontaneity of the
subject in ethical conduct sets in on the ground of a
primary intuition of values ("auf G-rund primarer Wertschau").
But it is not spontaneity as regards value, but as regards
other persons ("Sie 1st aber nicht Spontaneitat gegen den
Wert, sondern gegen andere Personen" ) . This indicates
that values are objective.
~
8
e. Value Offers the Same Absolute Resistance
to the Will as the Real Object of Perception
According to Hartmann, perceived reality ( das
wahrffenommene Reale ) differs from mere presentation by the
impossibility of perceiving it otherwise than just as it
18 Ibid
., 134-135.
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Is perceived. The ideal object, which is known a priori,
differs In exactly the same way from one which is a mere
/ x 19thought ( eln blosser G-edanke )
.
In the same way, Hartmann holds, no Ideal object of
a priori insight ("kein idealer G-egenstand apriorischer
Einsicht") can be displaced by the subject or made dependent
upon him. It offers the same absolute resistance ( "der
gleiche absolute Widerstand") to the will of the philsophi-
cally trained person as any real object of perception
(Wahrnehmung ) . This resistance indicates that value is
20
objective.
f • The Phenomenon of Werttauschung
is a Proof for the Objectivity of Value
If values were only things posited by the subject,
if they consisted of nothing except the act of evaluating
enlistment of feeling as such ( "wertende G-efuhlseinstellung
als solcher" ) then every chance enlistment of feeling ("jede
beliebige G-efuhlseinstellung" ) would be as justifiable as
every other. Valuatlonal delusion (Werttauschung ) would
then be Impossible. Hartmann maintains that if anything
is proof for the self-existence of values ("das Ansichsein
19 Ibid .. 139.
20
Ibid.
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der Y/erte" ) it is exactly the phenomenon of V/erttau s chung . 21
g. The Self-existence of Value
As to the nature of the objectivity of value Hart-
mann claims that there are two different kinds of self-
existence; one real ( real ) and the other ideal ( ideal )
.
Between the two subsists an essential relationship: The
structure of ideal self-existence reappears in that of the
real—not exhaustive of the latter, but in so far that the
aprioristic knowledge of ideal Being at the same time
constitutes an inner foundation ( G-rundlage ) for all knowl-
pp
edge of the real ( Realerkenntnis )
The ideal sphere, though homogeneous in mode of
existence ( S e inscharakt er ) is heterogeneous in content
( inhaltllch ) . However, in mode of existence and for knowl-
edge it is a unity. Its patterns are known in all the
departments always and purely a priori. 2^ "ideale Seins-
erkenntnis lasst nur elnen, den apriorischen Erkenntnis-
24
modus zu."
According to Hartmann, naive thought is prone to
21 Ibid * , 141-142.
22 Ibid ,. 135-136.
23 Ibid
., 136.
24
Ibid., 136-137.
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look upon real actuality (reale Wirkllchkeit ) alone as
self-existence (Anslchsein ) , but to exclude the ideal from
it. Because reality ( Realitat ) and Being ( Seln ) are falsely
identified. Moreover, ideality is mistaken for subjectiv-
ity. For this the double meaning of the term Idee is to
blame. When Idee is taken as the equivalent of presentation
(Vorstellung ) , ideality becomes the mode of Being of what-
ever subsists only in and for the presentation of a subject.
The true meaning of logic and mathematics, however, is dif-
ferent: they treat of a system of laws ( Seset zlichkelt en )
,
dependencies (Abhangigkelten ) and structures ( Strukturen )
which on their side control thinking, but themselves can
neither be forms of thought nor be in any way infringed
( beelntrachtlgt ) by thinking. Like the principles of
mathematics and logic, values constitute an objective,
absolute realm of essences, which man discovers a priori. 25
2. The Systematization of Values as the
Task of Philosophical Ethics
Hartmann is Hegelian enough to deal with the
proposition that "die Wahrheit 1st das G-anze." 26
25 IMd
. t 137.
26 Hartmann, PgS, 6.
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Der Gedanke Hegels, dass in alien philosophischen
Systemen ein Stuck ewlger Wahrheit stecke, und dass es
die Aufgabe der Philosophie sei, diese Bruchstucke der
elnen absoluten Wahrheit im ldealen System der Philo-
sophie zu vereinigen, muss mutatis mutandis auch fur
die Ethlk fruchtbar werden. 2?
He makes multiplicity of ends, which is a given
phenomena, the point of departure for his investigation.
Then he seeks connections ( Zusammenhange ) , binding relations
( blndende Relationen ) , references ( Bezlehungen ) t among the
empirical norms and values. Hartmann goes on to investigate
whether or not moral commandments ( moralische G-ebote ) are
really disparate ( disparat ) ; whether or not there are,
among those moral commandments, links ( Bindungen ) t attach-
ments ( ZusammengehBrlgkeiten ) , conditions ( Bedingtheiten )
,
and dependencies (Abhanglgkeiten ) . In short, Hartmann
tries to investigate whether or not there is a system of
ends ("ein System der Zwecke" ) or a system of values ("ein
System der Werte"), since values stand behind all ends and
only what appears to a man as valuable can he convert into
an end.
Hartmann explains that the positive living morality
( positive lebendlge Moral ) takes an atomistic view through
a temporary Wertgefuhl ; the philosophical ethics takes a
Hartmann, Ethik, 267.
Ibid
., 38.
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synoptic vj.ew. Compared with the former the latter is
derivative and dependent. But it has the advantage that in
being subsequent and taking a synoptic view sees something
entirely new and unique ("etwas durchaus Neues und Eigen-
artiges"): it sees the connections ( Zusammenhange ) , the
order ( Qrdnung ) , the relations and regularities which run
through the realm of values ("die das Wertreich selbst durch-
ziehenden Relationen und Gresetzlichkeiten" ) . For philo-
sophical ethics the stages of the wandering of a temporary
Wertschau are not lost ( verloren ) . In it they are trans-
muted ( aufgehoben ) and correlated ( zusammengefugt ) • Its
tendency is towards the system of values (System der Vtferte).^9
In another context Hartmann refers to the same aim--
the aim of philosophical ethics to systematize values:
Es handelt sich urn eine durchgehende G-liederung des
ethlschen Wertreichs, sowohl desjenigen der Sachen und
Sachverhalte als auch desjenigen der Personen und ihres
Verhaltens,50
3. The Order of the Wertreich
a. The Lack of Systematic Structure
Hartmann' s consideration of the laws of the Wertreich
starts from his intuitive presupposition that the Wertreich is
29 ipia *. 144.
50 Ibid
. ,
245.
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a scale of values, that each value has its eternally fixed
place assigned for it, and that Wertgefuhl is the only
cognitive authority which could test the scale of values.
This presupposition, however, is atomistically intuitive
and untested by coherent thought. Hartmann himself holds
that one's Wertbllck is often so prone to one-sidedness
and limitation-^ that it must be corrected and supplemented
by synoptic thought which is the source of a new and unique
Insight into ethical knowledge—an Insight which is beyond
the scope of any immediate intution.-^ If this last con-
tention is right, his consideration of the laws of the
Wertreich must be based on a precarious presupposition,
whose validity we shall investigate more adequately later.^4
He holds that the extent of the Wertreich is greater
not only than a philosophical consciousness but also than
a Wertgefuhl .35 Both of the two poles of the realm of
values ("die beiden Pole des Wertreichs" ) , that of the
simplest elements and that of the most complex materials,
31 ipia.
. 497,499.
32
IM£'» 556, 557; See pages 2,3 of this dis-
sertation.
55
* 144; See pages 2,3 of this dissertation.
54 See pages 128-140 of this dissertation.
35 Hartmann, Ethik, 495.
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n .36
elude his survey ( Uberschau ) . Hence the lack of com-
pletely systematic structure in the Wertreich.
G-uided by his Wertgefuhl , he arranges all the dis-
cerned values in ascending order of intrinsic importance.
He maintains that this ascending order is objective in the
sense that it is eternally fixed, ^7 that it subsists beyond
all actuality (Wlrkllchkelt ) and consciousness ( Bewusstsein )
,
perduring side by side ( neben ) with the world of things and
38persons.
Hartmann claims that the objectivity of his VYertreich
39is the same as that of Platonic Ideas; the differences and
similarities between these two realms, together with sys-
tematic coherence in each of them, we shall investigate
later. 40
In the lowest stratum of the above-mentioned
ascending order of values Hartmann sees the most general
valuational antitheses ("die allgemeinsten Wertgegensatze"^41
which consist of three valuational oppositions: 1. Modal
36 I Did
., 496.
37 Ibid., 497,499.
38 ibid
., 140.
59 Ibid
., 108,109,140.
40 See pages 119-126 of this dissertation.
41 Hartmann, Ethik, 267-303.
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oppositions (the antinomy of necessity and freedom, the
antinomy of activity and inertia, and so on); 2. Relation-
al opposites (harmony and conflict, simplicity and complex-
ity, and so on);^ 3. Qualitative and quantitative oppo-
sitions (universality and singularity, humanity and nation,
and so on)
,
In the second stratum are discerned the fundamental
values which condition contents ("die inhaltlich bedingenden
G-rundwerte" ) , which consist of valuational foundations in
the subject (consciousness, foresight and so on) and of
goods-values (situation, happiness and so on),^
In the third stratum are found fundamental moral
values ( die slttllchen G-rundwerte ) , which are four in
number: 1. the good; 2. the noble; 3. richness of experience;
4. purity.^6
In the fourth stratum he discerns special moral
47
values ( spezielle sittllche Werte ) , which can be divided
into two groups. The first group is that of general virtues
42 Ibid., 271-•276.
43 Ibid., 276--285.
44 Ibid., 285-305.
45
Ibid., 328-335.
46 Ibid.
,
336- 378.
47 Ibid., 379- 492.
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such as justice; wisdom; courage; self-control; the
Aristotelian virtues; brotherly love; truthfulness and up-
rightness; trustworthiness and fidelity; trust and faith;
modesty, humility, aloofness; the value of social inter-
Afi
course; love of the remotest; and radiant virtue. The
second group is that of individual virtues, such as person-
ality and personal love. ^9
What Hartmann here maintains amounts to the fact that
situated in the highest stratum of his Wertrelch is personal
love which is permanent, universal and genuinely objective;
and his view of the objectivity of value is such that this
personal love eternally persists beyond any human experience
of such a value. This cannot be reasonably explained apart
from theism which means that the Cosmic Source and Gontinuer
of personal love permanently exists. It is true that one's
belief in G-od must be based on the consideration, not only
of this one aspect of human experience, but its whole con-
crete range viewed coherently. Nevertheless, it is also
true that Hartmann 1 s view of the objectivity of value such
as personal love would create a most incoherent item in his
atheistic metaphysics. ^° Hartmann, or anyone, who thinks
48 Ibid .. 381-461.
49 Ibid .. 463-492.
50 See pages 141-175 of this dissertation.
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persistently about value experience must inquire about its
validity, its source, and its destiny. And Hartmann's
contention that personal love, as an abstract impersonal
entity, eternally subsists, might explain the validity of
the ideal value of our personal love, but would leave unex-
plained the actual phenomena of "axiogenesis" and "ax-
iosoteria.
"
^ An abstract ideal has "no power to generate
values or conserve them"; that power inheres only in G-od,
who is a person and adopts the ideal as his own.
In investigating the Wertrelch thus stratified
Hartmann's Wert&efuhl discovers in it the intimation
(Andeutunp; ) of six laws: 1. Laws of stratification ("G-esetze
des Schichtungsverhaltnisses" ) ; 2. Laws of foundation
("G-esetze des Fundierungsverhaltnisses" ) ; 3. Laws of oppo-
sition ("G-esetze der G-egensat zlichkeit" ) ; 4. Laws of comple-
mentation ("Gesetze des Komplementarverhaltnisses" ) ; 5. Laws
of valuational height ("gesetze der Ranghtthe" ) ; 6. Laws of
valuational strength ("Gesetze der Wertstarke" ) .53
In order that he may understand more clearly the
meaning of each one of those laws he employs the following
methods: Wertgefuhl
. valuational analysis (Wertanaly se)
,
5^
51 See Brightman, POR, 230.
52 iPia
. ,
230-231.
55 Hartmann, Ethik, 498-500.
54 ipia »» 521,528,563.
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synopsis (dbershau) , and comparison between the intui-
tively discerned laws of the Wertrelch and the laws which
are valid in the realm of categories . 56
Hartmann holds that he is Justified in employing
the last method because in a more extended sense values are
as yet categories (principles of existence sui generis), and
have in them a categorial arrangement, except that they are
other categories than those of ontological reality.-^ The
first two and the last two of the above-mentioned laws
receive the most elucidation from this method, says Hart-
58
mann.
b. Stratification and the Foundational Relation
Hartmann holds that in the categorial realm the laws
of stratification play a conspicuous part* There are four
laws:
1. The law of recurrence (Wlederkehr ) . The lower
principles and their elements recur in the higher as their
partial factors; thus they may enter into the foreground
55 IWLd., 556,557,563.
56 IM£.> 499,5^3-545.
57 Ibid
. , 499; Hartmann confuses values and ideals.
Hence this statement.
58
Hartmann, Ethik, 500.
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or the background of the higher structures, and accordingly
be visible ( sichtbar ) in them or vanish ( verschwinden )
,
In both cases they are pervading structural elements
( "durchgehende Strukturelemente" )
.
^
2. The law of transformation (Abwandlung ) . In their
recurrence these elements are not affected by the structure
of the higher forms. They vary in many ways, according to
the role which falls to them in the higher complex. Only
their elemental essence remains the same.
3. The law of novelty (Novum). The higher forms
cannot be resolved into the various elements recurring in
them. Together with the elementary stratification they
always manifest something new, which is not contained in
the elements. It is this novelty which determines the
prominence ( Hervortreten ) or seclusion ( Zurticktreten ) of
the elements, as well as the transformation (Abwandlung )
of their significance.^ 1
4. The law of distance between strata (Schichten-
dlstanz)
.
The superimposit ion of the higher upon the lower
principles does not advance in unbroken continuity but in
59 Hartmann, Ethik, 503; Hartmann, G-ME, 255-257;
Hartmann, Ethik
. 543-545.
60 Hartmann, Ethik
, 543-545.
61 Ibid.
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strata, which are separated from one another by distinct
intervals ("in Schichten, die gegeneinander durch deutliche
Schichtendistanzen abgehoben sind").^ 2
In the realm of values Hartmann finds the laws of
6^
stratification modified. Here the presence of the con-
ditioning relation ( Fundlerungsverhaltnls ) complicates the
situation. It is the relation of goods and situational
values to moral values ("das Verhaltnls der G-uter= und
Sachverhaltswerte zu den sittlichen Werten").^ Hartmann
discovers three differences between the conditioning
relation and the relation of stratification ( Schlchtungs -
verhaltnls )
.
65
1. In stratification the lower value reappears as
an element in the higher; it is contained in it in a
modified form, and cannot be removed from its substance.
In the conditioning relation the lower element does not
enter as a constituent into the higher value. For example,
the moral value no longer has in it anything of the
situational value. The latter is neither transformed
( abgewandelt ) in it nor even merely completed by any new
62 Ibid
.
63 Ibid
.. 504.
64 Ibid
., 506.
65 Ibid
., 506-509.
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factor ("durch ein Novum erganzt"), but is simply presup-
posed ( vorausgesetzt ) in it as its axiological condition,
2. In the Schichtungsverhaltnis t when the higher
value is actualized, the recurring lower element is neces-
sarily actualized at the same time. In the Fundlerungs -
verhaltnls , when the conditioned value is actualized, the
conditioning value is not necessarily actualized with it.
For example, the value of a moral disposition is indeed
dependent upon the value of the object aimed at; but its
actualization in the person depends in no way upon his
achievement of the object, but simply upon the object's
being intended in his disposition.^7
3. Wherever there is a stratification of values, the
matter ( Mater le ) of the higher value is not only conditioned
by that of the lower, but even the grade (Werthtihe ) of the
higher is conditioned by the grade of the lower. For
example, the value of radiant virtue ( schenkende Tugend )
^
grows with the fulness of life within it. However, this
dependence also does not reappear in the Fundlerungs -
verhaltnls
. Here the moral value rises or falls with the
degree of commitment (Einsatz) , as well as with the depth
66 Ibid
.. 507.
67 Ibid
., 507-508.
68
Ibid
.. 456-462.
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and genuineness of the intention ( Intention ) , but not with
the height of the value aimed at .69
c. Oppositional Relation and the
Synthesis of Values
It is theoretically possible, says Hartmann, that
concerning every individual value there are the following
five types of contrast in their anomalous inter-connected-
ness: 1. Value-neutrality ( Wert-Wert indifferenz ) ; 2. Dis-
value-neutrality (Unwert-Wertlndifferenz ) ; 3. Value-
disvalue (Wert-Unwert ) ;4. Value-value ( Wert-Wert ) ; 5. Dis-
value-dlsvalue ( Unwert-Unwert )
Hartmann holds that the Wertlndifferenz has a
peculiar meaning: it is the fixed point (der feste Punkt )
,
in relation to which the distances of height first attain
an absolute meaning. Hence he considers the first two
types of contrast later, when he investigates the order of
71
rank (Ranghohenordnung ) in the Wertrelch .
He discovers that the relation between disvalues,
which corresponds to an antinomy between value and value,
is not antinomical. Purity and fulness of life stand in an
69 Ibld «
.
508.
70 I£id., 513.
71 Ifria * » 513-514; Ibid ., 558-564.
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antinomic relation; but impurity and moral poverty may be
compatible. In the diagram only three of the four basic
A
f
& relations represented are in oppo-
sition (A to B, A to -A and B to -B)
,
but the fourth (-A to -B) is not
oppositional. Even the two diagonally
-A *"S
placed connections (A to -B and B to -A) manifest no
oppositional character. Purity does not conflict with
moral poverty; neither does fulness of life conflict with
7?impurity .
'
Hartmann admits that in their concrete materials
there are contrasts enough among disvalues; arrogance and
self-belittlement, and so on. He says that this type of
contrast is familiar to us from Aristotle* s doctrine of the
73
virtues. J
Hartmann discovers that, hidden behind the
Aristotelian virtues, there is always a duality of anti-
thetically placed values, the synthesis of which con-
stitutes the sought-for virtue. As Hartmann points out,
it is untrue that the Aristotelian f\(rffirr^ is merely built
upon the antithetic of disvalues: actually it is also built
72 ibid., 515.
75 Ibid., 516; Aristotle, Nlc. Eth . t Books II,vl,ix.
74
' Hartmann, Ethik, 517.
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upon an antithetic of values. 7 ^ The Aristotelian virtues,
says Hartmann, are really valuational syntheses. They are
complex values, which never consist of one-sided enhance-
ments of single valuational elements alone, but of inner
organic combinations of two materially contrasted elements!^
From this he infers that every moral value has a
"barbed hook" 77 (Wlderhaken ) , not indeed in Itself but for
men; there is a limit beyond which its dominance ( Herr-
schaf
t
) in consciousness ceases to be of value. 78 It is
only in their syntheses that the "barbed hook of values"
(Wlderhaken der Werte ) is diminished, their tyranny in
consciousness ("ihre Tyrannei im Wertbewusstsein" ) paralysed
( paralyslert )
.
7^ Thus he concludes that every value may
reach true fulfilment only in its synthesis with others
—
only in its synthesis with all (in Synthese mit alien). ^°
d. The Complementary Relationship
Hartmann holds that there is linked ( knupft ) to the
75 Ibid
., 519.
76 ifria
.
.
518.
77 The "barbed hook" is Brightman's translation
which he gave in a note of October 1, 1940.
78 TTHartmann, Ethik
, 525.
79 Ibid
. t 526.
80 Ibid.
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oppositional relationship a second one, of a different
kind but lying in the same dimension: the complementary
relationship. He sees it in trust and trustworthiness,
faith and fidelity, and so on. And there is always this
peculiarity in it, that the one value requires ( verlangt)
the other, has fulfilment of meaning ( Slnnerfullung ) in it,
but without its own worth thereby becoming dependent. Thus
the trust bestowed upon one who is unreliable or the
fidelity shown to one who is suspicious is still of moral
worth; it lacks only the axiologlcal completion of its
meaning in the adequate attitude of the other.
^
2
Hartmann points out that this relation extends down
to the fundlerende vVerte « Thus material goods are
complementary to certain biological values, upon which the
capacity of the person to enjoy goods depends; for example,
physical comfort, health; but complementary not less to the
communal good of legal status, which renders possible the
84
use and enjoyment of material goods.
In the domain of moral values, says Hartmann, the
Komplementarverhaltnls does not consist in the completion
81 Ibid., 532.
82 Ibid
, , 532-533.
83 305-335.
84 Ibid., 534.
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( Erganzung ) of one and the same complex attitude, but in
one person's moral completion through the moral value of
another. In other words, there is established in the
reciprocity of the two persons an ethically real structure
of a higher order ("ein ethisch reales Gebilde hflherer
Qrdnung"), which as a union of two dispositions bears a
unique value which is higher and more complex. ^5
Hartmann holds that this is an inter-personal
synthesis ( interpersonale Wertsynthese ) . As it forms out
of the two values one value, so also it forms out of the
two Werttrager one Werttrager . And as the one value is the
higher, so the one Werttrager is the more able to carry the
i a 86values.
e. The Grade and the Strength of Values
The order of rank ( Rango rdnung ) of values, says
Hartmann, does not simply concern the principle of valu-
ational height (Werthtthe ) , but involves in itself a second
decisive factor: valuational strength ( Wertstarke ) . He
holds that the regularity of height (Htthe) and strength
( Starke ) is a fundamental categorial law, which prevails
ontologically in all ideal and real Being ( Seln ) and thence
5 Ibid
., 539.
6 ioia *. 540.
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extends over the Wertreich ; but in this extension
( Ubergrelfen ) it gains a new meaning. '
According to Hartmann, there are three laws which
here come in question. In content they link up with the
laws of stratification, but unlike these latter they do not
concern the structure of the categorial edifice ("die
Struktur des kategorialen Aufbaues"), but the dynamic type
of dependence ("der dynamische Typus der Abhangigkeit").
They are laws of dependence (Abhangigkeit sgesetze )
.
1. The Law of Strength: the higher principle is
always the more dependent and in this sense the weaker.
The more unconditioned and in this sense the stronger prin-
ciple is always the lower one.
2. The Law of Material: every lower principle is
only raw material for the higher which is raised upon it.
Since the lower is the stronger, the dependence of the
weaker upon it goes only so far as the scope of the higher
formation is limited by the definiteness ( Bestimmthelt
)
and peculiarity ( Eisenart ) of the material.
3. The Law of Freedom: compared with the lower,
every higher principle is a new formation which is raised
upon it. As such it has unlimited scope ( unbegrenzter
Spielraum ) . Thus in spite of dependence upon the lower
87 ipia *. 543.

101
88
principle the higher is free, as against the lower.
Hartmann holds that the way in which these three
laws are valid in the Wertrelch is Indicated by Wertgefuhl .
If the clue to valuational height (Index der W erthflhe ) lies
in the assenting feeling of value ( das zustimmende Wert-
gefuhl ) , as it expresses itself in specific responses such
as approval ( Bllllgung ) , respect ( Verehrung ) , and admiration
( Bewunderung ) , so the clue to valuational strength ( Index
der Wertstarke ) lies in the negative, rejecting feeling of
value ("das negative, absprechende Wertgefuhl"), as it
89
asserts itself wherever values are violated ( verletzt )
•
According to Hartmann, das absprechende Wertgefuhl also has
its specific responses, which are reactions to disvalues.
These show an independent scale of intensification ("eine
selbstandige Skala der Steigerung") such as disapproval
( Ulssbllllgung ) t contempt (Vera chtung ) , abhorrence ( Abscheu )
,
and so on. He holds that this is not a simple reflection
of the scale of positive valuational responses ("einfaches
Spiegelbild nach der Skala der posit iven Wertantworten" )
.
The variability of valuational strength, which is independ-
ent of height ("die von der Werthtthe unabhangige Varia-
bility der Wertstarke"), is attached to the independence
88 Ibid
. , 544; Hartmann, PgS, 15-17.
89 Hartmann, Ethik, 546-547.
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of the negative scale. 9°
Here Hartmann maintains that this is proof of the
peculiar autonomous character of valuational strength as
compared with valuational height. When the higher value
is violated, the transgression ( Vergehen ) is less, not
more serious. When the stronger value is fulfilled, however,
the meritoriousness ( Verdlenst ) is not greater but less.
He gathers this fact into a formula (Formel) in which the
meaning of the basic categorlal law, when transported into
the axiological realm, is clearly given:
The higher law is always the more conditioned, the
more dependent, and in this sense the weaker; its fulfil-
ment is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the
fulfilment of the lower values. The more unconditioned,
the more elementary, and in this sense the stronger value
is always the lower; it is only an axiological foundation
of moral life ( "axiologlsch.es Fundament des sittllchen
Lebens"), not a fulfilment of its meaning ( "Erfullung
seines Sinnes"). The most grelvous transgressions are those
against the lowest values, but the greatest moral desert
attaches to the highest values.
^
90 Ibid *. 5^7.
91 ifria * , 548.
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f . Value and Valuatlonal Indifference
Hartmann holds that In addition to the limitations
of Wertgefuhl what makes the Rangordnung der 7/erte difficult
to grasp objectively is the circumstance that, so far as
most students of ethics are concerned, there is no fixed
point of reference ( fester Rlchtpunkt ) in the scale. The
same holds true, says Hartmann, of the Rangordnung der
Unwerte . 92
In the indifference-point ( Indlfferenzpunkt ) Hart-
mann discovers such a fixed point to which all that is of
value or contrary to it is related. It is the absolute
zero of dimensional elevation ("der absolute Nullpunkt der
Htihendimension" ) . To it corresponds --throughout the whole
extent of the Wertreich--a single average level ("ein
elnheitliches mittleres Niveau"), at which without dis-
tinction of qualitative difference value and disvalue
separate. He holds that this level of neutrality is the
93
same for all the qualitatively different scales of value.
He points out that the Indifferenzpunkt is not
necessarily midway in the single valuational scale ("die
Mitte der einzelnen Wertskalen" ) . Rather it is to be found
now nearer to the value, now to the disvalue, according to
92 lDid *
.
553.
95 iMd.
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the rank ( Ranghflhe ) of the value. It may of course lie
midway also; and there is a series of values of average
grade ("eine Reihe von Werten mittlerer Ranghtthe" ) , of
which this applies approximately.^
Hartmann holds that with the height of the value
the absolute grade of the whole valuational scale ("die
absolute Htthenlage der ganzen Wert skala" ) moves against
the Indifferenzpunkt , and in the same way the grade of the
disvalue. In the case of the lower values the whole scale
lies more below, in the case of the higher more above, the
Indifferenzpunkt . Hence with the lower value the anti-
value ( Unwert ) is far below it; with the higher the Unwert
is near to the Indifferenzpunkt . Since the depth (Tiefen-
abstand ) of the Unwert is the measure of the grievousness
of transgression against the value, but since in the
grievousness of the transgression is seen the strength of
the value, it follows universally ( allgemeln ) and on
principle ( prinzlplell ) from this that the lower values
are the stronger--a fact which hitherto could be seen only
inductively from particular values. 95
94 I^ld
. , 559.
95 Ibid .. 561.
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4. Criticism of Hartmann' s System of
Values as a Whole
a. In considering Kant's subjectivism Hartmann states
that it is not conceivable that the will should first give
the law and then transgress it. This statement, however, is
untenable because it is our common experience that we some-
times violate a self-imposed principle. What a will he must
Q6have never to contradict himself. Socrates, too, believed
that intentional inconsistency was impossible, 9^ but he was
wrong. If a student wishes to be educated, yet does not
study, he violates the principle which he has Imposed upon
himself. 98
Denying Kant's conviction that the moral law, hence
also every moral value, emanates from or depends on reason
(Vernunft ) , Hartmann holds: (1) Value is perceived only a
priori; (2) What is perceived a priori is objective, though
independent of experience; (3) Hence value, which is perceived
a priori is objective."
This argument is based on an atomistic conception of
96 Hartmann, Ethik, 91.
97 Plato, Gharmides ; See Taylor, Plato, 57.
98 Brightman, ML, 102-104.
00yj Hartmann, Ethik
.
94.

106
the meaning of a priori. According to an alternative view,
a priori principles cannot even be known to "be a priori
unless they are necessary to a coherent universe of dis-
course, which in turn must be related to other universes
of discourse and criticized with regard to its coherence. 10
b. Hartmann maintains, through an atomistic intu-
ition, that the relation between a valuable thing and a
perceiving subject is absolutely fixed and is objectively
drawn into the structure of the valuational materials.
From this he infers that goods are objective. 101
Here an alternative view is presented by Brightman
who holds that our perceptions of values, which are not
tested by "rational norms (rational meaning logically con-
sistent and coherent)," 102 are only value-claims, which
may sometimes be illusory; only systematic thought can
support the claim. For example, maternal love is an
instinctive, empirical value. Yet a mother may show it in
an unenlightened way. Such love becomes a true value only
when it is tested by intelligent regard for the child's
welfare. Hence, only when value-claims are consistent
100
Ibid., 126-127.
Pages 69, 70 of this dissertation,
101
102
Brightman, P0R, 91-93.
105 Brightman, ML, 131.
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and coherent with each other and with the other facts of
experience, are the claims verified; only tested value-
claims are true values.
Hartmann holds that moral value in the conduct of a
person does not exist for a subject but adheres to the
person as a quality. From this he infers that moral value
has a purer self-existence ("ein reineres Ansichsein") than
a goods -value.
Here Hartmann fails to note that all valuing is a
107
conscious experience. 1 Moreover, he has not demonstrated
that the particular moral value which adheres to a particu-
lar person is genuinely and objectively moral. At this
point it is possible to hold that only what a rational
system of the moral ideal commands us to regard as moral is
moral. For example, filial piety which is traditionally
regarded as a supreme moral value in Japan may manifest
108itself in such a way that a rational system of the moral
104 Bertocci holds that the standard of true value
is the result of the coherent systemat izat ion of value-
claims (Bertocci, EAG-, 285). This statement is not coherent
enough for it falls to consider the relationship of the
value-claims to the other facts of experience.
105 Brightman, POR, 93.
106
Hartmann, Ethlk
, 128.
107 This matter will be considered later (pages 116-
119 of this dissertation. Hartmann confuses values and ideals.
108 This refers to a Japanese girl who volunteered to
become a geisha that her father might meet his financial
obligation.
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ideal cannot sanction it. The moral ideal, then, must be
taken as a whole. As Haeckel said, "Reason is the highest
good of man." 109 Rational system must survey, order,
unify, and systematize all the instances of our moral
experience.
c. Hartmann distinguishes between the Materie of
value and its Wert charackter ; in the case of the value
of trust the Materie is the idea of trust ("die Idee des
Vertrauens" ) ; the Materie is the ideal structure of
essence of specifically formed relationship ("die ideale
Wesensstruktur eines besonders gearteten Seins-
verhaltnisses")
,
110 Here Hartmann' s view of the Materie
means something like what Brightman means by the ideal,
which is "a definition of value" 111 or "a general concept
of a type of experience which we value." 112
Hartmann goes on to maintain that the Wertcharakter
,
distinguished from the Materie t is always self-existent
and objectively valuable. 11 -^
However, here a thinker who appeals to coherence
109 Cited by Brightman, ML, 84; See Fabricus, AG, 28,
110 Hartmann, Ethlk
. 133-134.
111 Brightman, POR, 91.
112
Ibid .. 90.
11
^ Hartmann, Ethlk
.
134.
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would say that the Wertcharakter of trust is nothing but
an empirical value or value-claim which is indeed the very-
stuff of value experience "but may sometimes be subject to
illusion. We cannot know that the trust under consideration
114is the right kind of trust until we realize that that is
coherent with other value-claims and other facts of exper-
ience. We know that the Wert charakter is a true value only
after we have tested it by rational norms and thus have
discovered its function in personality as & whole.
For example, some people in Japan trust that what
the government declares to be right is always right. Yet
an independent thinker must test the validity of a partic-
ular form of trust on their part, say their trust in the
government's decree that Shlntoism ought to be imposed on
everyone who lives in the country. He must test such trust
by the rational system of Moral Laws and all the other
facts of experience, especially by his knowledge of God.
d. Hartmann holds that in intuiting values the
subject is always purely receptive; he, himself, on his
side, determines nothing, but they determine him. In this
respect, Hartmann claims, our knowledge of values is
Cf. Brentano, TRW, in which he calls true value
"rightly characterized love." (TRW, 16).
115 See Brightman, POR, 93.
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absolutely different from our knowledge of Anschauungen ,
G-edanken , or Vorstellungen . Hence values must be self-
existent and obj ective.-'-^^
117
Llesser regards this argument as valid ' but in
other contexts Hartmann himself refers to some actual
T 1 ft
cases of W ert t au s chung x when he mentions the false ob-
j ectification of instrumental values. This could be illus-
trated by a miser who regards an economic value as intrinsic,
110
or a legendary emperor * who identified a natural value
like longevity with an intrinsic value (his highest aim in
life). However, when we test such value-claims by reason
we find that both the economic value and longevity are
merely instrumental values. It is, then, impossible to
hold that in intuiting values the subject is always purely
receptive, and at the same time explain how these cases of
Werttauschung can take place.
Brightman presents an interpretation of the knowing
process which is inconsistent with Hartmann' s intultionism:
116 Hartmann, Ethik, 133-134.
117 Messer, WdG, 14.
118 Hartmann, QMS
,
54l; Hartmann, Ethik, 55,141-142;
pages 54-57 of this dissertation.
A Chinese story.
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The reference of our experience to something beyond its
present range is far from being a proof that the object
referred to (the referent) actually exists outside the
realm of imagination or conceivable essence.... When
we refer to any supposed object (be it real or imaglnery)
we are setting up what may be called a knowledge-claim.
Every experience, whatever else it may be, always in-
cludes a knowledge-claim which refers to something beyond
the experience.
...We experience only our present consciousness; of
this and this alone we are certain.... Knowledge-claims
are never perfectly well-grounded; but when a reasonable
degree of coherent empirical evidence and logical con-
sistency supports belief in a knowledge-claim, we call it
knowledge. 120
e. Hartmann holds that, like the real object of
perception, value offers an absolute resistance to our will
in the sense that it is Impossible for us to perceive it
121
otherwise than just as it is perceived.
However, the same is true of the snakes seen by the
victim of delirium tremens. Here again Hartmann Identifies
a knowledge- claim with an absoultely certain knowledge of
the object perceived. According to an alternative view,
however, all knowledge is "belief (more or less well-
grounded) that the referent of the knowledge is as described,"
and yet it is "never so certain that we know any object
correctly as it is that we are now conscious." 122 Our
perception of any and every object is valid only after it
120 Brightman, POR, 165-166.
121 Hartmann, Ethik, 139.
122 Brightman, POR, 165-166.
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has been tested by the ideal function of reason, which
"surveys, orders, unifies, and systematizes." 12 -^
f. If values were purely subjective, Hartmann holds,
Wert taus chung would be impossible, hence Werttauschung
124
Itself proves the objectivity of value.
This argument contradicts his other arguments for
the objectivity of value, which imply that Y/erttauschung
is impossible. 12 ^ It is, however, quite conceivable that
values are objective and yet our perceptions of them may
sometimes be vitiated by Werttauschung . Here again an
alternative view is found: Though all such perceptions are
empirical values which are the very stuff of value exper-
ience and without which there is no value experience at all,
and though many value-claims are true values, some value-
claims are not entirely free from subjective illusion.
According to this view, a true value is what we still
value after the testing of our empirical values by rational
127
norms which are based on a systematic organization of
all value-claims and all other facts of exoerience. For
125 Brightman, ML, 84.
124 Hartmann, Ethik
,
141-142.
125
Pages 80, 81 of this dissertation.
126 Ibid
., pages, 2, 3, 65, 66, 68-70.
127 See Brightman, POR, 93.
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example, an experience of alcoholic intoxication cannot
meet such a test but a philosopher's devotion to truth can.
Thus without appeal to reason we cannot always know the
fact that a certain perception of value is a Werttauschung.
^ence this argument for objectivity is a repudiation of the
appeal to intuition alone, and is essentially an argument
based on discriminations between coherent and incoherent
intuitions I
These investigations reveal that his arguments for
the objectivity of value are ultimately based on his con-
viction that value is always known a priori and what is
known a priori is objectively valid. Thus his arguments
for the objectivity of value disregard the claims of co-
herence .
An alternative argument for the objectivity of value
is presented by Sorley and Brightman when they hold that
just as the hypothesis of a real world is the most coherent
way of interpreting our sense experiences of nature and of
communication with other persons, so our value-judgment
s
can be organized into a system which is most coherent when
we interpret value as an objective claim that reality makes,
rather than as our merely subjective demand for pleasure
or satisfaction. *° Bertocci interprets this same argument
Sorley, MVIS, 172 ff
.
, 498 ff.; Brightman, ITP,
159.
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as follows:
A coherent interpretation of such value-judgment
s
indicates that values are as metaphysically objective
as are the existential objects reached by way of a
coherent interpretation of sense-impressions.
It is true that arguments for axiological objectivity
lack the mathematical accuracy of those for physical ob-
jectivity. But that accuracy is achieved only by abstrac-
tion.
g. So far Hartmann's arguments for the objectivity
of value have been examined. Now let us move on to
examine what he means by this objectivity of value. For
him it has six meanings:
(1) Values are originally patterns of an ethically
ideal sphere, of a realm with its own structures, its own
1"50
laws and order. **
(2) This ideal realm of values subsists for itself
—
beyond actuality just as much as beyond consciousness; and
Wertgefuhl alone can grasp them.
Es ein an sich bestehendes Reich der Werte gibt,
einen echten x£<j?^oc vo^jos , der ebenso jenseits der
Wirklichkeit, wir Jenseits des Bewusstseins besteht,
—
eine nicht konstruierte, erdlchtete oder ertraumte,
sondern tatsachlich bestehende und im Phanomen des Wert-
gefuhls greifbar werdende ethisch ideal e Sphere.... 1
"
129 Bertocci, EAG, 163.
150 Hartmann, Ethik
, 136.
131 Ibid ., 140.
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(3) The structure of the Ideal self-existence re-
appears In that of the real In so far that the aprlorlstic
knowledge of ideal Being at the same time constitutes an
inner foundation of all knowledge of the real.
Die Struktur des idealen Ansichseins kehrt in der
des realen wieder--zwar nicht restlos und nicht die des
letzteren erschttpfend, wohl aber so welt, dass die
aprlorische Erkenntnis des idealen Seins zugleich elne
lnnere G-rundlage aller Realerkenntnis ausmacht.32
(4) Values are materials, structures which constitute
a special source in things, relations and persons ("Inhalte,
Materien, Strukturen, die ein spezlfisches Quale an Dingen,
Verhaltnissen oder Personen ausmachen" ) .133
persons in whose actual conduct it is embodied or not.
Am eigentlichen W ertcharakter von etwas, d. h. von
einer spezifischen Materie, etwa der Wahrhaftigkeit oder
der Liebe, macht es gar keinen Unterschied aus, ob es
Personen gibt, in deren wirklichen Verhalten er realisiert
1st oder nicht.
(6) Values are eternally unchanging essences in the
sense of subsisting beyond the change of individual existence
( "Wesenheiten, die liber dem Wechsel des individuellen Daseins
bestehen") .135
132 ibid
.. 135.
133 Ibid., 109; this passage is quoted approvingly
by Messer in his WdO-, 13.
134 Hartmann, Ethik
, 136.
135 Ibid., 135.
(5) It makes no difference to value whether there be
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(7) The whole realm of values constitutes a multi-
dimensional scale where each value, in comparison with all
others, has a fixed place (Ort ) , relation (Verhaltnls ) and
character (Wertcharakter) .136
The theoretical construction of Hartmann* s system
of ethics deals chiefly with the last item, namely, his
scale of values. 137 Later the evaluation of this will
appear separately.
Concerning his view of the objectivity of value we
must say first of all that he confuses values and Ideals.
In one context he definitely affirms:
Werte haben kein reales Ansichsein. . . . Die eigentliche
Seinsweise der Werte 1st offenkundlg die eines idealen
Ansichseins.138
Brightman has stated, in correspondence, the dif-
ference between his view of value and Hartmann* s:
When Hartmann speaks of values as essences, he is
speaking of what I call Ideals. Every valid ideal,
Indeed every concept of every sort, qua concept, is time-
less in the sense of having a fixed and determinate
meaning. Whenever I refer to what I mean by cat today,
I must use exactly the same concept I now have, or else
my reference will not be valid. If I alter my concept
of cat, it remains eternally true that I. once had the
former concept and now have a new one, which in turn is
eternally valid as what I now believe. This, of course,
applies to ideals.
But I do not regard an ideal as a value. An ideal
is a valid concept of what would be a value if it were
136 ibid
. , 497.
1"57
Vide pages 85-104 of this dissertation.
138 Hartmann, Ethik
.
136.
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realized in temporal-personal experience. The eternal
truth that I ought to be benevolent is an ideal; but I
find no value in that ideal until I actually am benev-
olent; then my actual benevolence is a value because it
is a real experience conforming to the ideal. Hence I
say that values are not fixed entities, but conscious
fulfillments of ideals. The Ideals themselves are
fixed concepts (although I may be ignorant of what the
valid fixed concept of justice is); but values are
never mere concepts. Ideals are objective as G-od's
knowledge; values are objective as God's experience, and
it is in process of temporal development so that even
G-od's values are not static .^39
For Hartmann the realm of values enjoys its objectiv-
ity in an Isolated way because in the rest of the world
there is only rigid mechanism, ^^(of course, no G-od1^"1-),
except for our moral potentialities. His scale of values
is abstractly conceived and is incoherent with his total
world-view. Here he has created many a mystery rather than
succeeding in explaining reasonably all the moral exper-
iences in connection with the rest of the whole concrete
range of human experience. And what makes his view even
Brlghtman's letter of September 9, 1940; "An
ideal is a general concept of a type of experience which we
approve in relation to a complete view of all our exper-
ience, including all our approvals, and which we acknowledge
that we ought to realize." (Brightman, POI, 86); "Values are
conscious fulfillments of ideals, not fixed entities or
things," (Brightman, POR, 106 footnote).
l40
Hartmann, Ethik, 187-188. See page 38 of this
dissertation.
lZfl Vide pages 141-175 of this dissertation.
Pringle-Pattlson (IGRP, 38), Sorley (MVIG-,VIII )
,
Brightman (PI, 210-212)
,
Taylor (FM, Vol. I, 36), Van Dusen
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more incoherent is the fact that he is definitely aware of
the meaning and importance of coherence14^ ±n one's phllo-
1 44
sophizing.
Both Hartmann and Messer believe in an ideal self-
existent realm of values, which is indifferent to our real
world, the only point of contact between the two realms
being Wertgefuhl
.
l45 As to this function of Wertgefuhl
Brightman stated in correspondence:
By a value Hartmann means an ideal, yet for an
ideal, I do not see that Wertgefuhl is necessary. Knowl-
edge suffices,
Hartmann' s chief error is in supposing that value
experience is merely a Wertgefuhl
,
merely a beholding
of eternal ideals. Rather, value experience is the
creation of actual values which conform to the rule of
the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and variety,
within that rule.
The objectivity of the ideal is its eternal sub-
sistence. But if values are objective, they must exist,
(PMSG-, 111) all agree in regarding it as one of the most
important problems of philosophy to investigate the relation
between value and reality. This means that Hartmann'
s
failure coherently to explain this relation counts serious-
ly against his philosophy.
143 Hartmann, Ethlk, 38,144,245,267,496,527,534,535,
5^,556,557; See pages 2, 3,83-85 of this dissertation.
144 Whitehead defines philosophy as the endeavor to
frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general
ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can
be interpreted (PR, 4); Brightman defines it as an attempt
to discover a coherent and unified definition of the real
(Brightman, POR, 534).
145 Hartmann, Ethlk
. 107,140; Messer, WdG, 16; pages 1,
7,8,144 of this dissertation.
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not merely subsist; and exist in an objective mind.
On Hartmann's view value is never experienced; and
what it defines has no coherent relation to any actual
experience of value. It would make all claims to actual
value experience false, and hence would be a theory of
value with no valid empirical basis. Since it confuses
value and ideal, it is incoherent with the reference of
these terms to different types of referent.
Hartmann holds that since, in their mode of Being
( Seinsweise ) .values are Platonic ideas ( Platonlsche Ideen)
,
we cannot grasp ( erfas sen ) them by thought (Denken ) but we
can only behold ( schauen ) them by an inner vision ( eine
lnnere Schau) or Wertfuhlen just as Plato beheld his
Ideas. 147
Das Platonische Motiv des Schauens gerade passt gut zu
auf das, was die materiale Ethik Wertfuhlen nennt.... 1 ^"8
A comparison of Hartmann's idea of beholding values
with Plato's own idea of beholding his Ideas reveals that
Hartmann misrepresents the original meaning of beholding,
by substituting an atomistic Wertfuhlen for a synoptic
££c»Y>c«.« A few passages in Plato's dialogues throw light
on this matter:
A relevant passage is found in the Phaedo. About
Brightman's letter of September 21, 1940.
L ^ 1 Hartmann, Ethik
, 108-109; The fact that on
Hartmann's view our sensing of value is a Platonic be-
holding is mentioned by M. G. Walker (Walker, Art. 1, 39;
See pages 35-40 of this dissertation).
148 Hartmann, Ethik
,
109.

120
the philosopher Plato states that his soul must gain peace
from emotions, must follow reason, and abide always in it,
beholding (trtto/^W)) that which is true and divine and not a
matter of opinion, and making that its only food. 1^ Here
Plato's interest in truth is not emotional but It is in
keeping with reason, which is "the one principle of coher-
ence, synopsis, or totality." 1^
Another relevant passage is found in the Republic .
Referring to a soul that is ever to seek integrity and
wholeness in all things human and divine, Plato says that
it is habituated to the beholding (&£<*y>i<>0 of all time and
all existence. Since this soul is always devoted to
seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine,
such a soul is identical with a synoptic thinker, and it
follows from the very nature of this soul that this beholding
is not atomistic or merely intuitive, as is Indicated by
Hartmann's Wertfuhlen
.
but synoptic and comprehensive, thus
indicating reason,
A third passage is found in the Republic . Here
Plato attributes to dialectic the power to behold the
intelligible {vor)T0V) which is distinguished from reality
149 Plato, Phaedo, 84 B.
150 Brightman, POR, 184.
151 Plato, Republic
, 486 A.

(ovto?). 1 52 pia -t,o means by the vor^xov the realm of
ideas'1"^ and a dear understanding of the meaning of dia-
lectic will serve to illuminate what Plato means by this
passage. He says in the Fhaedrus-*-^ that dialectic is
philosophy in the wide sense in which that word means the
capacity for seeing the real affinities in things, and so
grouping them in well-defined genera; and detecting the
differences which mark off different species within the
genus. Again in the Phllebus1^ Plato speaks of dialectic,
the business of which it is to study the absolutely real
and the eternal. In the Republic , ^-56 the dialectic method
is described as a kind of induction ((TWa^fco^Y) ) whereby
the mind ascends from the many particulars to the one uni-
versal concept or idea: a comprehensive view (crvvo^ i T) of
the whole is what marks the synoptic dialectician (o ift/vo'TtTiKflS
1 52 Ibid., 511 c.
^"-^ Hartmann uses the expression Kotos' voryros for
his realm of values (Wertrelch ) (Ethik , 140).
1S4 Phaedrus
.
265 c - 266 a.
155 Phllebus
. 57 d.
156 Republic
. 537 B ff.; Brightman defines dialectic
as the mind s search for completeness and coherence (TOR,
528).
157 This means: The synoptic man is dialectical;
Alexander refers to the fact that Plato regards the meta-
physician as a synoptical man (STD, vol.i, 4).
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This consideration of Plato's ideas of beholding and
of dialectic reveals to us the fact that Hartmann misrepre-
sents Plato's thought when he substitutes Wertfuhlen for
dialectic. Plato's thought that the Ideas can be seen only
by reason was misinterpreted by Hartmann to mean that only
Wertfuhlen or 1 'ordre du coeur1 58 or 1 'organe morale1^ can
behold the values.
It has been pointed out1 ^0 that on Hartmann' s view
the realm of values, which is supposedly modelled after
Plato's realm of ideas, enjoys its objectivity in an
isolated way and its relation to the rest of the world,
where there is only rigid mechanism, creates a difficult
problem for synoptic thought. According to Calhoun, Plato's
ideas do not create such difficulty:
9 ^
/
Calhoun holds that Platonic ideas or forms ( l^C-**^,
€
^ 0 ) are the factors in a thing which make this thing
what it describably is, and are the ground for specifying
its relationships with other things. An idea, then, is not
a thing, but a stable character, the presence of which
justifies the attribution to the thing in which it is
260) .
158 Pascal's phrase quoted by Hartmann (Ethik, 260).
1^ Hemsterhuis's phrase quoted by Hartmann ( Ethik ,
160 Pages 117^118 of this dissertation.
161 Hartmann, Ethik
.
108-109.
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present of just that single character itself. D It is a
noumenon in the proper sense, an essential character compr-
hensible not by the senses but only by rational mind and
thought (vo\/S
J
voy)<rc<; ) . lo^
Concerning the relations of Platonic ideas to things,
Calhoun holds that if we could read Plato's statements "in
their original contexts without preconception," we should
get the "impression of clear logical differentiation and
close ontological association between ideas and things."
Calhoun thus rejects Aristotle's interpretation of Plato,
which sees not only "a logical distinction" but "an onto-
164logical disjunction" of ideas from things, such that the
165ideas are a second order of things existing separately,
the relation of which to sensible things would pose in-
162 Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 222.
165 Ibid
., 223.
Messer's view that Plato's ideas are "wahrhaft
wirkliche Wesenheiten, " points to the same ontological
disjunction (Messer, WdG, 13). However, Brightman holds
with Calhoun that at least the Platonic Ideas are eternal
subsistents. Brightman says: "Plato never made up his
mind about the metaphysical status of the Forms; they seem
in Phaedrus 247 to be noumenal reality ( oxrcia. ) ; so in the
myth of the cave ( Republic , 514- ff.); and in Tlmaeus (e.g.
38, and esp. 27 D— to 'ov kei ); yet the Parmenldes and
Epistles are a testimony to Plato's self-criticism." (A
note of January 15, 1941).
^ J Aristotle, Met., 1078b.30-1079a.4; 990a. 33-
991b.
9
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tractable problems for reason.
Calhoun goes on to maintain that for Plato there are
not two separate realms, one of intelligible or noumenal
things, the other of perceptible or phenomenal things,
standing over against each other in reciprocal isolation.
Ideas and things are present together in one world, in which
each is logically distinguished from the other; in which
there are systematic inter-relations among things; and in
which more ultimate factors than either things or ideas
are discoverable by systematic analysis.
As to Plato's cosmology Calhoun accepts the lines
of interpretation which are opened up in the Politicu s,
Phaedo , and Phllebus , and followed without essential change
in the Tlmaeus and the Laws . G-ood is the end in the light
of which all things are as far as possible to be understood,
but which can itself only be appreciated, not analytically
defined. Order, largely geometrical and numerical, is
166 Calhoun in Macintosh, RR, 226.
167 Ibid
. , 231.
Defining the G-ood Hartmann says: "Das Gute 1st
lnhaltlich umfassend und setzt die ganze Werttafel voraus,
nicht nur in ihren Materien, sondern auch in deren gegen-
seitigen Wertverhaltnissen. Es setzt also auch die G-esetz-
lichkeit der Werttafel voraus." ( Ethik , 496); however, since
some values are Invisible to his Wertgefuhl ( Ethik , 496),
the complete view of the Good is Impossible. Thus for him
the G-ood cannot be experienced, though it can be defined.
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16Q
the formal condition basic to the realization of good. 7
Mind is the agent by whose activity order is comprehended
and effected, the good being thereby progressively achieved.
The G-od (o fl-£0S ) of the Timaeusl?0 is good and desires that,
171
as far as possible, all things shall be good. Calhoun
concludes that Plato's is a thorough-going teleological
theory!? 2 which, whatever its degree of validity, is at
least straightforward and coherent. Compared with this
Platonic theory, Hartmann' s world-view, with its Wertgefuhl ,
its confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values
enjoying its objectivity in isolation and its rejection of
the concept of G-od as a Principle of Unification, 1^ reveals
169 Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 238.
170 Timaeus
,
30a. 2-3.
171 Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 238.
172 Calhoun points out that in Plato's later dia-
logues there is a growing emphasis of the alogical factors
without reference to which the actual world cannot readily
be described (Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 239).
173 Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 239; Brightman
holds that "Plato's ultimate metaphysics remains unsatis-
factory and disunlfied, because both the principles of
reason and the disorderly infinite seem to be external to
God," Brightman goes on to maintain that "Plato preserves
the goodness of God at the cost of metaphysical coherence."
"Plato seems to have believed that axiological coherence
was more important than cosmologlcal coherence." (Brightman,
POR, 288).
174 See pages 141-175 of this dissertation.
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internal inconsistency.
h. Another difficulty with Hartmann's theory of value
is that, though he takes seriously the objectivity of value,
he does not take its subjectivity seriously--the empirical
fact that valuing is a conscious experience, that "value is
dependent on personality ."^75
As Hessen points out, for Hartmann values are ob-
jective self-existent essences which do not require any
subjective correlate:
Fur ihn sind die Werte, wie wir bereits wissen, objektive,
an sich seiende Wesenheiten, die keinerlei subjektives
Korrelat erfordern. 176
Hessen is right in holding that it is intolerable to
detach values from their living connection with the value-
feeling personality and to make them fixed essences:
Es geht in der Tat nicht an, wie wir schon tifter betont
haben, die Werte aus dem lebendigen Zusammenhang mit
dem wertfuhlenden (jeist zu losen und zu starren Wesen-
heiten zu machen. 1 '
'
Such a fixed essence is really, as Hessen says, an
inadmissible hypostasization ("eine unzulassige Hypostasler-
ung"). 178 Hessen is right when he maintains that if we
^ Brightman, ITP, 163.
Hessen, Wertphllo sophie
,
24-3.
177 Ibid
. ,
243.
178 Ibid
., 31.
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eliminate from the concept of value its relation to a
value-experiencing personality we are sure to destroy it as
value; and we may add that there is left from the destruc-
tion, at best, only the truth that value ought to be- -but
is not.
Die Bezlehung auf einen werterlebenden G-eist kann
man aus dem Wertbegriff nicht eliminleren, ohne ihn
zu zersto'ren. 179
Hence, for anyone who wants to think coherently,
the subjectivity of value, its dependence on consciousness, w
must be reconciled with its objectivity or the fact that "I
face a world in which value is a reality beyond myself."
T^ere is only one way to reconcile them, to suppose that
"the true values are experiences of a mind beyond all human
individuals and societies." 1^2 And it follows that the true
179 ibid., 32; Matthews says that no value of any
kind can exist apart from personal experience (Matthews,
CjCTE, 161); Perry says that values are not absolute in the
sense of being indeoendent of all consciousness (Perry, PPT,
335).
This is recognized by Perry when he defines
value as any object of any interest (G-TV, 115-145), or as a
function of interest (G-TV, 693); See also Perry, PPT, 335.
181 Brightman, ITP, 163.
182 Ibid
. ; In his POR Brightman holds that logical
thought about value experience points to the conception of
a Supreme Person, who guides the universe by its ideals,
and in whom supreme good is acknowledged and actualized.
He calls this "the dialectic of desire." (POR, 251-259).
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ideals are the norms or purposes of that mlnd. 18^
i. Hartmann's discussion of the laws of the Werttafel1^4-
starts from his presupposition that the scale of moral
values from das Gute and das Edle up to Schenkende Tugend
and Fersonllche Llebe18 ^ j_ s a valid scale. He intuitively
arranges these values in ascending order of intrinsic im-
portance and then attempts to discover objectively—through
the methods of intuition ( Wertgefuhl ) , of analysis (Wert -
analyse ) and of synopsis ( Uberschau )—the laws which govern
them. What is incoherent is not so much his attempt to
discover such laws as his intuitive presupposition that such
a scale of moral values really exists.
His belief in the scale of values is supported by his
incoherent intuition that each value has its eternally fixed
place assigned for it in the scale. He maintains:
Die elnzelnen Werte lassen sich aus ihrem bestimmten Ort
im Wertraum auf keine Weise herausl5sen; wie sich die
vertikal (in der RanghBhe) geschiedenen Werte nicht
kunstlich zusammenbringen lassen—es sei denn in ab-
stracto, wobei sie aber ihren spezlfischen Wertcharakter
elnbussen--so auch die horizontal geschiedenen.
Das lebendige Wertgefuhl an die materialen und ax-
iologlsch-qualltativen Unterschiede fest gebunden bleibt.
? Pages 116-117 of this dissertation.
Hartmann, Ethlk
, 495-564.
18 5 Ibid
. ,
336-495.
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Das Wertgefuhl 1st die allelnige erkennende Instanz,
welche die Projektion auf der HBhenskala ablesen
kttnnte. . . .186
Aufzwingen lassen sich die Werte kein G-esetz.187
This theory of his makes it necessary to examine the
validity of the idea of a scale of values.
W. R. Sorley in his Moral Values and the Idea of G-od
regards it as impossible to discover the relative importance
of intrinsic values. When intellectual values are under
consideration, he says, we cannot prefer mathematics to
biology, economics to metaphysics, or the reverse. Or, in
morality, we cannot distinguish kinds of goodness and
arrange them in the order of their value, Reid and Martlneau
to the contrary notwithstanding. Hence Sorley believes that
if we are to compare values at all we must give up the idea
of a scale for that of a system. We shall never get what
we want by adding and subtracting quantities. Morover,
intrinsic value is relative to the situation in which it is
realized}^ For example, there is no value in playing base-
ball if we play it at a church service, or in rehearsing
Hamlet if we want to solve a mathematical problem at the
same time.
1Q6 Ibid
. , 497.
187 Ibid
., 499.
188±DO Sorley, MVIG, 50-52.
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Sorley goes on to maintain that there are many
dominant conceptions of value which appeal to the judgments
of different men. A complete theory of value should be
able to determine the relative validity of these con-
ceptions; and this would involve two things. In the first
place it would be necessary to make clear the universal
conditions of value which are valid irrespective of the
time, place and circumstances of the persons in and by whom
value is to be realized. In the second place, these gen-
eral principles should be shown to be consistent with, and
to make possible, different types of value corresponding
to differences of endowment and opportunity. And yet,
behind their difference of thought and of achievement, there
may be an identity of principle. To determine the way in
which different ideals are related to one another in a
community of lives that seek the highest value is the
crowning work of an ethical theory. Yet, short of this,
we cannot give a satisfactory solution of the problem of
the scale of values. Thus Sorley concludes that the
problem of the scale of values must be resolved into that
of the organic unity or systematic whole into which all
values enter, and by their relation to which the place and
degree of all partial values are determined. 1^
189 Ibid
.. 52-53.
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It has been suggested by a reader of Sorley that the
ground for the grouping of values into higher and lower is
found only in the extent of the contribution made by each
190
value to the coherent whole of life. Then that value is,
in any given situation, the highest which contributes most
to the coherent functioning and organization of experience
191
as a whole. Thus in some situations one value will be
highest, in others, another. For example, when a person is
hungry a good meal is more valuable to him than a lovely
poem, but when the meal is over, a walk in the open air may
perhaps be the highest value to him.
Brlghtman holds that each intrinsic value has a dual
character; it has a unique quality of its own to contribute
to the total value experience andyet each tends to coalesce
with the others. 1^2 There is ultimately only one intrinsic
value, namely, the systematic whole of value experience.
For example, we know that social values coalesce with the
others, for "unless we have play, or work, or knowledge, or
beauty, or religion, there is nothing to share." And
religion would be worthless "if it could not include either
190 Brightman, ITP, 146.
191 Ibid., 144.
192 Everett holds that all intrinsic values inter-
penetrate (Everett, MV, 183).
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goodness or truth or beauty in either the worshiper or his
He goes on to maintain that in the coalescence of
the system, the values are "more like whirlpools or eddies
than like fish swimming in the sea." They are "centers of
organization" rather than "separate and distinct entities,
each more or less valuable than the other." Hence, in
estimating the importance of a value Brightman, like Sorley,
gives up the idea of a scale for that of a system. Within
the system, degrees of value would be measured by "the
extent to which the particular value in question mirrors
or expresses the nature of the whole system of value. "194
This consideration makes it clear that Hartmann's
belief in a scale of values, in which each value is a sepa-
rate and distinct entity (each more or less valuable than
the other), is not a reasonable belief. Hartmann errs in
trying to substitute intuition of concrete values for law
or system as the basic ethical principle. Though he
attempts to systematize those values by means of a synoptic
survey!95 what was missed in the initial act of intuition
is lost sight of entirely. For example, religious values,
193 Brightman, POR, 100-101.
194 Ibid
., 101-102.
195 Hartmann, Ethlk
, 38,144,245,267.
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196
which can enrich the content of our morality, are lost
1 97from his system forever, y
Thus his ethics, when compared with Brlghtman's
system of Moral Laws, does not allow scope for "growth and
movement of life toward higher and deeper levels of in-
sight"; while the Moral Laws are "principles of rational
development," not "rigid prescriptions of specific acts
which are supposed to be eternally right,
"
19
nor, like
Hartmann' s, descriptions of concrete values grasped only
through intuition.
After this general criticism of Hartmann's scale of
values let us move on to examine specifically his view of
the laws of the Werttafel .
j. In considering the Schlchtungsverhaltnis Hartmann
Investigates the relationship between one value ( the well-
being of one's neighbor) and another (a situational value).199
In this consideration his analytical genius shows
its remarkable accuracy. And yet his thought remains
abstract and to that extent incoherent in the sense that in
it he does not consider any other value or any other fact
196 Brlghtman, ML, 269.
197 See pages 141-175 of this dissertation.
198 Brightman, ML, 94.
199 Hartmann, Sthik
, 508-509.
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of experience. What Hegel calls "the seriousness, the pain,
the patience and labor of the negative" ("der Ernst, der
Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen"
)
200
ought to
enlighten us here. By this he means that if we desire to
know the truth of anything we must not only study that
thing itself but also its relation to all the rest of
reality. Hegel admits that such a coherent investigation
is not easy. On the contrary, that requires pain, patience,
and labor. Nevertheless, it must be taken seriously because
the true is the whole ("Das Wahre ist das Ganze"). 201
This Hegelian wisdom, when applied to our problem,
means that in the investigation of the relation between A
and B, what is not A and what is not B must also be taken
into account and studied analytically, synoptically , and
thus in a systematically coherent way.
The same abstract procedure vitiates Hartmann's
Fundlerungsverhaltnis
.
202 though here again his analysis is
equally precise and keen
k. In the Gegensatzverhaltnls and the Wertsynthese
.
203
200 Hegel, PG, 20; Baillie, PM, 81 gives an English
translation.
201
Hegel, PG, 21; Baillie, PM, 81.
202 Hartmann, Ethik, 506-511.
203 Ibid., 512-532.

135
his consideration is more adequate. He starts from the
three different kinds of G-egensat zv erhal tn i
s
—Value-Disvalue,
Value-Value, Disvalue-Disvalue^OA
—
an<i attempts to see the
interrelations among them. He then realizes that only in a
synthesis can the valuational contrasts find their fulfil-
ment. 20^ Then he realizes that when syntheses do not exist
between single values they are not to be sought for within
the valuational structure of these values but outside of
it, in its relation to other valuational materials.
The dialectic of thought does not let him rest here
but rather does it urge him to move on to the highest and
all-embracing synthesis, in which the essence of the good
may be fulfilled and have a unified meaning. 20^ Here he is
adopting the principle of coherence for the time being.
1. In the Komplementarverhaltnis he considers the
relationship between values which require each other. Here
too, Hartmann discovers, only synthesis brings the single
values to fulfilment, though they stand in no antithetical
relation (such as in the relationship between activity
and. strength, strength and freedom). 20^ in the domain of
204 Ibid., 513.
205 Ibid
.. 518.
206 Ibid
.. 521.
207 Ibid
., 527.
208 Ibid
., 527.
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the moral values, the synthesis, which he requires, is
inter-personal (forming one Werttrager out of two Wert -
trager). 20^ Here again he is thinking coherently,
m. His supreme aim in the theoretical construction
of his ethics is to discover the Werthohe of each and every
value in the total scale of values. All the other relations
are intended to throw light on this. His consideration of
the Werthohe and the Wertstarke is based on his intuitive
presupposition that the Wertreich may be ordered by a fixed
scale. The incoherences contained in such a fixed scale
211
of values have already been pointed out.
His consideration of the Werthohe and Wert starke
Is also based on his cate^orial laws 212 which are as
follows:
A. Die Schichtungsgesetze
1. Die niederen Prinzipien oder deren Slemente kehren
in den hoheren als Teilmomente wieder; sie kttnnen dabei
in den Vordergrund Oder Hintergrund der hoheren G-ebilde
rucken und dement sprechend in ihnen sichtbar werden oder
verschwinden. In beiden Fallen bleiben sie durchgehende
Strukturelemente.
2. Diese Elemente bleiben in ihrer Wiederkehr von
der Struktur der hBheren Gebilde nicht unberuhrt. Sie
wandeln slch mannigfaltig ab, je nach der Rolls, die
209
Ibid
., 336-492.
Ibid
. . 540.
210
211
Pages 128-133 of this dissertation.
In his note of September 21, 1940, Brightman
has expressed agreement with my statement that Hartmann is
the only thinker who has ever contemplated categorial laws.
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ihnen in der hoheren Komplexion zufallt. Identisch
erhS.lt sich an ihnen nur ein elementarer G-rundsinn.
3. Die httheren G-ebilde gehen in der Mannigfalt igkeit
der in ihnen wiederkehrenden Elemente nicht auf. Sle
zeigen Jedesmal neben der Elementarschichtung— schon
allein in der Struktur der Komplexion—ein spezlfisches
Novum, das in den Elementen nicht enthalten ist. Dieses
Jedesmalige Novum ist es, was das Hervor- und Zuruck-
treten der Elemente, sowie die Abwandlung ihres Sinnes
bestimmt.
4. Die uberlagerung der niederen Prinzipien durch
htthere schreitet nicht in schllchter Kontinuitat fort,
sondern in Schichten, die gegenelnander durch deutliche
Schichtendistanzen abgehoben sind. Jede htthere Schicht
zeigt den niederen Schichten gegentlber wiederum ein
gemeinsames Novum, wahrend die Verbindung mit jenen durch
die Wiederkehr der sich abwandelnden Elemente hergestellt
wird.
5. 3-esetz der Starke: die httheren Prinzipien sind
von den niederen abhangig, nicht aber umgekehrt. Das
htthere Prinzip also ist allemal das bedingtere, ab-
hangigere und in diesem Sinne schwachere. Das
unbedingtere, elementarere und in diesem Sinne starkere
Prinzip aber ist allemal das niedere. Die Inversion
dieses Verhaltnisses ist wohl in abstracto denkbar,
niemals aber am Wesen der Prinzipien aufzelgbar.
6. G-esetz der Materie: Jedes niedere Prinzip ist fur
das htthere, das sich uber ihm erhebt, nur Materie, Da
nun das niedere Prinzip das starkere ist, so geht die
Abhangigkeit des schwacheren vom starkeren Prinzip nur
so weit, als der Spielraum seiner hdheren Formung durch
Bestimrnthelt und Eigenart der Materie begrenzt ist.
7. G-esetz der Freiheit: Jedes h8here Prinzip ist dem
niederen gegenuber durchaus neue Formung, die sich uber
ihm erhebt. Als solche hat es oberhalb der niederen
(materialen und starkeren) Bestimmtheit unbegrenzten
Spielraum. Das heisst, ungeachtet seiner Abhangigkeit
vom niederen Prinzip ist das htthere ihm gegenuber frei. 21^
As to these categorial laws the following inco-
herencies will be found
:
21^
21 3 Hartmann, Ethik, 502-504; 544.
21^ This reasoning follows out Brightman's sug-
gestions given in a note of August 13, 1940.
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In the first law Hartmann states that the lower
principles may enter into the foreground or the backgound
of the higher principles, and accordingly be visible in
them ("in lhnen slchtbar werden" ) or vanish ( verschwlnden )
.
It would have been wise for Hartmann to think of the lower
as aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense, —died and risen again
(transmuted). This first law is really dialectic; the
lower is aufgehoben in the higher.
According to the second law, he claims that when
the lower principles recur in the higher, the former do
not remain intact ( unberuhrt ) . Only an elemental essence
("ein elementarer G-rundsinn") remains the same.
This is very abstractly stated. Here is nothing of
bodily values in (say) logical values. If so, it is very
greatly aufgehoben , --both beHihrt and verschwunden .
The third categorial law states that the higher
forms manifest something new and this novelty determines
( best lmmt ) the prominence ( Hervortret en ) or seclusion
( Zurucktreten ) of the lower elements recurring in the
higher, as well as the transformation (Abwandlung ) of their
significance.
Nov; the fact that the novelty of the higher forms
determines the lower elements in this way is not consistent
with the fifth categorial law which states that higher
principles are dependent upon the lower, but the converse
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is not true. This fifth categorial law really breaks the
backbone of morality. The only sense in which this is
really true is that violence can destroy the life of per-
sons, and so in a sense the physical is stronger than the
higher values.
This same categorial law, which states that higher
principles are dependent upon the lower, but the converse
is not true, flatly contradicts also the seventh law which
states that compared with the lower every higher principle
is a new formation which is raised upon it and as such it
has unlimited scope ( unbegrenzter Splelraum ) above the
lower fixity.
Hartmann's view that higher principles are dependent
upon the lower but that the converse is not true overlooks
the fact that all intrinsic values interpenetrate21^ anci
216
coalesce. As has been pointed out, values are not
arranged in a scale or series but they constitute a system,
so that each value includes all the others, higher as well
as lower. For example, recreation (play or drama) includes
some form of intellectual, religious, moral, aesthetic, as
well as lower (bodily) values. Hartmann needs to specify
21 5 See Everett, MV, 183.
216 Brlghtman, POR, 100-102.
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far more clearly the sense In which the higher is both
dependent and independent,
n. Hartmann's discussion on the Wertlndlfferenz is
based on the alleged power of Wertftefuhl , which can tell
217
exactly the height and strength of each value. Here he
appeals to atomism without regard to the claims of coherence.
However, here again he demonstrates his unusual ability as
an analytic thinker.
21? Hartmann, Ethlk
. 559.

CHAPTER III
EXAMINATION OF HARTMANN 1 S CRITIQUE OF THE
CONCEPT OF GOD AS A PRINCIPLE OF
COHERENCE AMONG VALUES
Metaphysically, morally, and theologically, Hartmann
finds it impossible to accept belief in God, In this
chapter we examine his reasons for atheism.
1. His Metaphysical Reasons
a, God's Timelessness Not Relevant to Moral Struggle
Hartmann holds that in the first stage of any tele-
ological process the subject overleaps ( sprlngt uber ) the
time process in the setting up of the end. The second
stage consists of the return determination ( die rucklaufige
Bestlmmung ) of the means by the end, beginning with the
means nearest to the end and so backward to the first means
which is close to the subject. The third stage contains
the actualization of the end wherein the relation of means
and end which wa3 reversed in the backward determination is
changed into a straightforward continuous relation of cause
and effect. 1
Hartmann, Ethik, 174-177.
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Now in the second stage, Hartmann maintains, the
teleological process goes against the temporal succession
( die zeltllche Sukzession ) • Only a form which is in itself
timeless ("ein an sich zeitloses G-ebilde") can move against
the temporal current. Thought, the content of consciousness
( der Bewusstselnslnhalt ) , can do this. Hence only human
consciousness can furnish the ontologlcal mode for the
anticipation needed in the finalistlc nexus and for the
reversal of temporal succession ("der ontologische Modulus
fur die im Finalnexus erforderte Antizipatlon und Umkehrung
der Sukzession"). In man we find the single point in the
world ("der einzige Punkt in der Welt"), where there is
really verifiable axiological determination ("wirklich
2
nachwelsbare axiologiche Determination").
Hartmann' s argument is too exclusively analytic; his
logic is too atomistic to be convincing. A theistic argu-
ment, which is valid, is based on a coherent synopsis (as
contrast with analysis) of all that we know of reality as
a whole. A theist maintains that there is a 3-od who is
rational and purposive solely because the facts of exper-
ience viewed coherently bespeak the existence of such a
God. Hartmann is against the testimony of reality when he
concludes that only human consciousness is purposive.
2 IMd . t 186-188.
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According to Brightman, for example, belief in God
is based on the following considerations:^
(1) The synoptic method is the right method of philo
sophical investigation; (2) Coherence is the criterion of
truth; (3) "Knowledge of purpose other than that of the
present idea of the human knower is possible";^" (4) Nature
can be "understood best as the energizing of the rational
purposive will of the Supreme Person" ;^ (5) "Universals
and values have meaning only as the reason and purpose of
conscious mind, finite and Infinite" ;^ (6) "Human persons
are genuinely real and are clues to the nature of the
universe" ;^ (7) Personalistic theism is "the philosophical
standpoint that does fullest justice by all the facts of
experience"; (8) "Mechanical laws in the universe" are
"incoherent if taken as a complete account of reality";^
(9) "The recognition of purpose as a fundamental principle
of explanation" is coherent with "the results reached by
5 Brightman, ITP.
k Ibid., 314.
5 I Pld
6 Ibid
.
7 *Ma .
8 Ibid .
9 Ibid.
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the investigation of the other problems of philosophy." 10
Hence Brightman concludes; "This world is a realm of
persons, human and divine, whose calling is to realize "both
individually and collectively the whole range of true
value ."
In The Finding of G-od Brightman points out that
revelation, reason, moral loylaty, and religious experience,
considered synopt ically , lead us to the idea of G-od who is
12patient, mysterious, good, and powerful.
Since personalism regards Nature as being all of the
same kind of stuff as consciousness, its theistic position
is not invalidated by Hartmann's argument that only man is
conscious and that he alone can furnish the ontological
mode for teleology. In fact, Hartmann's view is meta-
physically question-begging.
Hartmann's description of teleological process with
its three stages is not valid. As Brightman has stated in
correspondence,
He substitues a logical order for the actual order.
There is no way of knowing what "the means nearest to
10 Ibid
.
11 Ibid.
12 Brightman, FG, Chaps. I-IX.
Brightman' s letter of March 6, 1940.

145
the end" are until we have experimented and inquired.
In short, his second stage is a function and result of
the operations of his third stage.
Further, his phrase "ein an sich zeitloses G-ebilde"
is not philosophically sound. It is clearly Indicated by
the context that Hartmann means human consciousness by the
"Gebilde." But since human consciousness exists in time it
cannot be timeless. "Timeless subsistence is clear, but
„14timeless existence is absolutely unthinkable....
b. God Not Objective
Hartmann maintains that Max Scheler's thelstic argu-
ment is based on the law of a correlation between person
and world. According to this law, the world lacks the all-
embracingness and absoluteness( Einzlgkelt und Absoluthelt )
which Hartmann thinks it possesses. The limited personality
is confronted with the idea of the macrocosm, to which it
is related as the part to the whole. If correlativity
( Korrelatlvitat ) continues in force as a law, there must be
a corresponding personal counterpart for the macrocosm.
The idea of 3-od, the idea of an infinite and perfect
spiritual person ("die Idee einer unendlichen und voll-
kommenen Gelstesperson" ) , is the formulation of such a
14 Brightman, FG-, 132
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IS
correlate. •*
Concerning Scheler's law of correlatlvity, Hartmann
says that there Is no such essential law. It contradicts
the plain and evident meaning of all objectivity ( G-egenst&id-
-i £
lichkeit), theoretical as well as practical. Just as
little does the concreteness of the world depend upon the
concreteness of a personal counterpart. The world is all-
embracing, absolute, and exists independently. Conversely,
a personal being who was not a member of a concrete, real
world would be an abstraction.
^
7
Hartmann Is Justified in disbelieving Scheler's
theism which is exclusively based on the law of correlatlv-
ity. But this does not invalidate the theistic argument
of a thinker who maintains that "no special formulation
i 8
of any law is sacred," and that "man has no intellectual
right to any idea that he is unwilling to relate to the
rest of his thinking. ul9 The cogency of a synoptic argu-
ment for theism is not affected by the untenability of an
abstract incoherent law like the law of correlatlvity.
5 Hartmann, Ethlk
.
217.
6 Ibid
. , 217.
7 Ibid
. ,
217-218.
8 Brightman, ITP, 261.
9 Ibid .. 335.
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c. Illicit Universalization of Human Personality
Hartmann maintains that the basic error of the belief
in a personal God lies in the universalization of personal-
ity beyond its natural sphere of giveness and validity ("die
Verallgemeinerung der Personalitat uberhaupt—uber ihre
naturliche G-egebenheits- und G-eltungssphare hinaus" )?° Hart-
mann goes on to maintain that aspects of the world are
relative to persons, and even this is true only in so far
as the persons are members of a real world; but the one real
world itself is not on that account related to any person.
But all persons are ontologically relative to the world.
If out of this relation of dependence one makes a corre-
lation by a forced passage beyond bounds, one stands in the
conceptual construction of theism. What holds good for one
aspect of the world cannot be transferred to the world
itself ("Was fur den Weltaspekt gilt,..., ist offenbar nicht
ubertragbar auf die Welt selbst ,....") 21
Hartmann * s contention that what holds good for one
aspect of the world cannot be transferred to the world
itself seems to mean that nothing can be known about the
world, for all knowledge must start from special aspects.
^ Hartmann, Ethik, 218.
21 Ibid.
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However, the present moment of my personal con-
sciousness, or the datum self, is my only possible starting
point in philosophy. 22 The fact that I must start with
this is not the fault of any type of philosophy, but of the
universe. 23
I am an Individual monad which in some dim way mirrors
the universe; but the universe is only reflected in
me, it is not itself in me. 22*-
However, "I cannot maintain my own reason without
acknowledging the insufficiency of my present conscious-
ness. ,,25 Every datum self contains "signs of a larger self
to which it belongs"; the whole self, or person, is a total
conscious process which is aware of its identity and whole-
ness by means of its "backward-looking memories" and its
"forward-looking purposes," The unity of personality is
that of consciousness; personality Includes consciousness
26
only, and does not include any of its environment.
Again it is reason that drives consciousness beyond
Itself; for a complete view of a person cannot be a coher-
ent view unless it be assumed that there is some explanation
22 Brightman, PR, 28.
24 Ibid
. , 29.
25 Ibid ., 28.
26 Brightman, POR, 358.
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for the experiences of the person in realities that lie
beyond it. 2^ All its environing factors, biological,
physical, social, subconscious, logical and ideal, and
metaphysical, are hypothetical entities; they are not
actually present in the datum self but reason leads us to
28believe in them.
As has been mentioned before, a valid theistic
philosophy must be more comprehensive, synoptic and coherent
than the theistic argument which Hartmann here refers to;
the former is based, not on what holds good for one aspect
of the world, but on aspects which may coherently be viewed
as valid for the whole.
Hartmann holds that the world is not relative to any
person but is self-sufficient and independent:
Weltaspekte sind relatlv auf Personen, und auch das
nur sofern diese ihrerseits Glieder einer realen Welt
sind; die eine reale Welt selbst aber ist deswegen
nicht relativ auf eine Person. 9
This is exactly what personalistic idealism denies.
The synoptic view of our experience of reality indicates
that the world is not self-subsistent but is best explained
as the creation, or more exactly, the activity of God who
2? Brightman, PR, 27.
28 Brightman, POR, 359.
29 Hartmann, Ethik
, 218
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is immanent in the world. "G-od is the metaphysical cause
of every event in Nature •"•^
d. Corporate Personality is Illicit
Max Scheler believes that man is rooted in a
personal unit of a higher order ("die Verwurzelung in einer
personalen Einheit hBheren Ordnung" )31 and that such higher
orders always take on further potentialities—up to an
absolute and all-embracing corporate person ("bis zu einer
absoluten und allumfassenden G-esamtperson" ) , 3 2 thus cul-
minating in the idea of God.
Hartmann rightly points out that the conditioning
of the individual person and his acts by a narrower or
wider community does not imply the personal character of
the latter, just as little as the conditioning of individual
knowledge by the prevalent level of public opinion ("ein
jeweillges G-esamtniveau menschlicher Erkenntnis" ) 33 implies
that the latter is a conscious communal subject.
However, Hartmann is wrong when he lets an inad-
equate theory of God such as Scheler' s prevent him from
30 Brightman, ITP, 336.
31 Hartmann, Ethik, 219.
32 Ibid.
33 ibid. , 220.
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believing in theism at all, for all the facts of experience
viewed synoptically bespeak the presence of God in the
universe. J
e. Category of Subject Not Applicable to G-od
According to Hartmann, personality exists only on a
basis of subjectivity, just as subjectivity exists only on
a basis of organic life, and life only on a basis of the
whole subordinate uniformity of nature. This categorial
gradation ("diese kategoriale Stufenfolge" ) is not reversible
( umkehrbar ) .35 The higher can never be brought forth out of
the lower but the former is always conditioned by the latter.
The higher category is always the weaker, the more dependent
("eben allemal die schwachere, abhangigere" ) , 36 in spite of
its autonomy; the lower is the stronger in spite of Its
paucity of content and indef initeness of outline ("trotz
ihrer geringeren inhaltlichen Bestimmtheit und FUlle").^
For the higher form it is only material but it is necessary
material. Without it the higher remains an abstraction
("Ohne sie bleibt die htthere eine Abstraktion" )
.
58 Every
34- See pages 142-144 of this dissertation.
55 Hartmann, Ethik, 213.
36 Ibid .
37 ibid .
38 Ibid.
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inversion of this categorial law ("Jede Inversion dieses
kategorialen G-rundgesetzes" ) is a falsification of the
given coherence of phenomena ("eine Verfalschung des
gegebenen Zusammenhangs der Phanomene" )
.
Jy
Es gibt Subj ektivitat ohne Personalitat , aber nicht
Personalitat ohne Subjektivitat . Das Bewusstsein 1st
die kategoriale Basis, die Materie uber der sich die
hBhere Formung der Person erhebt. Also auch hier eln
SchichtungsverhEltnis mit deutlicher G-eltung der
kategorialen Abhanglgkeitsgesetze. Personalitat ist
die htthere. Bewusstsein die starkere und allgemeinere
Kategorie
Hartmann depends on this categorial law ( das
kategoriale G-rundgeset z ) as the criterion of truth. With
him this law rules our thought and intuition; only in
accordance with it can we hold anything before our minds,
41but never without it or in opposition to it.
Kategoriale G-esetze sind, soweit uberhaupt sie einsichtig
sind, evident. Vom Wesen Gottes aber wissen wir nichts.
Wir k8nnen es auch nur nach den kategorialen Verhalt-
nissen, die unser Denken und Anschauen beherrschen, uns
vor Augen halten, niemals aber ausser ihnen oder im
G-egensatz zu ihnen. ^2
Since Hartmann believes that there is no conscious-
ness except in human personality he concludes that there is
no G-od in the universe where there is no consciousness as
39 Ibid .
40 Ibid
., 619.
41
Ibid., 221.
42 Ibid.
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the basis of divine personality* Such personality would
be a free-floating personality without a categorial basis
( "freischwebende Personalltat ohne kategoriales Funda-
ment"). 43
Hartmann's categorial law, or any and every law in
philosophy, must be judged by its adequacy to interpret all
44
the facts there are in experience as a whole. The cate-
gorial law is untrue to the whole life of ideal purpose.
What Hitler has done in G-ermany indicates that purpose,
which is characteristic of personality, is not the weaker.
Hence Hartmann's polemic against theism, which is based on
the categorial law, loses its cogency.
Hartmann's view is an emergent evolution which sees
consciousness developing out of the unconscious, if his
categorial law is true. Brightman holds, however, that
everything real is eternally conscious, but development is
a process of change and growth in consciousness, human and
4sdivine. Hartmann treats subject as based on organic life.
But there is no reason why he should confine it to this.
If subject need to be based on something it must be based
43 Ibid., 220.
44 Brightman, ITP, 261.
^"5 This argument owes much to Brightman' s letter
of March 20, 1940.

154
on the total content of The Given which affords concrete-
ness. The divine subject eternally requires and eternally
controls The Given. Each being in the universe is con-
ditioned by the rest of the universe, but some personalities
argue that the rest of the universe (Including organism) is
46
all of the nature of consciousness.
Over against Hartmann f s categorial law, personalism
asserts:
Mechanism is always and everywhere subordinate to
rational purpose. The lower, the beginnings, the ele-
ments, find their explanation in the higher, the con-
summations, the wholes. 47
Then, not that the personality depends upon the uncon-
scious for its explanation, but that personality is the clue
to the nature of the universe. Hartmann's categorial law is
metaphysically question-begging.
f . An Absolute Entity Excludes Personality
Scheler argues that persons of a higher order are
personal carriers of moral values, that the higher values
( die hBheren Werte ) attach ( zukommen ) to the persons of
the higher order ("die Personen httheren Ordnung" ) , and that
the highest value ( der httchste Wert ) therefore attaches
46 ipia .
4-7 Brightman, ITP, 313.
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only to an infinite person, God. Scheler concludes that to
man only the lowest moral values ("die nledersten sittlichen
Werte") are attached.^
But Hartmann maintains that man alone is a moral
being. Collective entities ( G-esamtpersonen ) such as nation
( Volk ) , state ( Staat ) , humanity ( Menschhelt ) , and God ( Gott )
are not good ( gut ) or bad ( bflse ) , not honest ( ehrllch ) or
mean ( hint erhaltig ) t not loving ( llebevoll ) or hateful
( hasserfullt ) , in the same primal sense as is the individual
man. Conversely, tie universal, absolutely all-embracing
entity ("das universale, absolut allumfassende Wesen"), if
such exist, is so far removed from being the highest person
that it must be much rather the lowest order of person, the
absolute minimum as regards personality ("ein absolutes
Minimum an Personalitat
" )
.
^
Sittliches Wesen 1st eben weder Gott noch der Staat,
noch sonst etwas in der Welt, sondern einzig der primare
Trager der sittlichen Werte und Unwerte der Mensch.5Q
Hartmann is right in pointing out that nation, state,
or humanity is not a person. Such a collective entity
"cannot experience or think or infer."
^
1
But the validity
^° Hartmann, Ethlk, 225.
49
Ibid
., 225-226.
5° Ibid
. t 226.
51 Brightman, PR, 18.
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of personalism is not affected by it since such theism is
based on a coherent investigation of reality as a whole.
The idea of God to which Hartmann objects, namely,
that of the universal, absolutely all-embracing God corre-
sponds to the God of absolute Idealism, though the theistic
argument of the latter is more coherent than that of
Scheler. Brightman also is against such an idea of God for
the following reasons:
(i) "The point of view of the Absolute" cannot be
52the same as that of the finite mind;
(li) "My individual selfhood" cannot be understood
as being "truly merged in the absolute self without a
surrender of the privacy and immediacy that is the very
nature of what a self is";^
(iil) "Such an Absolute tends to destroy distinctions
between good and evil and make freedom impossible" ; 5^
(iv) If there is only one Self, the testimony of my
own self-experience that I am a distinct consciousness is
so false that it becomes impossible to use selfhood any
longer as a clue to reality. 55
52 Brightman, ITP, 244.
55 Ibid., 245.
J Syllabus for the Philosophy of Religion course
given by Professor E. S. Brightman, 40-41.
55 Ibid.
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157
a. Religious Determinism Violates Moral Freedom
In ethics, Hartmann holds, the will only stands over
against the law of nature on the one side and the moral law
on the other. Both allow scope ( Splelraum ) , because the
uniformity of nature determines only causally, while values
in themselves do not determine at all. In the religious
conception of the world the will has, besides all this, to
cope with the providence of God. Divine providence is a
teleologic, finallstic determinism. Its ultimate ends are
the determinants. And because their determining power is
infinite and almighty and permeates the entire world, over
against it man with his teleology is impotent.^
Und weil die bestlmmende Kraft in ihnen eine unendliche
und allmachtige 1st, die uberdies alles Weltgeschehen
durchdringt--auch die kleine seelische Welt des
Menschen--, so 1st der Llensch mlt seiner Teleologie ihr
gegenuber ohnmachtig. 57
In divine providence man thus finds no more scope
( Splelraum ) for his self-determination ( Selbstbestlmmuns )
*
According to Hartmann, this thorough-going finalistic
determinism ( "durchgehender Finaldeterminismus" ) is an
inversion of the basic categorial lav;: the higher form of
56 Hartmann, Ethik, 740-741.
57 Ibid
., 741.
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determination is made the stronger form, the finalist ic
nexus alone dominates. 58
According to Hartmann, divine teleology determines
every event in the world. But this is not an empirical
account of the way G-od works in the world, and this for the
following considerations:
All that a personal! st would say is that
There is positive reason for believing that there is
superhuman purpose in our world; and that there is
equally positive reason for believing that we do not
know all there is to know about that purpose. 59
The facts of experience never bespeak absolute
teleological determination nor do they prove to him that
everything in the world-process is clearly discernible to
him, but they merely show that our partial knowledge of
purpose implies larger purposes of which we are ignorant.
The kind of divine teleology which Hartmann mentions is a
fiction. Cosmic teleology proposed by Brightman0^ or by
f>~\Tennant is a reasonable interpretation of the facts of
experience in the world where there are mechanisms, pur-
poses, and free creative persons. The facts come first and
58 ibid
. 741.
59 Brlghtman, ITP, 297.
60 Brightman, ITP, and Brightman, FG-.
61 Tennant, PT, II, Chap. 4.
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then an interpretation follows, Hartmann's teleolo^ical
determinism can never be forthcoming as an interpretation
of the facts. Since such determinism excludes facts of
freedom and novelty in the world it is not coherent with
experience,
A consideration of time also denies such absolute
predetermination, A synoptic thinker does not believe in
"the notion of a completed infinity of time" for the exper-
ience of God; "Human freedom, and the reality of evolution
and of creation," would suggest that the divine time span
is somehow limited. Hence even God is not entitled to
absolute "foreordination" but for him there is "a future
with some possibilities open.""^ What realistic religion
finds in God is not some abstract omnipotence nor absolute
predetermination, but a steady, invincible purpose for
right in dealing with every situation. 64-
Hartmann compares causal determinism with teleolog-
ical determinism and maintains that the former is com-
patible with morality because both the law of nature and
moral law, which are at work in it, may allow scope to
62 Brightman, FG, 133.
63 Ibid., 135.
64 Ibid
. , 181.

160
moral freedom. ^5 Here Hartmann's description of causal
determination is nothing but an empirical account of the
world-process, in which a personalist may discern divine
purposiveness. A synoptic thinker may see in Natural Law
the very expression of an eternal rational purpose of
G-od, while he regards moral law as an expression of the
reason of God, which is eternal and uncreated. ^7
Hence the antinomy assumed to exist between causal
determinism and teleological determinism disappears when
we see in the former a glimpse of divine purpose and in
the latter a misrepresentation of divine providence.
That there is no antinomy between religion and
morality is indicated by Brlghtman when he writes about G-od
who is finite and yet the "Controller" of "The Given."
Belief in such a God is a moral necessity for freedom;
a religious necessity for redemption; a metaphysical
necessity for creation; and an ideal necessity, if
God's perfection be perfectibility .°8
b. Religion is Heteronomous As
Regards the Authority of Values
Hartmann holds that ethical values are autonomous;
they are of worth not for the sake of anything else but
65 Hartmann, Ethik, 741.
66 Brlghtman, ITP, 288-290.
6? Brlghtman, ML, 269.
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purely from their own nature and for their own sake ("rein
aus sich selbst heraus una um ihrer selbst willen").69 No
authority, no fiat of power ( Macht spruch ) nor any will
stands behind ethical values, for otherwise their evidence
( Elnleuchten ) would not be absolute.'''0
Against this religion sets up the antithesis: every
moral claim of the Ought is at bottom a commandment of G-od
and only on this account does man, towards whom the com-
mandment is directed, feel its content to be a real moral
value.
Denn Sittlichkeit besteht im Leben nach Gottes G-ebot.
Dadurch werden die sittlichen Werte unselbstandig,
heteronom. Sie slnd nun gerade durch gBttlichen Macht
-
spruch gegeben.71
This is Hartmann's view of religion. He sees thus,
between the authority of religion and that of moral values,
an antinomy which is insoluble because it is inherent in
the nature of G-od that nothing can be of value on any
other ground except that he wills it and commands it. So
if besides these there were values existing in themselves,
G-od must repudiate ( vernelnen ) them or first sanction
( sanktlonleren ) them by his will.?2
69
* Hartmann, Ethlk, 739.
70 iMd.
. 739.
71 Ibid
.. 739.
72 Ibid
. , 740.
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Hartmann Is convinced that it is inherent in the
essence of moral values that they have convincing power
ii .
( Uberzeugungskraf
t
) in themselves. And if God dictated
what did not harmonize with self-existent values, his
dictation could be carried out only as a commandment but
could never be sensed ( ftefuhlt ) as a value. 7^
As Hartmann describes the situation, the antinomy
between autonomy and theonomy is insoluble. Oman points out
that a religion, when it is purely formal, may have no con-
cern with morality; and a morality, when it is purely con-
ventional, may have no dependence upon religion. Oman is
right in holding that the interdependence of religion and
morality is not seen when religion is regarded as merely
creed, and morality as merely conduct, and also when the
sole relation of religion to morality is taken to be the pro-
viding of rules of conduct and motives for following them. 7^
However, there is really no insoluble antinomy be-
tween autonomy and theonomy, but rather there are important
relations between the two, and even a reconciliation of themJ^
73 Ibid
., 740.
74 Oman, NS, 387.
7
^ This argument is based on Brightman's discussion
on "Moral Law and Religion" in his ML (Brightman, ML, 264-
272); Lyman holds that prophetic religion is predominantly
ethical religion (Lyman, MTR, 77-99).
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In the first place, morality is more fundamental
than religion:
It is unreasonable to believe in the existence of a
good God unless experience offers evidence of goodness;
and the evidence of goodness is found largely in moral
conduct .76
In the second place, autonomy is logically prior to
theonomy
:
The moral laws are valid because they are a reasoned
account of the nature and implications of moral exper-
ience, not because they are commanded by an eternal law-
giver or communicated on a Mount Sinai. Moral law is
autonomous and independent of religion and of the
existence of G-od so far as the obligatory nature of its
principles is concerned.''
In the third place, there are two respects in which
morality is dependent on religion: (i) It is dependent on
religion for some of its content; 7^ (li) Autonomy is depend-
ent on theonomy in the sense that G-od created us as moral
79beings. ^ However, the moral law is not an arbitrary
creation of the will of God"but an expression of the eternal
uncreated reason of God, which may be discovered by auton-
76 Brightman, ML, 265.
77 Ibid
. ,
268-269.
78 Brightman holds that if the Law of the Most Inclu-
sive End be true and if religion be a real value, then "it is
a part of one's duty to worship God and in accordance with
the Law of Best Possible to achieve the highest type of
religion of which one is capable." (Brightman, ML, 269).
79
Brightman, ML, 269.

omous thought. 80
In the fourth place, autonomy and theonomy can be
reconciled through love:
The love of God Is consistent with autonomy because
it is recognized as embodying the highest values which
autonomy discovers in experience. °I
The realization of these relations between autonomy
and theonomy, and of the reconciliation of the two through
love, reveals the fact that Hartmann is in error in three
respects:
First, Hartmann holds that ethics demands that
82
nothing should stand behind moral values. However, if
they are an expression of the reason of God, the autonomy
of the moral life is not violated, because only through
autonomy may we discover that values are an expression of
the eternal, uncreated reason of G-od, and only autonomy
leads us to acknowledge these values as binding.
Second, Hartmann believes that God must necessarily
repudiate ( verneinen ) values existing in themselves ("an
sich bestehende Werte"), 8 -^ but the values are objective
84
only in the sense that they are norms in the mind of God.
80 ibid
. ,
269.
81 Ibid
. ,
271.
82 Hartmann, Ethlk , 739.
83 Ibid
. ,
7^0.
84 Brightman, ITP, Chapter 5.
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Third, the realization that values are norms in the
mind of G-od also takes away Hartmann 's fear that vi-od might
dictate what did not harmonize with self-existent values.
c. Forgiveness of Sin is Immoral
What Hartmann regards as the antinomy of salvation
85("die Antlnomie der ErlBsung") is as follows: Morally, thei
is no taking away of guilt ( Schuldabnahme ) »°° Religiously,
there is a Schuldabnahme since G-od might be able to do what
a man cannot do. Ethically, a S chuldabnahme is not a thing
which a man may will: it would be the disfranchisement and
degradation of man, the avowal of his unfreedom ("die
Entmundigung und Entwurdigung des Menschen, seine Unfrei-
heitserklarung" ) .87 Yet, religiously it is not only
possible but it is the most Important and valuable benefit
("das Wichtigste und Wertvollste"
)
88
which can accrue to
man. The conflict here is that between the preservation
and the surrender of freedom ( "Wahrung der Freiheit und
Preisgabe der Freiheit"), between the will to deliverance
from guilt and the will to protection against deliverance
85 Hartmann, Ethlk, 7^3.
86 Ibid
.. 745.
88
Ibid.
.
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from it ( "Erlttsungswillen und Eric1 sungsabwehr" ) , between
the will to bear responsibility and the will to escape it
89
( "Verantwortungswillen und Verantwortungswiderwillen" )
.
With each of these conceptions the thesis as well
as the antithesis is substantiated ( belegt ) by well-known
facts ( wohlbekannte Tatsachen ) , on the one side by the
phenomena of the ethical life, on the other by those of
the religious life ("durch Fhanomene des ethischen Lebens
einerseits, des religitisen Lebens andererselts" ) . Hartmann
9<
thus sees in this antinomy an insolubility (Unl8sbarkeit )
.
This antinomy, however, is not insoluble. Hartmann
does not refer us to the highest and the best in man's
religious life but to the antiethlcal nature of some
unhappy outgrowth of the religious life. As Bennett points
out, the concept of sin religiously defined is broader than
the concept of sin morally defined. With regard to the
former he writes as follows.
One is a broader definition which includes under the
concept of sin everything traceable to human action
and all human motives and dispositions which fall short
of the will of God. 91
Bennett goes on to point out that the moral definition of
89 Ibid .. 746.
90 ibid
.
91 Bennett, SS, 6.
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sin has only three conditions:
...Knowledge of the standard which is violated, reali-
zation that the action in its intention or results does
violate the standard, and capacity to obey the stan-
dard. 92
When Brightman maintains that morality depends on religion^
for some of its content he implies that a religious man
compared with an exclusively moral man must have knowledge
of a wider realm of value, which he ought to realize.
Thus, instead of securing the sense of the Schuld-
abnahme one's religion deepens his sense of sin. And the
desire to secure the Schuldabnahme formally is not in
keeping with a religious interpretation of life like that
of Brightman whose religion creates in him not an easy sense
94
of the forgiveness^ of sin but the realization of radical
change, real improvement, to be the purpose of life.
The sufferings of man and the ideal obligation to attain
the highest values are stern factors in life, rendered
more stern by the personalistic interpretation of suf-
fering and obligation as entailed by the divine pur-
pose. 95
92 ibid., 7 .
93 Brightman, ML, 269.
94y In a letter of May 9, 1940 Brightman defines
forgiveness as "loving approval of a man whose goodwill
evidences repentance.
95 Brightman, ITP, 364.

168
3. Theological Reasons
a. Otherworldliness is Immoral
According to the conception of religion which Hart-
mann has, our mundane sphere has no values whatever of its
own: To seek the values of this world for their own sake
is bad; within this world only that is good which tends
beyond it ("Gut 1st innerhalb dieser Welt nur, was tiber sie
heraustendiert" ) .96
Moral striving, Hartmann says, regards everything
which transcends this life as a waste of moral energy and a
diversion of it away from true values and their actuali-
zation ("Vergeudung und Ablenkung sittlicher Kraft von den
wahren Werten und ihrer Verwirklichung" ) .97 Hence Hartmann
discerns a genuine antinomy between morality and religion.
However, if Hartmann has the right conception of
religion when he says that this world has no values what-
ever of its own ("das Diesseits habe uberhaupt keine
eigenen Werte" )
,
98 then it follows from this logically that
then man has no means of access to God.
96 Hartmann, Ethik, 738.
97 Ibid ,
98 ibid
., 737.
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As soon as we suppose man to be wholly worthless, so
soon we have denied religion entirely. It is chiefly
the good in man and in the world, from which we infer
God. 99
Hartmann maintains that for moral striving every-
thing which transcends this life is a deceitful phantom
("Fur slttllches Streben ist alle Transzendenz ein
trugender Schein" )
.
10° But if the moral life is genuinely
valuable and the value it strives to realize is truly
objective, as Hartmann maintains, 101 then man's moral ex-
perience and the whole realm of value point beyond this
world toward immortality.
If value be objectively real,..., then the voice of
duty is that of reality itself. Further, if personality
itself be the value on which all others depend, the
objectivity of value cannot be fully expressed (unless
it is fully realized in human personality). No human
personality must be annihilated if the full actual and
potential value of the universe is to be conserved.
The objectivity of value inferred from our moral life thus
points beyond this world toward a future life.
According to Hartmann, religion sets up an antinomy
between this world and the life to come. But the goodness
of G-od, inferred chiefly from the good in man and in this
99 Brightman, PR, 30.
100 Hartmann, Sthik, 738.
101 Ibid., Chaps. 14,15,16,17.
102 Brightman, ITP, 3^6.
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world, offers the most fundamental argument for man's
Immortality, "if there be a G-od, man's immortality is
certain; if not, immortality would not be worth having." 1^
Therefore, the antinomy which Hartmann sees between
the tendency towards this world and the tendency towards
the Beyond ( Diesselts - und Jenselt stendenz ) is not
genuine.
b. Divine Transcendence
Theology believes in a Person who is outside of the
world ( elne ausserweltllche Person) , maintains Hartmann.
And to this ausserweltllche Person the world as a whole is
a correlated thing ( Sachkorrelat ) . Hartmann argues that
the existence of such a Person is beyond human judgment
("jedem menschlichen Erraessen entzogen"). The only kind
of person we know exists in the world and lives, wills, and
acts within the real world.
Hartmann' s polemic against the ausserweltllche
Person may apply to deism, which stresses the pure trans-
cendence of G-od and denies his immanence entirely, 10^ but
103 Ibid*
, 349.
104 Hartmann, Ethik
, 737.
10 5 Ibid
.. 216.
106 Sorley, MVIG-, 450 ff.
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not to personal ism, which, with its idealistic view of
matter, is the type of theism laying chief stress on the
107immanence of God.
c. Divine Teleology has Unknown Ends
Hartmann is convinced that teleology is the peculi-
arity of human nature. Whether it is found elsewhere in
the world, we do not know; for it is possible only in a
conscious entity capable of knowing and striving. But
whether, besides men, there are other beings with such a
capacity is a matter of purely speculative assumption
("Sache blosser spekulativer Mutmas sung" ). 108
It has already been mentioned that our faith in a
rational, purposive God is philosophically well-grounded.
We thus deny Hartmann' s agnostic atheism. However, we
must realize that after all has been said for the divine
purpose in the universe the fact remains that there is
mystery in the universe. We cannot know God with complete
certainty.
It is plain that the goodness of any God who is fit
to be worshiped—who is transcendent and eternal--is
incapable of complete proof. To know the goodness
107 Brlghtman, ITP, Chaps. X, 5 and 6 (pages 335-
339).
108 Hartmann, Ethik, 180.
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of G-od with complete certainty, one must know his whole
prsent and past and future. 109
All religion is an attempt to solve life's mystery..,.
There is reason to believe in God; but our vision of
him is dim. Both in what we see and in what we do not
see of the divine nature we acknowledge a mysterious
factor.HO
(Modern liberalism) is in need of a recognition of the
mystery of G-od; for over-simplification is its curse
at the prsent tlme.m
The clearest vision is most keenley aware of the
lnexhaustibe abysses of the divine nature.
H
2
Nevertheless, this justified allowance for an
element of mystery in the nature of G-od should not make us
forget that belief in G-od is not "blind trust" nor "wishful
thinking.
"
113 It is in accordance with "fact and reason" 11
that we believe in G-od.
d. Religion is Heteronomous as Regards Human Ends
The last antinomy which Hartmann sees between ethics
and religion is that ethics is always concerned finally
with man, while religious thought with G-od. "Der Sthik
109 Brightman, FG-, 178.
110 Ibid
.. 148-149.
111 Ibid
., 149.
112 ifria *. 151.
115 Ibid
. , 179.
114 Ibid.
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kommt es letzten Sndes immer auf den Menschen an, dem
religiBsen Denken auf Cjott." 11 ^ That anything whatever,
even though G-od himself, should take precedence of man,
would not be moral. Religiously, however, it is inherent
in the nature of God, that only he, and nothing outside of
him, can be the aim of all aims (das Ziel der Ziele ) and
that as compared with G-od everything, even man, is vain
( nlchtig )
.
117
Here is a form of religion which is open to this
criticism. For example, Kierkegaard holds that G-od is so
superior to everything human that man is regarded as
llfi
absolutely sinful and worthless in the sight of G-od.
Barthianism which asserts that our sin is what we are and
what we do^^ is "operation exclusively on the part of G-od."
On the contrary, "in Humanism there is operation only on
the part of man." 120 However, "personallsm states the
115 Hartmann, Sthik, 738.
117 IM£. , 739.
T -I Q
Cited and discussed by Brightman, ML, 268; See
also Leisegang, RP, 38-39.
119 Barth, KG (tr. Hair and Henderson), 53.
120 Brightman's statement made in his lectures in
philosophy of religion, first semester, 1937-1938, Boston
University School of Theology.
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relation of God and man in terms of purpose. ..121 Religion
is not "mere blessed contemplation of a perfect universe,"
nor is it "mere feverish, despairing activity." "What
religion offers is the high adventure of cooperation with
Religion is a devotion to personal values as expressing
the purpose of G-od; not to cotiperate with men for the
social realization of those values is at the same time
not to cooperate with G-od's purpose. Religion, when
conscious of its own aestiny, is best defined as co8p-
eration with G-od and man for the realization of indi-
vidual and of shared values. 123
This same thought is expressed by Galhoun in his
G-od and the Common Life . He holds that the way of G-od with
man includes communication, co-working, and transcendent
sovereignty. Men are creatures in the sense that for their
existence they are dependent upon powers beyond themselves,
also in the sense that their goodness when compared with
divine goodness must be infinites imally small. Yet men may
become sons of G-od and co-laborers with G-od: co-laborers
to share in the task of reconciliation which is healing,
whole-making; and sons of G-od to reflect in their faulty
lives something of the mercy of G-od. This is the meaning
of man's vocation: that he is called by God to be a
God. 1.122
121 Brightman, ITP, 339.
122 Brightman, RV, 219.
123 Brightman, FOR, 435.
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participant in a shared task. The call is not coercive,
and each man's response must be his own. But the initia-
124
tive is first and forever from God's side.
These considerations reveal the fact that the
antinomy which Hartmann assumes between ethics and religion
disappears. The universe is, then, a society of inter-
acting and free persons, endeavoring to discover, appreciate,
and create, ideal value.
4. The View of G-od which is Consistent with the
Moral Life and is Not Open to Justified
Criticism from Hartmann
a. G-od as a Principle of Coherence among values is
the most reasonable principle of explanation of what we
know of reality as a whole. His character, whether it is
goodness, rationality, or purposiveness, is inferred from
the facts of experience.
b. The fact that some views of G-od are abstract
and incoherent neither proves nor disproves the existence
of G-od in the universe.
c. Evidence, or lack of evidence, for God, which
we see in some one aspect of reality does not either prove
or disprove theism.
12li Calhoun, GCL, 240-242
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d. We acknowledge a mysterious factor in what we
see and in what we do not see of the divine nature.
e. God is not only transcendent to the world but
immanent in it.
f . God is not an absolutely all-embracing Being,
which Hartmann denies, but is finite.
g. Religion is not exclusively other-worldly: God
is inferred chiefly from the good in man and in this world,
while God's goodness indicates man's immortality; the
objectivity of value which we infer from experience also
points to man's immortality.
h. God desires that man should cooperate with Him
in the preservation and creation of ideal value.
i. Moral law is not an arbitrary creation of God
but an expression of his eternal, uncreated reason, which
may be discovered by autonomous thought: autonomy and
theonomy are reconciled through love.
j. God is not omnipotent: since he does not prede-
termine every event in the world he does not violate man's
moral freedom; but his purpose cannot ultimately be
frustrated.
k. God does not take away our guilt but broadens
and intensifies our concept of sin; God does not create in
us an easy sense of the forgiveness of sin but he stimu-
lates us to see more clearly our obligation as entailed by
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his purpose.

CONCLUSIONS
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1. In presenting the empirical basis for his positive
view Hartmann depends on Wertgefuhl alone; here W ertgefuhl
is his criterion of the truth of value judgments. In the
theoretical construction of his system he is partly an
advocate of coherence.
2. His grounds for objectivity of value stand on an
almost exclusively intuitive basis.
2. He confuses values and ideals: on his view value
is never experienced; and what it ideally defines never
appears in any actual experience of value.
4. His chief error is in supposing that value exper-
ience is merely a Wertgefuhl
,
merely a beholding of eternal
Ideals. Rather, value experience is the creation of actual
values which conform to the rule of the eternal ideal, yet
manifest freedom and variety within that rule.
5. He contemplates, not a system of values, but a
scale of values, which is an abstract, formal, and partial-
ly incoherent account of our value experience, yet, even
as scale, involving comparative intuitions that approach
coherence.
6. Incoherent theories of God, of our moral life,
and of the world prevent Hartmann from conceiving God as
a Principle of Coherence.
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7. His world-view, with its Wert^efuhl . its con-
fusion of Ideals and values, its realm of values enjoying
its objectivity in isolation, and its rejection of the
concept of G-od as a Principle of Unification, reveals
internal inconsistency.
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
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The problem of the dissertation is to investigate
the use of systematic coherence in Hartmann' s system of
ethics. The systematic coherence which concerns the present
writer not only excludes logical inconsistency but requires
two other attributes: first, consistency between ideas and
the facts of experience; secondly, systematic and purposive
connections in the facts and theories.
Such an investigation involves two major problems.
The first problem is that of the relations between Hart-
mann's ethical convictions based on atomistic intuition
(Wertgefuhl ) and those based on coherence, because there is
an apparent inconsistency between these two kinds of con-
victions. The second (and related) problem is that of
belief in God, a belief which Hartmann rejects on meta-
physical, moral, and theological grounds. The dissertation
aims to test whether or not Hartmann's reasons for atheism
rest on an appeal to coherence.
Hartmann holds that man's spiritual growth is
essentially an inner growth of his Wertgefuhl and that to
educate it is the greatest task of ethics. Wertgefuhl is
the only point of contact between man and the ideal realm
of values. Every moral rejection or acceptance rests upon
it. The presupposition of our commitment to any cause is
the Wertgefuhl of that toward which the commitment is
directed. For Hartmann Wertgefuhl is the empirical basis
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for his positive view.
He declares that the whole responsibility for the
legitimacy and objectivity of the Wertmassstab rests upon
Wertgefuhl because even the few features of the valuational
gradation which are known to us, can be grasped not by a
synoptic survey but by an immediate Wertgefuhl alone. This
assertion when used as a basis for ethical knowledge contra
diets his statement that one's Wertgefuhl is so limited
that it cannot always discern the synthesis of moral values
while every value reaches true fulfilment only in its
synthesis with all the others, and it also contradicts his
statement that synoptic thought, compared with Wertgefuhl
,
is more adequate in grasping the entire gradational ladder
of moral values, with which morality in the full and
genuine sense has to do.
Wertftefiihl
. Hartmann says, alms at a synthesis of
valuational antinomies. In another context, he says that
every value, when once it has gained power over a person,
tends to dominate his Wertgefuhl at the expense of all
others. By thus referring to two conflicting tendencies
in Wertgefuhl he implicitly demonstrates that it must be
guided by a criterion other than intuition Itself.
For Hartmann the grounds for the objectivity of
value are based on the following considerations: (1) Kant's
subjectivistic and functional! stic apriorism is a misunder-
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standing of the originally objective character of every-
thing knowable a priori. (2) Value is related to a subject
but is absolute in itself. (3) Not the material of value
(e.g., the idea of trust) but the valuational character
(e.g., the value of trust itself) is objective. (4) A
subject is purely receptive in intuiting values. (5) Value
offers the same absolute resistance to the will as the real
object of perception. (6) Wertt auschung is a proof for
objectivity of value. All these arguments are ultimately
based on his conviction that value is always known a priori
and what is know a priori is objectively valid.
For Hartmann, values are objective in the sense
that they are originally patterns of an ethically ideal
sphere which subsists beyond actuality just as much as con-
sciousness. He misrepresents the Platonic meaning of
beholding by substituting an atomistic Wertfiihlen for a
synoptic feo^HA. On his view the realm of values enjoys
its objectivity in an isolated way because in the rest of
the world there is only rigid mechanism, except for our
moral potentialities. His scale of values is abstractly
conceived and is incoherent with his total world-view.
Here he created many a mystery rather than explaining
reasonably our moral experiences in connection with the
rest of human experience. What makes his view even more
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inconsistent is the fact that he is aware of the meaning
and importance of coherence.
Hartmann's discussion of the laws of the Werttaf el
starts from his intuitive presupposition that the scale of
moral values from das G-ute and da s Edle up to Schenkende
Tugend and Personllche Llebe is a valid scale. He intui-
tively arranges these values in ascending order of intrinsic
importance and then attempts to discover objectively the
laws which govern them. Thus he discovers the following
laws: (l) Stratification and the foundational relation;
(2) oppositional relation and the synthesis of values;
(3) the complementary relationship; (4) the grade and the
strength of values; (5) valuational indifference.
Here Hartmann's intuition (especially in the second
and third laws) becomes substantially identical with
coherence.
Hartmann's reasons for atheism are examined. His
metaphysical reasons: (1) Hartmann holds that man alone is
conscious and can furnish the ontological mode for teleology.
However, the facts of experience may be taken coherently
to mean that Nature is the will of G-od in action. (2) Hart-
mann rejects theism because Scheler's theism is based on
the law of correlativity , which is an incoherent account of
the correlation between G-od and world. (3) The idea of G-od
which Hartmann rejects is the illicit universalization of
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human personality. However, emprical theology Is not
derived from such a universalization. (4) Hartmann holds
that the conditioning of the individual person by a unit of
a higher order does not mean the personal character of the
latter. However, not such conditioning hut an interpretation
of experience as a whole bespeaks a personal God. (5) Hart-
mann 1 s categorial law states that personality exists only on
a basis of subjectivity and that since there is no con-
sciousness except in human personality there Is no G-od as a
conscious personality. But such a law begs the question.
(6) The absolute person, whom Hartmann contemplates, is the
absolute minimum as regards personality. However, G-od may
not be absolute but finite. His moral reasons : (1) According
to Hartmann, divine teleology permeates the world, thus
violating human freedom. Such teleological determinism,
however, is not empirical, (2) The antinomy which Hartmann
sees between autonomy and theonomy can be reconciled through
love. (3) For Hartmann, the forgiveness of sin, which
religion inculcates, is immoral. Forgiveness, however,
intensifies the sense of sin. His theological reasons ;
(1) For Hartmann, religion is otherworldly and therefore
immoral. However, God is inferred chiefly from the good
in man and in the world, while God's goodness indicates
man's immortality. (2) Hartmann rejects a wholly trans-
cendent G-od because the only kind of person he knows exists
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In the world. However, G-od may be not only transcendent
to the world but immanent In it, (3) Hartmann holds that
teleology is the peculiarity of man; whether it is found
elsewhere, that is unknown. But fact and reason reveal a
cosmic teleology, (4) Hartmann sees an antinomy between
ethics and religion because he fails to see that religion
is a cooperation between G-od and man.
Conclusions: (1) In presenting the empirical basis
for his positive view Hartmann depends on Wertgefuhl alone;
in the theoretical construction of his system he is partly
an advocate of coherence. (2) His grounds for objectivity
of value stand on an almost exclusively intuitive basis.
(3) He confuses values and Ideals; on his view value is
never experienced; and what it Ideally defines never appears
in any actual experience of value. (4) His chief error is
in supposing that value experience is merely a Wertgefuhl
.
merely a beholding of eternal ideals. Rather, value exper-
ience is the creation of actual values which conform to the
rule of the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and variety
within that rule. (5) He contemplates, not a system of
values, but a scale of values, which is abstract, formal,
and partially incoherent account of our value experience,
yet, even as a scale, involving comparative Intuitions that
approach coherence. (6) Incoherent theories of G-od, of our
moral life, and of the world prevent Hartmann from con-
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ceiving, God as a Principle of Coherence. (7) His world-
view, with its doctrines of coherence and Wertftefuhl
.
its
confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values
enjoying objectivity in isolation, and its rejection of
the concept of G-od as a Principle of Unification, reveals
internal inconsistency.
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The problem of the dissertation is to investigate the use of systematic
coherence in Hartmann's system of ethics. The systematic coherence whicn
concerns the present writer not only excludes logical inconsistency but requires
two other attributes: first, consistency between ideas and the facts of experi-
ence; secondly, systematic and purposive connections in the facts and theories.
Such an investigation involves two major problems. The first problem is
that of the relations between Hartmann's ethical convictions based on atomistic
intuition (Wertge/uhl) and those based on coherence, because there is an
apparent inconsistency between these two kinds of convictions. The second
(and related) problem is that of belief in God, a belief which Hartmann
rejects on metaphysical, moral and theological grounds. The dissertation aims
to test whether or not Hartmann's reasons for atheism rest on an appeal to
coherence.
Hartmann holds that man's spiritual growth is essentially an inner
growth of his Wertge/iihl and that to educate it is the greatest task of ethics.
Wertge/uhl is the only point of contact between man and the ideal realm of
values. Every moral rejection or acceptance rests upon it. The presupposition
of our commitment to any cause is the Wertge/iihl of that toward which the
commitment is directed. For Hartmann Wertge/uhl is the empirical basis for
his positive view.
He declares that the whole responsibility for the legitimacy and objectivity
of the W ertmassstab rests upon Wertge/uhl because even the few features of
the valuational gradation which are known to us, can be grasped not by a
synoptic survey but by an immediate Wertge/uhl alone. This assertion when
used as a basis for ethical knowledge contradicts his statement that one's
Wertge/uhl is so limited that it cannot always discern the synthesis of moral
values, while every value reaches true fulfilment only in its synthesis with all
the others, and it also contradicts his statement that synoptic thought, com-
pared with Wertge/uhl, is more adequate in grasping the entire gradational
ladder of moral values, with which morality in the full and genuine sense has
to do.
'Wertgejuhl, Hartmann says, aims at a synthesis of valuational antinomies.
In another context, he says that every value, when once it has gained power
over a person, tends to dominate his Wertge/uhl at the expense of all others.
By thus referring to two conflicting tendencies in Wertge/uhl he implicitly
demonstrates that it must be guided by a criterion other than intuition itself.
For Hartmann the grounds for the objectivity of value are based on the
following considerations: (1) Kant's subjectivistic and functionalistic aprior-
ism is a misunderstanding of the originally objective character of everything
knowable a priori. (2) Value is related to a subject but is absolute in itself.
(3) Not the material of value (e.g., the idea of trust) but the valuational
character (e.g., the value of trust itself) is objective. (4) A subject is purely
receptive in intuiting values. (?) Value offers the same absolute resistance to
the will as the real object of perception. (6) Werttciuschung is a proof for
objectivity of value. All these arguments are ultimately based on his con-
viction that value is always known a priori and what is known a priori is
objectively valid.
For Hartmann, values are objective in the sense that they are originally
patterns of an ethically ideal sphere which subsists beyond actuality just as
much as consciousness. He misrepresents the Platonic meaning of beholding
by substituting an atomistic Wertfiihlen for a synoptic Theoria, On his view
the realm of values enjoys its objectivity in an isolated way because in the
rest of the world there is only rigid mechanism, except for our moral poten-
tialities. His scale of values is abstractly conceived and is incoherent with his
total world-view for the intrusion of value into mechanism violates the purity
of both value and mechanism. Here he creates mysteries rather than explain-
ing reasonably our moral experiences in connection with the rest of human
experience. What makes his view even more inconsistent is the fact that he is
aware of the meaning and importance of coherence.
Hartmann's discussion of the laws of the Wertta/el starts from his in-
tuitive presupposition that the scale of moral values from das Gute and
das Edle up to Schen\ende Tugend and Personliche Liebe is a valid scale. He
intuitively arranges these values in ascending order of intrinsic importance and
then attempts to discover objectively the laws which govern them. Thus he
discovers the following laws: (1) Stratification and the foundational relation;
(2) oppositional relation and the synthesis of values; (3) the complementary
relationship; (4) the grade and the strength of values; (5) valuational in-
difference.
Here Hartmann's intuition (especially in the second and third laws)
becomes substantially identical with coherence.
Hartmann's reasons for atheism are examined. His metaphysical reasons:
(1) Hartmann holds that man alone is conscious and can furnish the ontological
mode for teleology. However, the facts of experience may be taken coherently
to mean that Nature is the will of God in action. (2) Hartmann rejects
theism because Scheler's theism is based on the law of correlativity, which is
an incoherent account of the correlation between God and world. (3) The
idea of God which Hartmann rejects is the illicit universalization of human
personality. However, empirical theology is not derived from such a univer-
salization. (4) Hartmann holds that the conditioning of the individual person
by a unit of a higher order does not mean the personal character of the latter.
However, not such conditioning but an interpretation of experience as a whole
bespeaks a personal God. (5) Hartmann's categorial law states that person-
ality exists only on a basis of subjectivity and that since there is no conscious-
ness except in human personality there is no God as a conscious personality.
But such a law begs the question. (6) The absolute person, whom Hartmann
contemplates, is the absolute minimum as regards personality. However, God
is not absolute but finite. His moral reasons: (1) According to Hartmann,
divine teleology permeates the world, thus violating human freedom. Such
teleological determinism, however, is not empirical. (2) The antimony which
Hartmann sees between autonomy and theonomy can be reconciled through
love. (3) For Hartmann, the forgiveness of sin, which religion inculcates, is
immoral. Forgiveness, however, intensifies the sense of sin. His theological
reasons: (1) For Hartmann, religion is otherworldly and therefore immoral.
However, God is inferred chiefly from the good in man and in the world,
while God's goodness indicates man's immortality. (2) Hartmann rejects a
wholly transcendent God because the only kind of person he knows exists in
the world. However, God is not only transcendent to the world but im-
manent in it. (3) Hartmann holds that teleology is the peculiarity of man;
whether it is found elsewhere, that is unknown. But fact and reason reveal a
cosmic teleology. (4) Hartmann sees ah antinomy between ethics and religion
because he fails to see that religion is a cooperation between God and man.
Conclusions: (1) In presenting the empirical basis for his positive view
Hartmann depends on Wertgefuhl alone; in the theoretical construction of his
system he is partly an advocate of coherence. (2) His grounds for objectivity
of value stand on an almost exclusively intuitive basis. (3) He confuses values
and ideals; on his view value is never experienced; and what it ideally defines
never appears in any actual experience of value. (4) His chief error is in
supposing that value experience is merely a Wertge/uhl, merely a beholding
of eternal ideals. Rather, value experience is the creation of actual values
which conform to the rule of the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and
variety within that rule. (?) He contemplates, not a system of values, but a
scale of values, which is an abstract, formal, and partially incoherent account
of our value experience, yet, even as scale, involving comparative intuitions
that approach coherence. (6) Incoherent theories of God, of our moral life,
and of the world prevent Hartmann from conceiving God as a Principle of
Coherence. (7) His world-view, with its doctrines of coherence and Wert-
ge/uhl, its confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values enjoying its
objectivity in isolation, and its rejection of the concept of God as a Principle
of Unification, reveals internal inconsistency.
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